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International criminal law (“ICL”) is legally plural, not a single unified 
body of norms. As a whole, trials for international crimes involve a 
complex dance between international and domestic criminal law, the 
specificities of which vary markedly from one forum to the next. To date, 
many excellent scholars have suggested that the resulting doctrinal 
diversity in ICL should be tolerated and managed under the banner of 
Legal Pluralism. To our minds, these scholars omit a piece of the puzzle 
                                                
* This version of the article is longer than the shorter version we have published with the 
American Journal of Comparative Law. This longer version includes a fourth part 
focused on criminal law procedure. In this additional part, we set out the eclectic nature 
of Argentine criminal procedure as a null hypothesis, since it shows evidence of a 
congruence between criminal law doctrine and surrounding social values that acts as an 
exception to the trend we identify in our other examples. We then qualify this Argentine 
counterexample by discussing the history of employing divergent criminal procedure in 
post-WWI trials to show instances when ICL must adopt a unified standard for functional 
reasons. In this longer version, we also weave the insights from these two examples of 
criminal procedure throughout the remainder of the piece. 
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that has major implications for their theory – the law’s history. Neglecting 
the historical context of the international and national criminal laws that 
inform ICL leads to (a) the uncritical adoption of criminal law doctrine as 
a proxy for diverse social, cultural and political values; and (b) in the 
limited instances where criminal law doctrine does reflect underlying 
societal values, an overly general assumption that respecting the various 
embodiments of this law is best for ICL. These oversights result in 
important normative distortions, with major implications for the field’s 
self-image, function and legitimacy. In particular, scholars and courts 
overlook that much criminal law doctrine globally is the result of either a 
colonial imposition or an “unsuccessful” legal transplant, as well as 
historical examples where respecting pre-existing doctrinal arrangements 
undermined the value of postwar trials on any semi-defensible measure. In 
this Article, we revisit a cross-section of this missing history to contribute 
to both Legal Pluralism and ICL. For the former, we demonstrate that 
there is nothing inherently good about Legal Pluralism, and that in some 
instances, a shift from its descriptive origins into a more prescriptive form 
risks condoning illegitimate or dysfunctional law. For ICL, our 
historiography shows how partiality is embedded in the very substance of 
ICL doctrine, beyond just the politics of its enforcement. At one level, this 
realization opens up the possibility of renegotiating a universal ICL that, 
at least in certain circumstances, is actually more plural in terms of 
values and interests than doctrinal pluralism although the dangers of 
power masquerading as universalism are also profound. At another, it 
suggests that institutions capable of trying international crimes need to do 
far more to step away from the ugly legal histories they have inherited.  
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“[T]here is nothing inherently good, progressive, or emancipatory about 
legal pluralism.” 
 





International criminal law (“ICL”) is legally plural, not a single 
unified body of norms. Trials for international crimes, like aggression, 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, take place in 
international and domestic courts alike, and frequently involve a complex 
interplay between international and domestic criminal law. This interplay, 
which is largely improvised rather than choreographed, takes place on at 
least five levels: (1) within national courts, trials involving international 
crimes often employ their own local criminal law standards rather than the 
international law equivalent;2 (2) international courts sometimes follow a 
particular national system in interpreting ICL rules;3 (3) international 
courts often survey then synthesize a wide selection of national rules to 
demonstrate widespread support for their favored approach;4 (4) at times, 
                                                
1 BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW, 
GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION 89 (2002). 
2 Rb.’s-Gravenhage 23 december 2005, LJN: AX6406, Docket no. 09/751003-04 (Van 
Anraat), ¶¶ 6.5.1–6.6 (Neth.) (intriguingly, applying the standard of complicity in 
customary international law but that contained in Dutch criminal law for war crimes). For 
commentary on the case, see Harmen van der Wilt, Genocide v. War Crimes in the Van 
Anraat Appeal, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 557 (2008). Sometimes, of course, the 
international aspects of ICL operate to preclude the application of national criminal law 
to war crimes. See in this regard, the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Hamdan to 
effectively strike down conspiracy as a war crime because it was not adequately 
recognized in the history of ICL. Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 577, 46 (2006) 
(concluding that “international sources confirm that the crime charged here is not a 
recognized violation of the law of war”). 
3 The most conspicuous example of this phenomenon is probably the uptake of German 
criminal law principles of attribution in the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), in 
sharp contrast with their explicit rejection at ad hoc tribunals beforehand. For a helpful 
doctrinal synthesis of ICC case law governing (German) modes of attribution, see 
WOMEN’S INITIATIVES FOR GENDER JUSTICE EXPERT REPORT, MODES OF LIABILITY: A 
REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE AND 
PRACTICE (2013), http://iccwomen.org/documents/Modes-of-Liability.pdf. 
4 Surveys of national criminal law have featured in all international criminal tribunals and 
courts to ascertain the scope of customary international law and guide hermeneutics. See, 
for example, the survey of conspiracy standards in France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Japan, and Spain at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Tribunal). 
16 R. JOHN PRITCHARD & SONIA MAGBANUA ZAIDE, THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TRIBUNAL 39,036–37 (1981); Prosecutor v. Šainović et al., Case 
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international statutes, treaties and national legislation define the same ICL 
concept differently,5 and finally, (5) judicial bodies that interpret ICL 
occasionally disagree amongst themselves about the interpretation of the 
same body of law.6 In combination, these improvised rather than 
                                                                                                                     
No. IT-05-87-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 1644–45 nn.5409–19 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014) (undertaking a very substantial survey of criminal law 
governing complicity in national law, including Mexico, India, Singapore, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, Hong Kong, New Zealand, South Africa, Belgium, the United 
States, England, and others); Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-A, 
Appeals Judgment, ¶ 729 n.1680 (Dec. 14, 2011) (drawing on criminal law from a large 
number of states, including Germany, Kenya, Lithuania, Costa Rica, and New Zealand, 
to conclude that the desecration of a corpse “constituted a profound assault on human 
dignity meriting unreserved condemnation under international law”). See also Prosecutor 
v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 178 n.222 (Aug. 2, 2007) 
(surveying the criminal law applicable in France, Italy, Argentina, Egypt, Bolivia, and 
elsewhere to define the war crime of collective punishments). Interestingly, the ICC has 
cited other surveys of national law undertaken in other international tribunals. See 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-1049, Decision Regarding the 
Practices Used to Prepare and Familiarise Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial, ¶ 29 
(Nov. 30, 2007) (stating that “the practice of familiarizing witnesses with the courtroom 
and the procedures which they will encounter . . . is documented in many national and 
international contexts,” then citing surveys undertaken by the ICTY for support). These 
comparative law surveys are also a powerful basis for dissent. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, Decision on Victims’ Participation 
Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge René Blattmann, ¶ 26 n.13 (Jan. 18, 2008) 
(drawing on criminal procedure in Germany, France, Argentina, Peru, Chile, Ireland, and 
Canada to criticize the majority’s position on victim participation). 
5 Crimes against humanity and genocide are prime examples. With respect to the former, 
the Statutes of International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) 
differs from that pertaining to its sibling the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
which differs again from that enacted in their cousin institution, the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”). For a thorough comparison of the development of these 
principles, see CHRISTINE BYRON, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN THE 
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2009). As for genocide, 
national rules criminalizing the offense often extend the ambit of the crime beyond just 
the four protected groups announced in the Genocide Convention itself. For an excellent 
survey of examples, see WARD FERDINANDUSSE, DIRECT APPLICATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS 23–29 (2006). 
6 Sometimes, international statutes differ. Crimes against humanity, for instance, are 
defined differently in at least three different international courts. In other circumstances, 
international courts and tribunals reach contrary conclusions on questions of law that 
their statutes leave unresolved. For example, the famed Tadić Judgment concluded that 
an extended version of a concept called Joint Criminal Enterprise (“JCE”) was well-
founded in customary international law. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 
Appeals Judgment, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), ¶ 185–
229. Over a decade later, however, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (“ECCC”) openly begged to differ. Ieng Sary et al., Case File No. 002-19-
2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC38), Decision on the Appeals against the Co-Investigative Judges 
Order on Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE), (10 May 2010), ¶ 83 (concluding that the 
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choreographed dynamics make ICL a doctrinally plural normative inter-
penetration between multiple national and international systems of 
criminal law, and not a unified singularity.  The question is––Is the 
resulting doctrinal diversity desirable for ICL?  
Over the past decade, Legal Pluralism has emerged as a prominent 
analytical lens that, with caveats, tends to answer in the affirmative.7 In 
his ground-breaking work Global Legal Pluralism, for instance, Paul 
Berman offers a balanced catalogue of the strengths and weaknesses of 
universalism: the idea that we should fashion a more uniform single set of 
international standards from the existing variety. Berman concludes that, 
“there are reasons to question both the desirability and—more 
importantly—the feasibility of universalism, at least in some contexts.”8 
Chief among his objections is that “universalism inevitably erases 
diversity.”9 Extrapolating this idea onto ICL, Alexander Greenawalt 
eloquently argues that Legal Pluralism leads to the conclusion that “it is 
not self-evident that international criminal law must take the form of a 
uniform, all-encompassing body that trumps contrary domestic laws in 
every instance”.10 Similarly, others have argued that even international 
legal institutions need not pursue uniformity,11 and ultimately, that for ICL 
                                                                                                                     
Court “does not find that the authorities relied upon in Tadić… constitute a sufficiently 
firm basis to conclude that JCE III formed part of customary international law”). These 
contrasting interpretations can even involve three ways splits that include other 
international institutions that apply public international law rather than criminal law per 
se. The International Court of Justice, for instance, has adopted a definition of pillage that 
is inconsistent with that announced in the ICC Elements of Crimes, and to compound 
matters, the ICTY has adopted a third variant. JAMES G. STEWART, CORPORATE WAR 
CRIMES: PROSECUTING PILLAGE OF NATURAL RESOURCES 19–23 (2010), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1875053. 
7 See, in particular, PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A 
JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS (2012); Ralf Michaels, Global Legal 
Pluralism, 5 ANNUAL REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 243 (2009); Sally Engle 
Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869 (1988); William Burke-White, 
International Legal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 963 (2003); Peer Zumbansen, 
Defining the Space of Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global Governance, and Legal 
Pluralism, 21 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305 (2012). 
8 Paul Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1191 (2007). 
Consequently, Berman continues and offers a set of procedural mechanisms, institutional 
designs and discursive practices for managing hybridity. 
9 Id. at 1191. In fairness to Berman, he cites this as just one factor that might make 
universalism undesirable, and rightly points to the fact that even if this is not the case in 
discrete areas, managing hybrid/conflictual systems of law will be essential in periods of 
transition to a universal standard, if one is feasible at all.  
10 Alexander K. A. Greenawalt, The Pluralism of International Criminal Law, 86 IND. 
L.J. 1063, 1069 (2011). 
11 Carsten Stahn & Larissa van den Herik, ‘Fragmentation’, Diversification and ‘3D’ 
Legal Pluralism: International Criminal Law as the Jack-in-the-Box?, in THE 
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in particular, “[l]egal pluralism can even be regarded as an asset, a 
strength.”12 While we believe that these views are valuable and of ongoing 
importance, we add a perspective grounded in legal history. 
Clearly, the desire to preserve cultural variety is a key aspiration 
for prescriptive accounts of Legal Pluralism. We should let be the variety 
of criminal laws governing, say, perpetration of international crimes in the 
many legal systems of the world, not unify them in an objectionable act of 
legal eugenics. The notion that legal variation reflects cultural variety has 
a long pedigree. In the oft-cited words of Montesquieu, for example, laws 
“should be adapted in such a manner to the people for whom they are 
framed, that it is a great chance if those of one nation suit another.”13 
Isaiah Berlin, in turn, warns that “there is no single set of principles, no 
universal truth for all men and times and places”, and that universalism 
represents nothing more than a vain and destructive search for “the ideal 
society.”14 For leading criminologists too, punishment “is necessarily 
grounded in wider patterns of knowing, feeling, and acting, and it depends 
upon the social roots and supports for its continuing legitimacy and 
                                                                                                                     
DIVERSIFICATION AND FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 21, 51 
(Carsten Stahn & Larissa van den Herik, eds., 2012) (arguing that “it might even be 
acceptable that the ECtHR and the ICTR would come to different results and conclusions 
in cases that display factual similarity, since both entities operate on the basis of different 
mandates and legal frameworks”). 
12 Elies van Sliedregt, Pluralism in International Criminal Law, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 
847, 849 (2012). Admittedly, not all writings about legal pluralism in ICL follows this 
line. We agree, for instance, with Maxime Clarke when she writes that “global legal 
pluralism...must move beyond legal pluraism to attend to the complexities of power at 
play and the ways that force and power cut through even pluralist constellations.” 
KAMARI MAXINE CLARKE, FICTIONS OF JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
AND THE CHALLENGE OF LEGAL PLURALISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (CAMBRIDGE 
STUDIES IN LAW AND SOCIETY) 118 (2009). 
13 CHARLES DE SECONDAT BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 23 (Thomas 
Nugent (trans), Kitchener, Batoche 2001). 
14 ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY 224 (1992) (“If each culture 
expresses its own vision and is entitled to do so, and if the goals and values of different 
societies and ways of life are not commensurable, then it follows that there is no single 
set of principles, no universal truth for all men and times and places. The values of one 
civilization will be different from, and perhaps incompatible with, the values of another. 
If free creation, spontaneous development along one’s own natives lines, not inhibited or 
suppressed by the dogmatic pronouncements of an elite of self-appointed arbiters, 
insensitive to history, is to be accorded supreme value; if authenticity and variety are not 
to be sacrificed to authority, organization, centralization, which inexorably tend to 
uniformity and the destruction of what men hold dearest — their language, their 
institutions, their habits, their form of life, all that has made them what they are — then 
the establishment of one world, organized on universally accepted rational principles — 
the ideal society — is not acceptable.”). 
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operation.”15 As a result, we read these scholars as urging us to embrace 
the heterogeneity of criminal law doctrine that presently couples with and 
informs international crimes out of respect for cultural diversity. 
Thus, our priorities should shift to what private international 
lawyers would call “choice of law,” where comity dictates that legal 
systems pay due respect to one another’s legal doctrine by peaceably 
resolving conflicts based on preordained second-order rules. Perhaps cases 
involving international crimes occasioned in the Congo should involve 
Congolese notions of complicity, whereas international crimes carried out 
in the United States could draw on rules indigenous to that culture. When 
Americans are complicit in atrocities in the Congo, we look to a second 
set of standards at a higher level of abstraction to resolve the doctrinal 
discord at the lower. All the while, Legal Pluralists tend to dismiss as 
either culturally intolerant or politically impracticable what early 
comparativists called un droit commun de l’humanité.16 Although 
universalizing tendencies will often allow power to corrupt regulatory 
schemes that are genuinely plural too, we cautiously take issue with the 
supposition that Legal Pluralism is necessarily a better solution in every 
instance. To do this, we use ICL as our subject and history as our 
methodological foil. 
Most fundamentally, we dispute the underlying assumption that 
doctrine is necessarily a dependable measure of cultural diversity.17 This 
is the assumption that seems to underpin much of the ‘pluralist’ work in 
ICL, although most scholars who are part of the emerging debate we enter 
into here are more considered in their pluralism. This is to be contrasted 
with the ‘pluralism’ of international tribunals, which – as we demonstrate 
below – repeatedly assert the universality of one particular norm or 
another on the basis that it reappears in multiple domestic legal systems.  
To our minds, entertaining this assumption of global criminal law 
risks confirming Markus Dubber’s concern that “the study of comparative 
                                                
15 DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 21 (2002). See also Joachim Vogel, Why is the Harmonization 
of penal law necessary? A Comment, in HARMONISATION AND HARMONISING MEASURES 
IN CRIMINAL LAW 55, 55 (André Klip & Harmen van der Wilt eds., 2002) (it “has 
national and cultural roots and is part of the identity of a nation, its society and its 
culture.”). 
16 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 3 
(1998). For contemporary comparative work that picks up on this theme, see MIREILLE 
DELMAS-MARTY, TOWARDS A TRULY COMMON LAW: EUROPE AS A LABORATORY FOR 
LEGAL PLURALISM (2007). 
17 Others have made the law-culture connection more explicit. See, e.g., Sarah Harding, 
Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 409, 411 (2003) 
(“Legal systems reflect the cultures within which they are situated and thus have unique 
and highly contingent identities”). 
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criminal law can be oddly ahistorical.”18 What, for instance, of the 
influence of colonialism on criminal doctrine throughout a large portion of 
the world?19 Indeed, the very notion of Legal Pluralism first arose as a 
means of describing the normative interplay between the system of law 
forcibly imposed by colonial masters and the indigenous social order it 
purported (often unsuccessfully) to displace.20 Surely the various criminal 
law doctrines imposed during colonial rule would have no automatic claim 
to reflecting societal values in the territories in which they still apply in; in 
fact, one might suspect the opposite.21 Though there may be some places 
and some histories in which cultural values have come to match these 
transplanted criminal law doctrines––much like some formerly colonized 
countries have adopted cricket as part of their national identity22––it is not 
the case that this equivalence necessarily follows. In this respect, scholars 
of ICL should be mindful of Martti Koskenniemi’s warning that one of the 
dangers of reifying doctrinal pluralism is that “it ceases to pose demands 
on the world.”23 
To substantiate the point using ICL, we pair the history of four 
doctrines in national criminal law with their international equivalents. We 
divide the criminal doctrine we select by type. We focus first on 
procedure, followed by inchoate crimes, forms of responsibility and 
criminal offenses. As for national examples, we select examples from all 
major colonial traditions: the Spanish influence over criminal procedure in 
Argentina, the French influence (via Belgium) over the inchoate offense 
of association de malfaiteurs in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the 
collective influence of European colonial powers that led Japan to absorb 
German criminal doctrine governing modes of participating in crime like 
complicity, and finally, the distorting character of English criminal law 
                                                
18 Markus Dubber, Comparative Criminal Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 1287, 1291 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 
2008). 
19 For a detailed history of the relationship between colonialism and law, see LAUREN A. 
BENTON, LAW AND COLONIAL CULTURES: LEGAL REGIMES IN WORLD HISTORY, 1400 – 
1900 (2010). 
20 Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 872 (1988) 
(distinguishing “Classic Legal Pluralism”, which involved dual legal systems when 
European countries superimposed their legal systems, from “New Legal Pluralism” that 
has arisen since the 1970s in noncolonized societies). 
21 On this point, discussing so-called ‘primitive legal systems’, see JEREMY WALDRON, 
PARTLY LAWS COMMON TO ALL MANKIND 210 (2012) (“Anthropologists and 
philosophers with a culturalist axe to grind sometimes exaggerate the self-contained 
purity of these systems”). 
22 We are grateful to Antony Anghie for the point. 
23 Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and 
Politics, 70 MOD. L. REV. 1, 23 (2007).  
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governing the crime of blasphemy in Pakistan. For the international 
counterpart, we seize upon similar doctrine at each major historical 
interval of ICL: the procedure developed after WWI to try German war 
criminals at Leipzig, the controversial adoption of conspiracy as an 
inchoate offense at Nuremberg and Tokyo post-WWII, the rise of Joint 
Criminal Enterprise (JCE) as a mode of participation at ad hoc tribunals in 
the 1990s, and the failure to create a crime of colonialism or define 
apartheid in a way that accorded with its natural meaning in the ICC 
Statute, despite concerted attempts. The analysis produces a loose 
typology of ways in which legal doctrine is not a reliable referent for 
cultural diversity Legal Pluralism ought to champion.   
In Part II, we commence by highlighting the exception to our thesis, 
then a qualification of this exception. First, drawing on excellent work on 
the progeny of Argentine criminal procedure, we show how this example 
may personify Antony Anghie’s cricket metaphor—instances where 
previously colonialized peoples embrace an alien introduction, shape it 
and call it their own. We lead with this Argentine example since it creates 
something of a null hypothesis for our subsequent case studies. In all the 
other examples we explore, we very much doubt that the cricket metaphor 
holds: the other examples we consider are not like criminal procedure in 
Argentina. By beginning with the counterexample, however, we 
emphasize that connections between popular values and criminal doctrine 
in previously colonialized societies do sometimes exist; we simply express 
great caution about making the assumption categorical and note that in 
certain contexts it is unquestionably false. Second, we use the experience 
with war crimes trials post-WWI to qualify our null hypothesis with one 
additional observation—many international trials will involve political 
and cultural values that transcend any one community. As we show, the 
criminal procedure applicable in Leipzig after WWI was a key feature of 
the trials’ alienating characteristics for relevant audiences in France, 
Belgium and Britain. Thus, even if the German criminal procedure used at 
Leipzig did reflect German values, it is not only these values that matter. 
Together, our analyses of criminal law doctrine in Argentina and Leipzig 
set the stage for all that follows. 
In Part III, we discuss inchoate crimes in the DRC and post-WWII 
tribunals to illustrate the first variant in our typology of how doctrine is 
not a safe metric for value pluralism—criminal law is often part and parcel 
of the violent repression ICL exists to counteract. This unfortunate reality 
undermines doctrine’s credentials as a medium for expressing cultural 
diversity worth preserving. It was, after all, criminal law doctrine in 
national systems that allowed Joseph Stalin to sign 3,167 judicially-
2017] THE AHISTORICISM OF LEGAL PLURALISM 11 
   
imposed death sentences in a single day,24 and Adolf Hitler to make being 
Jewish a criminal offence.25 Undoubtedly, most contemporary criminal 
law is not operating in a political climate remotely comparable to the Red 
Terror or National Socialism, but like many aspects of extreme violence, 
these episodes of frightening excess teach lessons that still resonate: 
relying on a formalistic notion of law as a Polaroid image of cultural 
values within the surrounding community is unsafe; sometimes law and 
culture coincide, but the correspondence is hardly guaranteed or 
dependable. Moreover, regardless of whether law represents widespread 
local cultural values or not, the experience post WWI suggests that its 
adequacy for ICL cannot be assumed. Our example of the inchoate offense 
of association de malfaiteurs in the DRC evidences these realities very 
concretely, and although conspiracy’s record in post-war tribunals is more 
ambiguous, it too demonstrates points of continuity with an oppressive 
style of criminal justice.  
In Part IV, we discuss the transmission of European models of 
blame attribution into Japanese criminal law in the nineteenth century and 
into ad hoc international criminal tribunals in the twentieth. In our 
typology’s second element, we observe how, even outside colonial 
contexts, much criminal law doctrine is mass-produced far away rather 
than tailored locally.26 The literature on legal transplants is voluminous,27 
but somewhat strangely, it tends to focus on private law exclusively, even 
though the criminal law undeniably ranks among the branches of law most 
regularly uprooted then re-sown in foreign lands.28 The point is, for better 
                                                
24 At a rate of more than one every two minutes. RICHARD VOGLER, A WORLD VIEW OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 74 (2005). According to Vogler’s harrowing account, a single court 
court tried and sentenced 551 individuals to death in October 1928 alone, contributing to 
over a million judicially imposed executions over the period. 
25 Id. at 85, (citing a letter from the Reich Minister of Justice stating that “[i]n criminal 
proceedings against Jews the decisive fact is their Jewishness rather than their 
culpability.”). 
26 For an important exception in criminal procedure, see Máximo Langer, From Legal 
Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the 
Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2004). 
27  The locus classicus is ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO 
COMPARATIVE LAW (1974). For an extremely impressive earlier work, that treated law 
less specifically as a component of sociological imitation across cultures generally, see 
GABRIEL DE TARDE, THE LAWS OF IMITATION (Elsie Worthington Clews Parsons trans., 
Henry Holt & Co. 1903) (1895). 
28  Those authors who do write on comparative criminal law frequently decry the failure 
to consider criminal law as part of this process. See Elisabetta Grande, Comparative 
Criminal Justice, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 191, 191 
(Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2012) (calling comparative criminal law’s history “a 
past of oblivion,” because of this lack of engagement within the wider comparative 
project); Dubber, supra note 18, at 1288 (lamenting that “[t]extbooks on comparative law 
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or worse, scholars tend to agree that legal transplants of these sorts seldom 
“work.” While there are important exceptions–and we argue that criminal 
procedure in Argentina is one such example29–extensive empirical 
analyses classify the bulk of legal transplants as “unreceptive,” meaning 
that the recipient society is “unable to give meaning to the law.”30 If this is 
true of German notions of complicity forcibly introduced into Japan or of 
Anglo-American notions of JCE infused into ICL through ad hoc 
tribunals, it would be bizarre (to say the least) for ICL courts and scholars 
to ascribe meaning to a maladjusted foreign criminal law doctrine, when 
affected populations in the recipient state cannot.  
In Part V, we focus on the criminal offense of blasphemy in 
Pakistan, which is actually a relic of criminal laws first introduced by the 
English, after which we consider failed attempts at making colonialism 
and apartheid crimes in the ICC Statute. These examples present the third 
variant of our typology. As Günther Teubner has famously argued, legal 
transplants are often better described as “legal irritants,”31 given that they 
are “not transplanted into another organism, rather [they work] as a 
fundamental irritation which triggers a whole series of new and 
unexpected events.”32 By extension, we argue that the Islamization of 
British criminal law in Pakistan, and in particular the crime of blasphemy, 
is one example of an irritant that spawns unintended and unwelcome 
downstream consequences. Originally intended to manage inter-religious 
conflict, blasphemy instead became a tool for cruelly exploiting that 
tension. We pair Pakistan’s experience of blasphemy with attempts to 
criminalize colonialism and apartheid in the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
That process largely inverts the Pakistani experience. Whereas the 
criminalization of blasphemy was fuelled by the colonial domination of 
the Indian subcontinent, the criminalization of colonialism, apartheid and 
other conduct was arguably suppressed by Western domination of 
international lawmaking. As a result, we use blasphemy to caution, first, 
against ICL bowing to transplanted domestic criminal law doctrine that is 
an outright nuisance locally. Doing so may not only fail to add meaningful 
diversity, it may also add insult to injury. Second, we highlight how the 
demands for pluralism in ICL bely the neo-colonial reality of a lawmaking 
                                                                                                                     
feel no need to address, or even acknowledge the existence of, comparative studies in 
criminal law.”). 
29 See Part II.A, infra. 
30 Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The Transplant Effect, 
51 AM. J. COMP. L. 179, 179 (2003). 
31 Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law 
Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998). 
32 Id. at 12. 
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system where “legal irritants” are redefined as norms that would expose 
powerful states representatives to criminal liability. 
Finally, although constraints on length have precluded including 
an illustration of the fifth and final element of our typology, in our view, 
an unconditional deference to criminal doctrine in Global Legal Pluralism 
would unjustifiably marginalize alternative systems of social ordering. As 
previously mentioned, Legal Pluralism was initially purely descriptive, 
attempting to plot the interactions between displaced social orders and 
formal colonial law.33 To the extent that it took on a normative bent, this 
largely grew out of challenges to methodology; i.e. objections to what 
should figure as “law” within the wider sociological inquiry. Having 
understandably dispensed with state-sanctioned law’s claims to a 
monopoly over law, early adherents of Pluralism looked to a wider array 
of social mores.34 As Brian Tamanaha intimates, this certainly raises 
thorny questions about what might count as “law”,35 but even if no 
completely satisfying answer to that question is ever forthcoming, the very 
existence of the debate delivers a powerful blow to doctrinal pluralism 
within a global polity: an over-emphasis on domestic criminal doctrine is 
anathema to true pluralism, whose very program involves looking beyond 
positivistic state-centered law. Although we do not develop a case study to 
emphasize the point here, it also militates against equating doctrine with 
the popular values that should really matter to a normative account of 
Legal Pluralism. 
We remain alive to the critique that what we target here is not in 
real Legal Pluralism, but a simulacrum that focuses on state law alone.36 
Yet we remain wary of the relative absence of historical attention in this 
doctrinal pluralism, and of its prescriptive standpoint that posits Legal 
Pluralism as the solution to a variety of ills facing ICL. We are skeptical 
that Legal Pluralism has the tools to adjudicate between local norms and 
legal doctrine in a choice-of-law modality or to decipher what norms are 
optimal in disputes across communities, even if it does appreciate the 
                                                
33 William Twining calls this mode of Legal Pluralism “Social Fact Legal Pluralism.” We 
agree with him that “there is a tendency in the literature to slide from the descriptive to 
the prescriptive.” William Twining, Legal Pluralism 101, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND 
DEVELOPMENT: SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS IN DIALOGUE 112, 121 (Brian Z. 
Tamanaha, Caroline Sage, & Michael Woolcock eds., 2012). Our concern is only with 
this prescriptive aspect of the discourse. 
34 As Tamanaha puts it, “[l]aw characteristically claims to rule whatever it addresses, but 
the fact of legal pluralism challenges this claim.” Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding 
Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 375, 375 (2008). 
35 Id. 
36 As articulated to us variously by Doug Harris, Sarah Nouwen, and Alexander 
Greenawalt. 
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socio-historical significance of the norms in any one polity. Moreover, 
while we agree that doctrinal pluralism is problematic for the reasons we 
explain, we also recognize the inevitability of the reliance on foreign 
domestic criminal law by international lawyers and institutions. It is, after 
all, readily available and clearly law. True, an alternative proposition 
might be to simply focus on local values and not local laws, but while 
appealing because of its democratic ethos, it becomes unclear what work 
Legal Pluralism does in this program. Finally, though we posit the 
possibility of a universalist ICL in certain circumstances, we also 
recognize the utility of alternative, non-legal responses to international 
crime. Our desire to pluralize ICL should not be read as excluding what 
Mark Drumbl identifies as a pluralism of response,37 especially those that 
do not rely on the criminal law we explore here. 
Thus, we view our primary contribution as involving Legal 
Pluralism itself, but we also conclude by highlighting the great 
significance of this history for ICL, too. First, our analysis provides a 
concrete illustration of Boaventura de Sousa Santos’s famous (but 
abstract) statement “there is nothing inherently good, progressive, or 
emancipatory about Legal Pluralism.”38 Second, we show that ICL’s 
partiality does not just manifest at the level of enforcement, it is more 
deeply embedded in the very substance of ICL norms themselves. Third, 
once the false equivalence between criminal law doctrine and pluralism is 
acknowledged and withdrawn, it clears the ground for pluralism by 
unification. Might it not be possible for a unified system of law governing 
ICL to promote a genuine plurality of values?39 Why, in other words, limit 
our gaze to existing laws (even broadly defined) as objects for protection, 
when a wide variety of scholars accept that diversity of cultural values and 
                                                
37 Mark Drumbl, The Curious Criminality of Mass Atrocity: Diverse Actors, Multiple 
Truths, and Plural Responses, in PLURALISM IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 68, 101 
– 102 (Elies van Sliedregt & Sergey Vasiliev, eds., 2014). 
38 Supra note 1. 
39 In the context of women’s rights, for instance, Martha Nussbaum has offered a 
compelling marriage of pluralism within a universal philosophical construct. See 
MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES 
APPROACH 60 (1st Edition ed. 2001) (“We have some good reasons already, then, to 
think than universal values are not just acceptable, but badly needed, if we really are to 
show respect for all citizens in a pluralistic society.” For other qualified defenses of 
universalism, see also Ralf Michaels, “One Size Can Fit All” - On the Mass Production 
of Legal Transplants, in ORDER FROM TRANSFER: COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
DESIGN AND LEGAL CULTURE Forthcoming (2013); MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, 
TOWARDS A TRULY COMMON LAW: EUROPE AS A LABORATORY FOR LEGAL PLURALISM 
(2007). We anticipate the possibility of something similar for ICL, although in which 
aspects and how is beyond the scope of this research. 
2017] THE AHISTORICISM OF LEGAL PLURALISM 15 
   
political interests are our real concern?40 For instance, referring to the 
“universal structure of criminal law” as an “antidote” to the sorts of 
positivist arguments that reify domestic criminal law doctrine, George 
Fletcher writes that “resolutions on the surface of the law should not 
obscure the unity that underlies apparently diverse legal cultures.”41 
Although we do not suggest the aspects of the field where this unity might 
be meaningful, the content of unified norms or the methods for 
implementing them,42 we do test apparently diverse legal cultures in the 
hope of opening up greater space for the idea that a single universal norm 
may enjoy stronger credentials in (value) pluralism than the variety of 
standards in existing doctrine. Obviously, universalism poses enormous 
difficulties for Third World States, but we intend to show how Legal 
Pluralism is no immediate solution to these difficulties and how, in 
prescribed circumstances, universal norms have explored potential as 
vehicles for value pluralism. Fourth, recognition of the histories of 
coercion and suppression that are woven throughout our analysis suggests 
that ICL institutions and practitioners have a real moral obligation to 
redirect their energies towards enforcing international criminal law in 
ways that better address Third World interests, as a collective 
responsibility for the past. 
 
                                                
40 See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY: INCORPORATING FOUR 
ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 166, 216 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002)  (“Pluralism, with the measure of 
‘negative’ liberty that it entails, seems to me a truer and more humane ideal…because it 
does, at least, recognize the fact that human goals are many, not all of them 
commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one another”); ANDREI MARMOR, LAW IN 
THE AGE OF PLURALISM 49 (2007) (also referring to “value pluralism” as the core 
objective); JOHN KEKES, THE MORALITY OF PLURALISM 210 (1993) (same); and 
Emmanuel Melissaris, The More the Merrier? A New Take on Legal Pluralism, 13 SOC. 
& LEG. STUD. 57, 72 (2004) (same). 
41 GEORGE FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 5 (1998). 
42 One of us has suggested that forms of participation might be one site where this 
universalism is both achievable and appropriate. See James G. Stewart, Ten Reasons for 
Adopting a Universal Concept of Participation in Atrocity,  in PLURALISM IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (Elies Van Sliedregt & Vasiliev eds., 2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2343392. Several other scholars acknowledge that some degree 
of harmonization may be desirable in certain areas of ICL. See Van Sliedregt, supra note 
12, at 852 (“Accepting pluralism at national level does not disqualify the need for a 
general part at the international level.”). While aware of the risks of large-scale 
standardization (see, e.g. Kevin E. Davis, Legal Universalism: Persistent Objections, 60 
U. TORONTO L.J. 537, 541 (2010) (“In short, therefore, the main objections to 
universalistic legal theories are that they cannot accommodate variations across societies 
in either conceptions of development or the presence of substitutes or complements for 
the components of the legal system upon which they focus”), some harmonization in 
certain areas of ICL can offer benefits. 
2017] THE AHISTORICISM OF LEGAL PLURALISM 16 
   
II. PROCEDURE 
 
Our goal is not to show that legal systems never reflect local 
values. That claim is not necessary for our argument, and indeed, it would 
be the inverse of the categorical assumption we resist throughout the 
Article. While the legal pluralist arguments we reference sometimes 
appear to assume that legal and cultural values parallel one another, our 
position is that any such correspondence is coincidental and unpredictable, 
not automatic. In this Part, we develop an example where there does 
appear to be strong evidence of a national criminal law that is the product 
of deliberate, voluntary, local design, despite a history of colonial 
imposition at its founding. In particular, the history of the unique and 
eclectic brand of criminal procedure developed in Argentina post Spanish 
colonialism points to an active, ongoing and conscious process of 
deliberate legal redesign. Thus, Argentine criminal procedure operates as 
a null hypothesis for the remainder of the article; we argue that almost 
none of our other examples demonstrate this same degree of independent 
local consent in the various criminal doctrines we explore. Put differently, 
Argentine criminal procedure acts as the exception that establishes the 
rule. Having discussed our paradigm case of local assumption then 
modification of a (Spanish) colonial inheritance, we immediately 
problematize even this ideal type as a model for ICL by assessing the role 
of criminal procedure in war crimes trials post WWI. In this our example 
from ICL, we show how doctrine that only reflects the political or cultural 
values of a single polity can often lead to what French statesman Aristide 
Briand once called “a parody of justice.”43 At times, ICL needs to speak 
one unified language across polities, suggesting the need for unified 
standards.  
 
A. Procedural Eclecticism in Argentina 
 
While the bulk of this paper examines legal transplants that are are 
coercive in nature, or legal translations that claim pluralist credentials in 
spite of the narrow range of sources on which they draw, not all legal 
translations need be problematic in this manner. The adaptation of 
Argentine criminal procedure is an example of a deliberate reshaping of 
colonially-imposed law into one that better reflects the values and 
priorities of the local population. That system is and was the subjugated 
recipient of legal rules and norms; a dissatisfied editor of the same; a 
political instrument for military and democratic rulers alike; a legal 
                                                
43 JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF 
PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 136 (1st edition ed. 1982). 
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innovator; and ultimately a normative exporter as well. The deliberate and 
inclusive ethos that has guided the evolution of criminal procedure in 
Argentina in a way that hints at the possibilities of a meaningful legal 
pluralist approach to criminal law.    
As a colony, Argentina had Spanish criminal law impressed upon it. 
Criminal procedure in Argentina originally took the inquisitorial form 
found throughout the Spanish colonies,44 which was included in the 
compendious Spanish code Las Siete Partidas (“The Seven Parts”). As 
with other colonial transpositions, Spanish criminal procedure was 
formalized in a voluminous code cultivated from numerous regional, 
religious and cultural sources, including the ecclesiastical laws of the 
Catholic Church, local custom, regional sources and Spanish kingdoms, 
previous attempts at codification, Justinian’s Roman code, the Moors, the 
Visigoths, and Italian scholarship.45 Spanish criminal law and proceure 
was, however, in a state of flux. Spain itself moved from a more open, 
accusatorial-style system in the 12th century to a more private, secret 
inquisitorial process that was formalized through Las Siete Partidas in the 
14th century.46 It was precisely this reformulated inquisitorial model that 
was later imposed on the Spanish colonies.47 By this process, Spanish 
criminal procedure served as the template upon which modern Argentine 
criminal procedure would be cast. 
This Spanish procedural regime persisted in Argentina until 
independence in 1816 sparked a long series of legal and political shifts.48 
After experimentation with several constitutions, independent Argentina 
approved a model explicitly based on the United States’ Constitution in 
1853,49 on the basis that, unlike continental European models, the 
American text offered procedural guarantees and restraints on political 
excess through the separation of powers. This shift had profound impacts 
on the redevelopment of procedural criminal law by eventually granting 
                                                
44 OSVALDO BARRENECHE, CRIME AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN BUENOS 
AIRES, 1785 – 1853, 10–11 (2006).   
45 Helen Clagett, Las Siete Partidas, 22 Q. J. LIBR. CONGRESS 341, 342 (1965). The 
codification process was started by King Alfonso X of Spain in the late 13th century; The 
King was carrying on a project started by his father. Charles Sumner Lobingier, Las 
Sietes Paratidas and its Predecessors, 1 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 488–89 (1912 − 1913). 
46 Barreneche, supra note 44. 
47 A Royal Decree in 1530 confirmed the applicability of domestic Spanish law in 
Spanish colonies. Lobingier, supra  note 44, at 491–92. 
48 With the addition of special legislation developed to account for the presence of 
indigenous peoples in the Spanish colonies in the Americas. See Clagett, supra note 44. 
49 REBECCA BILL CHAVEZ, THE RULE OF LAW IN NASCENT DEMOCRACIES 30 (2004) 
(According to one delegate at the constitutional convention, “[The Argentine 
Constitution] is modeled on that of the United States, the only federation in the world 
which is worthy of being copied”). 
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Argentine provinces the ability to develop their own procedural codes, 
which led to a highly influential and drastically different code in one 
province, and ultimately much of Latin America. 
Yet this constitutional shift was far from concrete,50 and did not 
automatically lead to a comparably profound shift in criminal procedure. 
Faced with the option of fully investing in an American-type accusatorial 
model and jury trials,51 Argentine élites recommitted to the familiarity of 
the colonial criminal regime they had inherited in ways vaguely 
comparable to the adoption of cricket as a national pastime on the Indian 
subcontinent.52 As with much of Latin America, Argentina “stayed bound 
to the pure inquisitorial system in a form almost identical to that which the 
colonial administrations had employed”,53 even as the texts of criminal 
procedure were routinely challenged and revised. When the first code of 
criminal procedure was adopted in 1887, there were immediate complaints 
that it was outdated,54 leading to a half-dozen revisions55 and ultimately a 
compromise code in 1921 that drew from all of its predecessors.56 The 
tension inscribed in these moves replicated itself through the oscillation of 
                                                
50 Yet, as Robert Barros notes, these guarantees were far from impermeable: “Military 
dictatorships deconstitutionalized the country, collapsing the separation of powers and 
centralizing executive and legislative authority within the military leadership”. Robert 
Barros, Courts out of Context: Authoritarian Sources of Judicial Failure in Chile (1973 – 
1990) and Argentina (1976 – 1983), in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN 
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 156, 164 (Tom Ginsburg, ed., 2008). 
51 Máximo Langer, Revolution in Latin American Criminal Procedure: Diffusion of 
Legal Ideas from the Periphery, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 627 (2007). 
52 KRISTIN RUGGERIO, MODERNITY IN THE FLESH: MEDICINE, LAW, AND SOCIETY IN 
TURN-OF-THE-CENTURY ARGENTINA 189 (2004), (“In spite of the criticism of Argentine 
judicial practices, congressional opposition to the jury system remained firm. The 
opposition was mainly based on a lack of confidence in Argentine character and level of 
civilization”). See also Langer, supra note 51, at 628, citing Andres D’Alessio, The 
Function of the Prosecution in the Transition to Democracy in Latin America, in 
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY (Irwin P 
Stotzky, ed., 1993), and James L. Bischoff, Reforming the Criminal Procedure System in 
Latin America, (2003) 9 TEX. HISP. J. L. & POL’Y 27, 34 – 35 (that the uneducated classes 
could not be trusted to make decisions). 
53 Bischoff, supra note 52, at 34. 
54 Marcelo Ferrante, Argentina, in THE HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 12, 
13 (Kevin Jon Heller & Markus Dubber, eds., 2011). 
55 Taking place in less than 35 years. JULIA RODRIGUEZ, CIVILIZING ARGENTINA: 
SCIENCE, MEDICINE, AND THE MODERN STATE 203 (2006). These revisions were based 
on at least four separate northern European penal codes - Germany, Austria, Sweden, and 
Switzerland. See Edmund H Schwenk, Criminal Codification and General Principles of 
Criminal Law in Argentina, Mexico, Chile, and the United States: A Comparative Study, 
4 LA . L. REV. 351, n1 (1941 −  1942). But see Ferrante, supra  note 54 (arguing that the 
most influential code was actually the Italian Criminal Code of 1889). 
56 Ferrante, supra  note 54. 
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Argentina’s political and legal systems between asserting strong 
individual due process rights and democratic governance, and military rule 
and the manipulation of existing legal structures to serve repressive or 
self-interested ends.57 Local political debate and contestation animated 
legal development that, we say, ultimately exhibited a degree of 
congruence between criminal law doctrine and underlying values. 
As this conservative-liberal undulation took place at the macro level of 
Argentine governance, the local contestation led to modernization at the 
provincial level. The new constitutional structure may not have guaranteed 
the due process rights that many reformers wanted, but it led to a national 
criminal code, a national procedural code for certain cases, and – crucially 
– allowed each of Argentina’s 23 provinces to develop their own 
procedural code to be applied in respect of the bulk of criminal offences.58 
From this new and eclectic division of powers arose the Córdoba criminal 
procedure code of 1939, which  embodied a more progressive liberal spirit 
that quickly diffused throughout the country.59 Drawing heavily from 
Italian criminal procedure, the Córdoba code began a substantive shift 
away from the Spanish inquisitorial model through the implementation of 
due process rights more familiar to common-law systems.60 Important 
changes included making criminal trials public and oral, granting more 
rights to defendants, and expediting the criminal justice process by 
allowing prosecutors (instead of judges) to lead investigations of less 
serious offences.61 These parallel political processes combined to 
transform Argentina’s colonial inheritance: the reframing of the national 
constitution and a turn towards a new separation of powers, along with the 
subsequent reimagining of criminal procedure law at the provincial level 
out of an internally driven restructuring that we argue does not occur 
frequently elsewhere. 
                                                
57 See Barros, supra note 50, at 164 – 165 (military dictatorships concentrated political 
power, but also employed constitutionally recognized emergency powers as political 
instruments); GRETCHEN HELMKE, COURTS UNDER CONSTRAINTS: JUDGES, GENERALS 
AND PRESIDENTS IN ARGENTINA 153 (2012) (arguing that judges under the post-military 
democracy devoted their lives’ work to arguing for the protection of human rights, but 
then limited the scope of the trials prosecuting former military leaders); and  Gastón 
Gordillo and Silvia Hirsch, “Indigenous Struggles and Contested Identities in Argentina: 
Histories of Invisibilization and Reemergence” (2003) 8:3 The Journal of Latin American 
Anthropology 4 (that the various  post-independence constitutions of Argentina helped 
erase indigenous peoples from public consciousness in Argentina).  
58 AYA GRUBER, VICENTE DE PALACIOS & PIET HEIN VAN KEMPEN, PRACTICAL GLOBAL 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 22 (2012). 
59 Between 1941 and 1971, 12 (of 23) provinces adopted the Cordoba Code. Langer, 
supra note 51, at 634–36. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 634–35.  
2017] THE AHISTORICISM OF LEGAL PLURALISM 20 
   
 The Córdoba Code of 1939 and its successors became the 
progressive vanguard for Argentina. After the fall of military rule in 1983, 
legal scholars revised national criminal procedure again.62 Unsurprisingly, 
the model was found in Córdoba; Julio Maier, the author of the new 
national code had studied under Sebastian Soler, the drafter of the 
Córdoba code. Maier was tasked with reforming the federal Argentine 
procedural code, and in 1986 produced a draft that drew alternately on 
both German criminal procedure and the Córdoba code.63 Extensive public 
debate in and out of Congress followed, and the new federal code of 1991 
eventually drew on many of these concepts.64 Maier’s 1986 draft also 
became the basis for an updated Córdoba code, completing the normative 
circle. 65 Local scholars believed that the resulting code was imbued with 
an important degree of popular assent—one described the new procedural 
regime as “everything we might ask for in a modern and democratic code 
of criminal procedure.”66   
If Córdoba was both a synthesis of Argentine society writ large as well 
as “a model for the administration of justice”,67 its influence was not 
confined to national legal debates. Rather, the Córdoba code became the 
harbinger for criminal procedure reform throughout much of Latin 
America. Just as Argentina’s initial lurch towards a more progressive 
constitution did not immediately herald a similar liberal inclination in 
criminal procedure, so too did Latin American criminal procedure 
                                                
62 See Gregory W. O’Reilly, Opening Up Argentina’s Courts, 80 JUDICATURE 237, 239 
(1997). 
63 This draft introduced five major reforms: open trials in a mixed court of lay people and 
judges; granting accused the right to know the charges and evidence against them, to 
have an attorney, to gather evidence, and to seek pre-interrogation legal advice; the 
elimination of automatic pretrial detention; transferring pre-trial investigation to the 
prosecutor, not judges; and mechanisms for avoiding the compulsory prosecution of all 
crimes. Elements of this draft were built into the national criminal procedure code in 
1992. Langer, supra note 51, at 638—640. 
64 Id. at 641. 
65 Córdoba was an ‘early innovator’, implementing oral and public trials, excluding 
coerced confessions and derivative evidence, and establishing an adversarial system 
While the 1994 constitutional reforms are hailed for institutionalizing international due 
process norms as part of the country’s constitutional law, the Córdoba codes had already 
included a number of those same guarantees in 1987, although the provinces of San Juan 
and Neuquén had done so earlier. A.M HERNÁNDEZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN 
ARGENTINA 17 (2014).  
66 DANIEL M. BRINKES, THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO POLICE KILLINGS IN LATIN 
AMERICA: INEQUALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 207 – 208 (2008). 
67 María Inés Bergoglio, Argentina: The Effects of Democratic Institutionalization, in 
LEGAL CULTURE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND LATIN EUROPE 
20, 28 (Lawrence Friedman & Rogelio Perez-Perdomo, eds., 2003). 
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generally continue “a much more archaic dynamic than that of Europe”,68 
such that many of the worst abuses had continued even after the facial 
modernization of criminal procedure.69 Those rule changes required (and 
continue to demand) an attendant cultural shift in the tradition and 
behavior of justice system actors,70 including politicians and judges,71 as 
well as public pressure for meaningful reform.72 Here, the changes in 
criminal procedure exhibited a an important degree of democratic 
legitimacy that resonated beyond Argentina. 
Thus, the adoption of an Argentine accusatorial model that formally 
offers greater guarantees for individual rights, upended the historical stasis 
of criminal procedure and led to common reforms throughout Latin 
America.73 As Bischoff writes, “[t]he considerable similarity among Latin 
America's new codes is no coincidence. The region's legislatures have 
garnered their inspiration from the Model Code of Criminal Procedure for 
Ibero-America of 1988, itself the modern incarnation of the seminal 
Córdoba (Argentina) Code of 1939.”74 In Guatemala,75 Chile,76 and 
                                                
68 Bischoff, supra note 52, at 34. 
69 See generally Bischoff, supra note 52 (identifying the concentration of decision-
making in the investigative phase of inquisitorial proceedings and the relegation of the 
oral trial to a formality as the central  problem).  
70 Alfredo Fuentes-Hernández, Globalization and Legal Education in Latin America: 
Issues for Law and Development in the 21st Century, 21 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV 39, 45 
(2002- 2003) (“Aside from formal rules and written Codes, there are informal restrictions 
deeply entrenched in traditions, the culture of lawyers, and corporate behavioral patterns, 
which generate perverse incentives and deter individuals from implementing changes of 
routine”). 
71 Carlos Menem’s expansion of the Supreme Court from five to nine judges was widely 
recognized as means of ensuring the court - now stacked with judges who owed their 
positions and loyalty to Menem - would rubber-stamp instead of contesting the acts of 
the executive branch. Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using 
Sociology, Legal History and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51 
AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 865 (2003). This leads, however, to an incentive for judges to rule 
against the government that appointed them so that future government keeps judges in 
their posts.  
72 Mario Di Paolantonio, Tracking the Transitional Demand for Legal Recall: The 
Foreclosing and Promise of Law in Argentina, 13 Soc. & Leg. Stud. 351(2004) 
(describing the “social demand” for legal reform, including the overturning of national 
amnesty laws that precluded prosecutions for a wide range of offences committed by 
military officers during the juntas). HELMKE, supra note 58, at 154. 
73 Pablo Ciocchini, Campaigning to eradicate court delay: power shifts and new 
governance in criminal justice in Argentina, 61 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 61, 63. 
74 Bischoff, supra note 52, at 42. 
75 Steven E. Hendrix, “Innovation in Criminal Procedure in Latin America: Guatemala’s 
Conversion to the Adversarial System” (1998) 5 Sw. J. L. & Trade Am. 365, 387 
(Guatemala’s far-reaching changes from an inquisitorial to an accusatorial system were 
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elsewhere,77 Argentine and by extension Córdoban criminal procedure 
came to predominate.78  
This ongoing history of procedural development shows that not only 
was Argentina a norm exporter in relation to international criminal law 
and transitional justice solutions, it was and continues to be profoundly 
influential in the development of a uniquely Argentine brand of criminal 
procedure that has spread across the continent. This dual history of 
international and domestic development undermines the assumption “that 
such diffusion is more likely to flow from wealthier and more powerful 
countries to less powerful countries.”79 Finally, while there may never be 
a perfectly “organic connection of law with the being and character of the 
people”,80 the particular history of criminal procedure we have traced 
suggests this correspondence is difficult but not impossible. The reformers 
drew on experiences and norms developed externally, but “chose to adapt 
only those ideas that they felt best met the needs of Latin America’s social 
and political reality”.81 In Argentina, these changes were rooted in the 
                                                                                                                     
drafted by Argentine jurists and were based on a new bill of Criminal Procedure awaiting 
approval in Argentina). 
76 Alberto Binder and Julio Maier, the architect of the Argentine national criminal 
procedure code, and the student of Sebastian Soler, were key influences of criminal 
procedure legal reform in Chile. Daniel Palacios Muñoz, Criminal Procedure Reform in 
Chile: New Agents and the Restructuring of a Field, in LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW 
IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 112, 117 – 119 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, eds., 
2011). 
77 Christian Riego, The Chilean Criminal Procedure Reform, 26 INT’L J. SOC. L. 437, 438 
(1998) (“The model used for the reform and the main ideas come from other Latin 
American experiences, especially from that of Argentina which has developed much of 
the Model Code for Iberoamerica, on which most of the above reforms are based”). 
78 The authors of the 1986 draft Argentine federal criminal procedure code collaborated 
with activists in other countries to create a dynamic regional and international network of 
reformers revising criminal procedure codes throughout Latin America. A “Southern 
activist expert network” brought together at least 19 different groups and agencies 
throughout the Americas as part of the reformist group. See Richard J. Wilson, 
Supporting or Thwarting the Revolution? The Inter-American Human Rights System and 
Criminal Procedure Reform in Latin America, 14 SW. J. L. & TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 
287, 290 (2008), and Langer, supra note 51, at 652−56. 
79 Kathryn Sikkink, “From Pariah State to Global Protagonist: Argentina and the Struggle 
for International Human Rights” 50 LAT. AM. POL. & SOC’Y 1, 1 – 2, 16 – 17 (2008). 
80 FREDERICK KARL VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION 
AND JURISPRUDENCE 18 (Abraham Haywards, trans., 1999). 
81 See Langer, supra note 51, at 668, and Máximo Sozzo, Cultural travels and crime 
prevention in Argentina, in TRAVELS OF THE CRIMINAL QUESTION: CULTURAL 
EMBEDDEDNESS AND DIFFUSION 185, 210 (Dario Melossi, Máximo Sozzo, and Richard 
Sparks, eds., 2011) (“local actors have made use of the culturally imported devices to 
face the numerous problems in their local contexts, generating cultural objects ‘here’, 
through their political and theoretical inventiveness”). 
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evolving political contexts of the post-colonial state, one where suspicions 
of the illegitimacy of authority – because of their exclusionary violence – 
were largely overcome.82 Here, deliberate and considered local 
participation and action that continues to this day83 has reshaped colonial 
inheritances and legal transplants into a local legal code that exhibits the 




B. Procedural Conflict in War Crimes Trials After WWI 
 
The history of ICL unjustifiably fixates on Nuremberg as the field’s 
point of origin, but this focus underappreciates earlier periods that laid the 
foundation for what historian Mark Lewis memorably calls “the new 
justice.”84 Surprisingly, there were literally thousands of war crimes trials 
after WWI. Between 1921 and 1927, for instance, the Reich Court at 
Leipzig opened some 1,700 investigations into German war crimes carried 
out during the Great War.85 Likewise, in France and Belgium, “by 
December 1924 more than twelve hundred Germans had been 
condemned.”86 Importantly, the criminal law procedure employed in these 
trials was, like Argentina, native to the national system and highly 
divergent from surrounding systems, but it was also often alien to foreign 
audiences, which proved to be a major factor in the abysmal failure of the 
trials by any normative measure. Thus, we use this history to qualify 
lessons from our Argentine example, showing how doctrinal pluralism 
may not be optimal for ICL when criminal doctrine in a single jurisdiction 
must speak cross-culturally. Even when criminal doctrine is a safe proxy 
for social and cultural values within the community it governs, as is 
                                                
82 Martin Böhmer, An Oresteia for Argentina: Between Fraternity and the Rule of Law, 
in LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN THE EMPIRE OF FORCE 89, 115 – 117 (H. Jefferson Powell & 
James Boyd White, eds., 2009). 
83 Graciela Rodriguez-Ferrand, Argentina: Reform of Code of Criminal Procedure, 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR, (Dec. 16, 2014), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205404230_text.  
84 MARK LEWIS, THE BIRTH OF THE NEW JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CRIME 
AND PUNISHMENT, 1919-1950 (OUP Oxford, 1 edition ed. 2014). 
85 GERD HANKEL, THE LEIPZIG TRIALS: GERMAN WAR CRIMES AND THEIR LEGAL 
CONSEQUENCES AFTER WORLD WAR I 6 (2014). The Reich Court and Prosecutor dealt 
with hundreds of trials, but only 17 resulted in oral hearings. Id. at 65. For a helpful 
breakdown of all the allegations by charge, see JOHN HORNE & ALAN KRAMER, GERMAN 
ATROCITIES 1914: A HISTORY OF DENIAL 342–343 (1st edition ed. 2001). 
86 JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF 
PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 142 (Greenwood Pub Group, 1st 
edition ed. 1982). 
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evident from our Argentine example, this fact alone is not a sufficient 
condition for privileging it in a contest between normative orders.   
The lead up to trials post-WWI is a matter of enormous intrigue,87 
commencing with wartime warnings that paralleled those issued from 
London during WWII, such as a notice issued by the French government 
on 5 October 1918 declaring that “acts so contrary to International law, 
and to the very principles of human civilization, should not go 
unpunished.”88 Indeed, in contrast with his more famous posture after 
WWII, where he called for summary executions of Nazis, Winston 
Churchill was a staunch advocate of criminal prosecutions in the aftermath 
of WWI.89 In this punitive spirit, the Treaty of Versailles initially included 
a provision requiring the extradition of German war criminals to their 
victors. In the words of Clemenceau, “no victory could justify an amnesty 
for so many crimes.”90 A month later, the Allies requested the extradition 
of nine hundred Germans pursuant to this provision and sought to 
establish an international tribunal to punish Wilhelm II, all “as deterrent to 
those who might at some time in the future be tempted to follow their 
example.”91 
                                                
87 Several scholars have offered insightful overviews of these politics. See in particular, 
Jürgen Matthäus, The Lessons of Leipzig: Punishing German War Criminals after the 
First World War,  in ATROCITIES ON TRIAL: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICS 
OF PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES 3–23 (Patricia Heberer & Jürgen Matthäus eds., 2008); 
GARY BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE : THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES 
TRIBUNALS (2002); WILLIS, supra note 42; HORNE AND KRAMER, supra note 85; Gerd 
Hankel offers by far the most detailed historical account of the politics behind and within 
the Leipzig trials. See HANKEL, supra note 85. Mark Lewis’ excellent book describes the 
international politics best. See LEWIS, supra note 87, at 1-77. 
88 CLAUD MULLINS, THE LEIPZIG TRIALS: AN ACCOUNT OF THE WAR CRIMINALS’ TRIALS 
AND A STUDY OF GERMAN MENTALITY 5 (1921). General von Lüttwitz, who controlled 
Berlin at the time, reported that if the government accepted extradiction, there was an 
“urgent danger… that the officer corps would mutiny.” HORNE AND KRAMER, supra note 
85 at 329. Evidently, the government was prepared to countenance this possibility by 
adopting a “policy of catastrophe,” whereby its collapse provoked revolution in Allied 
countries too who had no appetite for a return to war, bringing down the enemy with it to. 
Id. at 335. 
89 Hankel cites Churchill as declaring that “individuals against whom definitive breaches 
of the laws of war and humanity can be brought, particularly those who have been guilty 
of cruelty to helpless prisoners, must be brought to trial, and if convicted must be 
punished as they deserve, no matter how highly placed”.  HANKEL, supra note 85, at 14, 
citing “Germany Must Pay” in James (ed), Winston D. Churchill, p. 2645. 
90 HANKEL, supra note 85, at 15.  
91 HANKEL, supra note 85, at 20. As Lewis explains, however, the aspirations for postwar 
trials were varied and not always liberal, meaning that unsurprisingly, noble aspirations 
for deterrence were not the only rationales for the new justice even if they were 
important. See LEWIS, supra note 87, at 28-29. 
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Politically, the request was a bridge too far. The Allies were forced 
to back down from their demands for extradition when it became apparent 
that doing otherwise may lead to a mutiny within the German army that 
would topple the government,92 thereby further destabilizing a decimated 
Europe. The resulting political stand-off over the vexed question of 
accountability for “war guilt” was extraordinary. As Horne and Kramer 
observe “it is remarkable that a democratic government of the Republic 
[of Germany], which was prepared to accept a treaty that imposed severe 
territorial and economic restrictions, limited the army to 100,000 men, and 
banned conscription, should run the risk of collapse of the peace and 
invasion over accusations of criminal acts against the old regime.”93 
Nevertheless, this is exactly what transpired. But with little domestic 
appetite for a return to what English war poet Siegfried Sassoon called 
“flickering horror”,94 the Allies agreed to an obviously fraught 
compromise: vanquished’s justice.95 Germany would try her own war 
criminals. 
As a result of this compromise, on 18 December 1919, the German 
National Assembly adopted legislation incorporating international law on 
war crimes into German criminal law and conferring a federal court in 
Leipzig with extraterritorial jurisdiction to prosecute the offenses.96 The 
Allies were understandably apprehensive; in a move later emulated by the 
drafters of the permanent International Criminal Court, they formally 
reserved to themselves the right to reassert jurisdiction if the trials 
proposed in light of this legislation proved to be “exclusively aimed at 
                                                
92 For various views about whether the prospect of revolution in Germany was likely if 
the Allies insisted on extradition, see LEWIS, supra note 87, at 47-49. 
93 HORNE AND KRAMER, supra note 85 at 329. 
94 Trench Duty, in SIEGFRIED SASSOON, COUNTER-ATTACK: AND OTHER POEMS 36 (E.P. 
Dutton 1918). 
95 The term is, we acknowledge, slightly misleading because without the enormous 
pressure of the victors, it is clear that there would have been no trials at all. Nevertheless, 
we imagine that a key characteristic of vanquished’s justice is that it is never fully 
volitional.  
96 On 18 December 1919, the German National Assembly adopted a “Law on Prosecution 
of War Crimes and War Offenses,” which incorporated international law on the subject 
into German criminal law and extended German jurisdiction extraterritorially. HANKEL, 
supra note 85 at 45 (“The law to be applied by the Reich Court in individual cases was in 
every case to be German law, including the ‘recognized rules of the laws of nations’ 
within the meaning of Article 4 of the Weimar Constitution.”). Although this option was 
probably the only one available, there was also a certain logic to it. As the British 
Attorney General remarked at the time, “[i]f the trials had taken place in London, the 
probability is that the Germans would have asserted that the trials were unfair, and built a 
memorial in Berlin to those who were the subjects of them.” MULLINS, supra note 88 at 
13.  
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protecting the guilty from punishment for their offenses.”97 As we will see 
momentarily, reasserting this jurisdiction would later pose important 
problems of criminal procedure. At this juncture, however, the Allied 
attitude was necessarily realistic. As the British then-Attorney General 
remarked, “[i]f the trials had taken place in London, the probability is that 
the Germans would have asserted that the trials were unfair, and built a 
memorial in Berlin to those who were the subjects of them.”98  
Importantly, the Leipzig courts employed German criminal 
procedure to try cases before it.99 Claud Mullins, a bilingual Englishman 
sent to cover the trials for the British, dedicated the better part of an entire 
chapter of his book for British audiences on the topic to the particularities 
of German criminal law procedure. There, he encountered legal pluralism, 
observing that “[t]he system of judicial procedure prevailing on the 
continent differs in many essential points from that obtaining in 
England.”100 In particular, Mullins pointed out that in German criminal 
procedure: (a) the Court received and examined all the evidence before the 
trial began as distinct from a more adversarial approach that leaves 
production of evidence to the discretion of the parties;101 (b) if the accused 
decided to testify, the judge and not lawyers examined him first, including 
on prior convictions;102 (c) cross examination was not employed in any 
form approximating to the English equivalent; 103 and (d) there were no 
strict rules of evidence like those that govern criminal trials in Anglo-
American systems.104  
Mullins was confronted with doctrinal legal pluralism, and he was 
not impressed. As a harbinger for what would later emerge as a recurrent 
problem for ICL, he concluded his legal comparison by observing that 
“[t]his procedure will strike every English lawyer as strange and 
dangerous.”105 Evidently, the problem was less his legal parochialism and 
more that the process and resulting verdicts dispensed pursuant to German 
criminal procedure would not resonate with his compatriots at home. So, 
while the German criminal procedure employed at Leipzig mimicked 
Argentine insofar as, historically speaking, it was a “conglomeration of 
                                                
97 HANKEL, supra note 85, at 31. 
98 MULLINS, supra note 88 at 13. 
99 For discussion, see HANKEL, supra note 85 at 36. 
100 MULLINS, supra note 88 at 36. 
101 Id, at 36-37. 
102 Id, at 38. 
103 Id, at 38. 
104 Id, at 38. 
105 Id. at 39. 
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various heterogeneous parts,”106 it failed to speak to the full cross-cultural 
spectrum of audiences that took a keen, nay furious, interest in the Leipzig 
trials.107  
To compound this initial sense of alienation, the German legislature 
twice amended its usual criminal law procedure to deliberately abdicate 
responsibility for “war guilt”. First, a supplementary law passed in 
Germany in March 1920 prohibited the Chief Reich Prosecutor from 
ending a trial with a dismissal order pursuant to the then German Code of 
Criminal Procedure, instead requiring him to submit the file to the Reich 
Court with an application for a public dismissal of the case.108 Second, in 
May 1921, it added a novel procedural rule that allowed the prosecutor at 
Leipzig to bring his own case proprio motu even if there was insufficient 
evidence to support a conviction.109 As the leading historian on these trials 
observes, “[t]his new deviation from German criminal procedure made it 
possible for the Reich Prosecutor, in any case in which he found it 
desirable for any reason, to go public, knowing full well that a 
demonstration of German innocence and a ‘first rate acquittal’ could be 
expected.”110  
To illustrate, the case against Lieutenant General Karl Stenger for 
ordering that no quarter be offered French prisoners of war was dismissed 
in precisely this fashion. While in Northern France in August 1914, 
Stenger was alleged to have ordered that “[a]ll the prisoners are to be 
massacred; the wounded, armed or not, are to be massacred; even men 
captured in large organised units are to be massacred. No enemy must 
remain alive behind us.”111 Because many Frenchmen were killed as a 
result of this order, the French government had listed Stenger atop its list 
of “war accused.”112 At trial, Stenger denied having issued the order 
despite evidence from his own subordinate to the contrary. Nonetheless, 
the Chief Reich’s Prosecutor, i.e. Stenger’s formal accuser, declared that 
                                                
106 THOMAS VORMBAUM, A MODERN HISTORY OF GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW 84 
(Bohlander, Michael ed., Margaret Hiley tran., 2014 edition ed. 2013). 
107 According to Lewis, “[i]n France and Belgium, there was intense resentment about the 
German invasion, atrocities against civilians, the devastation of agriculture, and the 
enemy's military rule in occupied areas.” Evidently, these sentiments were important 
political factors motivating the trials. LEWIS, supra note 87, at 32. 
108 HANKEL, supra note 85, at 101. 
109 Id. at 45. According to Mullins, the relevant procedure read: “when the State Attorney 
is of the opinion that the facts do not justify an indictment, he may request a trial in order 
that the facts may be ascertained.” MULLINS, supra note 88 at 36. 
110 HANKEL, supra note 61, at 45. 
111 Id. at 45. See also HANKEL, supra note 85, at 1. 
112Liste des personnes désignées par les Puissances Alliées pour être livrées par 
l’Allemagne en execution des article 228 à 230 du traité de Versailles et du Protocole du 
28 juin 1919, at 40. 
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“I believe him, as I said, completely.”113 The purpose of his trial, 
therefore, “was merely to confirm this, especially to a foreign 
audience.”114 After Stenger’s acquittal, a large crowd assembled outside 
the courthouse in Leipzig to present him with flowers and spit at the 
departing French delegation.115  
In retaliation, the French and Belgians resorted to a particular, 
culturally-specific criminal procedure of their own. A trial in absentia, or 
procès par contumace, is a trial without the accused present. The practice 
initially developed in France around the 13th Century, at first as a means 
of disincentivizing a defendant’s flight. In its earliest inceptions, a trial in 
absentia led to the banishment of the defendant from the realm and a 
declaration that he or she was an outlaw. Aside from placing the fugitive 
outside the law’s protections, outlawry also implied the forfeiture of 
assets, which effectively deprived the fugitive’s family of their 
inheritance,116 thus motivating defendants to appear in court 
(notwithstanding the brutal forms of proof and punishment that awaited 
them there). Over the ensuing centuries, the contours of the procès par 
contumace morphed in line with changing perceptions of criminal 
justice,117 but a variant of the procedure survived the transition into an 
inquisitorial model of French criminal procedure, such that it furnished a 
viable mechanism for at least rhetorically denouncing Leipzig’s grave 
shortcomings.  
In the face of a series of Stenger-like acquittals at Leipzig that 
deeply enraged the French and Belgian political élite and citizenry,118 both 
                                                
113 HANKEL, supra note 85, at 101. 
114 Id. at 91. 
115 WILLIS, supra note 86 at 136. Stenger received so many letters congratulating him on 
his decision to give the order of no quarter that after his acquittal, he took out an 
advertisement in the press thanking his many correspondents. HORNE AND KRAMER, 
supra note 85 at 350. 
116 YVES JEANCLOS, LA JUSTICE PÉNALE EN FRANCE. DIMENSION HISTORIQUE ET 
EUROPÉENNE 99 (Dalloz, 1st ed. 2011) (“Il utilise d’ailleurs possiblement la contumace 
comme moyen de pression exercé sur la famille, pour la convaincre de livrer le coupable, 
afin de ne pas perdre les biens du lignage.”) 
117 By increasing the time-frame the defendant was provided an opportunity to appear, 
shifting the result from outlawry to conviction of the crime alleged, then making the 
conviction provisional in the sense that apprehension of the accused would result in a 
retrial ab initio. A. ESMEIN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: WITH 
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO FRANCE 161–65 (Little,  Brown and Co. 1913). 
118 The official report on these proceedings analyses the cases that did go to trial. See 
German War Trials, Report of Proceedings Before the Supreme Court in Leipzig, 16 AM. 
J. INT. LAW 628–631 (1922). For an excellent new set of commentary on these trials, see 
Joseph Rikhof, The Istanbul and Leipzig Trials: Myth or Reality?, 1 in HISTORICAL 
ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 259–298 (Morten Bergsmo, Wui Ling 
CHEAH, & Ping YI eds., 2014); Wolfgang Form, Law as Farce: On the Miscarriage of 
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governments harnessed this procedural particularity as a form of local 
redress. By comparison with modern war crimes trials, the resulting 
procès par contumaces staged in France and Belgium after WWI took 
place in truly spectacular numbers, and at light speed.  Up to 764 Germans 
in occupied territories were already tried by French and Belgian courts by 
1920,119 less than two years after the end of the war. And as we saw 
earlier, “by December 1924 more than twelve hundred Germans had been 
condemned.”120 To the best of our knowledge, the substance of these cases 
are entirely undocumented in the history of ICL, so we can say little 
conclusive about them. In all likelihood, though, their number and celerity 
reveal something of their (un)fairness and the zeal with which they were 
brought. If it is true that within the Leipzig trials themselves, French and 
Belgian witnesses “breathed hatred,”121 this sentiment surely also affected 
trials in absentia at home.  
Instead of reviewing these trials in absentia in detail, our purpose is 
to highlight how this legally plural procedural arrangement actually 
undermined the utility of these trials as exercises in post-war justice. The 
hostile use of these two sets of criminal procedure—a novel procedure to 
exonerate in already alienating German criminal procedure and trials in 
absentia in France and Belgium—amounted to a continuation of war. 
German defendants would hear of their convictions in absentia through 
French and Belgium newspapers, apply to the Reich Court in Leipzig to 
be tried there pursuant to the supplemental procedure in order to be 
exonerated, and when the decision exonerating them was forthcoming as 
anticipated, it “was publicized in the German, and if possible, 
international press.”122 In all, 861 out of 901 allegations were disposed of 
                                                                                                                     
Justice at the German Leipzig Trials: The Llandovery Castle Case, 1 in HISTORICAL 
ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 299–332 (Morten Bergsmo, Wui Ling 
CHEAH, & Ping YI eds., 2014); Matthias Neuner, When Justice is Left to the Losers: 
The Leipzig War Crimes Trials, 1 in HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 333–378 (Morten Bergsmo, Wui Ling CHEAH, & Ping YI eds., 2014). 
119 HANKEL, supra note 1, at 40. It is unclear whether Hankel includes in this figure the 
number of Germans tried and convicted during the war itself, which certainly took place 
before they were met with reprisals against French prisoners of war, at which point they 
came to an abrupt halt. See LEWIS, supra note 87, at 32. 
120 WILLIS, supra note 44 at 142. 
121 Claud Mullins, "Notes of a Conversation with Herr von Tippelskirch at Leipzig on 
Belgian & French War Trials," Hanworth Papers, cited in WILLIS, supra note 86, at 134. 
122 HORNE AND KRAMER, supra note 85 at 353. In an astonishing illustration, the German 
government wrote to the Leipzig Court about a Colonel von Giese, who had been 
sentenced to death in a trial in absentia held in Belgium, explaining that the Colonel 
“wishes that his case be completed in Leipzig as soon as possible,” and that he “wishes to 
use the Reich Court decision for his further vindication domestically and abroad.” The 
letter concludes that “[b]ecause the case is very beneficial to our propaganda purposes, I 
would be especially grateful if you could accommodate Colonel von Giese’s desire for 
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in this manner,123 meaning that the whole debacle was of dubious value on 
any semi-defensible theory of criminal law and probably 
counterproductive as a practical matter.124 
To return to procedural pluralism, it was also striking that British 
courts could not participate in this ongoing legal conflict. As a matter of 
their own local criminal procedure, “British law made no provision for 
trials in absentia.”125 Although the point was probably made moot by the 
waning British interest in these trials,126 it still bears noting that, first, a 
bitter legal contest was waged with criminal law procedure as instrument 
between three European nations well after the Peace of Versailles, and 
second, that a fourth power had to sit out the contest because of the 
idiosyncrasies of its own criminal law procedure. There is much that one 
could add about this truly fascinating history127 (including that the legal 
contest was also in part about differing Allied and German interpretations 
                                                                                                                     
rapid conclusion of his case.” Hankel explains that the case was dismissed less than a 
month later as requested. HANKEL, supra note 85, at 360. 
123 WILLIS, supra note 86 at 146. 
124 In part because they helped consolidate the rise of right-wing power in Germany; See 
Jüergen Matthäus, The Lessons of Leipzig: Punishing German War Criminals after the 
First World War, in ATROCITIES ON TRIAL: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICS 
OF PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES 3, 16 (Patricia Heberer & Jüergen Matthäus, eds., 2008) 
(“The disinclination by German courts to prosecute war criminals attests to the same 
prejudice that dominated the German judiciary’s handling of political violence and that 
did so much to prepare Hitler’s coming to power.”); Wolfgang Kaleck, “German 
International Criminal Law in Practice: From Leipzig to Karlsruhe” in INTERNATIONAL 
PROSECUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES 95, 96 (Wolfgang Kaleck et al, eds., 2007) (on 
local courts’ failures to prosecute Nazis for their political violence during the Weimar 
years); GORDON WALLACE BAILEY, DRY RUN FOR THE HANGMAN: THE VERSAILLES-
LEIPZIG FIASCO, 1919 – 1921, FEEBLE FORESHADOW OF NUREMBERG (Univ. of Maryland 
PhD Thesis, 1971) 286 (Leipzig was one of the first “steps along the dark road to the 
Third Reich”); and, JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND 
DIPLOMACY OF PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 141 (noting that 
Hermann Goëring and Adolf Hitler met during an anti-trial demonstration).  
125 Id. at 357. Presumably, trials in absentia were not available in English criminal law 
because in an accusatory system of criminal procedure “[t]he necessity for the personal 
presence of the parties arises, originally, from the very nature of the action, which is a 
feigned combat.” See ESMEIN, supra note 117, at 5. 
126 WILLIS, supra note 86 at 140 (citing a statement by one British official to the effect 
that “everybody concerned--most of all the Attorney-General--is only too anxious to let 
the whole war criminals question sleep. It only brings us trouble both with the French & 
with the Germans.”). 
127 Such as the arguments that the Allied use of African soldiers amounted to perfidy. As 
one commentator of the period noted, “the use of wild people, even if they have 
experienced a temporary taming in the troop unit, [violates] the spirit of international 
law.” HANKEL, supra note 85, at 140. 
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of the substantive law of war),128 but for present purposes, we seize on 
these as well as other procedural shortcomings of local law in these trials 
to highlight the limitations of just locating congruence between local 
values and criminal law doctrine in a single jurisdiction. That German 
criminal procedure at Leipzig reflected German societal values is no 
reason for Legal Pluralists to unquestioningly celebrate it as a standard 
ICL should embrace, precisely because the Leipzig experience suggests 
that impartiality and standards that are meaningful to more than one polity 
are countervailing normative aspirations.  
Even at the time, commentators believed that universal standards 
might have improved matters. As Claud Mullins concluded in reflecting 
on the whole experiment with post-war criminal accountability, “there 
were difficulties of procedure, due to the widely differing judicial systems 
of England and her Allies.”129 Then, with a distinct air of regret, Mullins 
openly lamented that “there was no uniform criminal procedure.”130 
Whether or not uniformity was achievable or desirable in ICL procedure 
at the time, this history presents an important qualification of the ground 
we cede through the Argentine example: even if there is evidence that 
criminal law doctrine sometimes embodies the values of the underlying 
polity as in Argentine criminal procedure, post WWI trials show how 
establishing this congruence cannot automatically immunize Legal 
Pluralism from broader normative questions about whether ICL should 
defer to this national doctrine. Thus, in prescriptive form, Legal Pluralism 
is either overly presumptive (much legal doctrine does not reflect popular 
local values à la Argentina) or incomplete (venerating pre-existing legal 
values in each and every society does not address ICL’s aspiration for 
cross-cultural justice as in Leipzig). In what follows, we explore different 
variations of these dynamics within the typology we set out by way of 
introduction. 
  
                                                
128 As Hankel notes, international law had not crystallised into custom by the time of the 
trials, giving leeway for Germany to differ from the major Entente Powers on the 
interpretation of core concepts of the law of war, including the treatment of civilians, 
military necessity, and liability for superior orders. HANKEL, supra note 85, at 167–189. 
See also Kaleck, supra note 124; Alan Kramer, The First Wave of International War 
Crimes Trials: Istanbul and Leipzig 14 EUR. REV. 441 (2006) (that the German view of 
international law was that it was to be subordinated to the military necessity of swift 
victory); and, Herbert R. Roginbogin, Confronting “Crimes Against Humanity” from 
Leipzig to the Nuremberg Trials, in THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 115, 121 (Herbert R. Roginbogin et al, eds., 2006) (“The trials provided a venue for 
the legitimization of concepts that justified atrocious acts in war...[and] diluted the whole 
concept of war crimes in the course of the trials as to become meaningless.”). 
129 Mullins, supra note 88 at 26. 
130 Mullins, supra note 88 at 211. 
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III. INCHOATE CRIMES 
 
Armed with our Argentine example of apparent coincidence 
between criminal law doctrine and social values, plus our illustration from 
the post-WWI experience of the limitations of even this exemplar, we 
move to the first illustration of our typology. In this Part, we discuss an 
inchoate crime in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and another 
in post-WWII international tribunals to showcase how doctrine is not a 
dependable analytical stand-in for social, cultural or political values. 
Specifically, we show how social value and criminal doctrine come apart 
where criminal law is part and parcel of the violent repression ICL exists 
to counteract. In both the DRC and post-WWII tribunals, this unfortunate 
reality manifests. Because criminal doctrine serves an oppressive function 
in both contexts, it appears to fall well short of matching the overlap 
between social value and criminal doctrine evident in our Argentine 
example, even leaving aside the caveat we take from Leipzig. In other 
words, where criminal doctrine is an instrument of repression, relying on 
it as even a partial guarantor of cosmopolitanism in ICL seems sharply 
ahistorical, undermining the very utility of Legal Pluralism as a 
prescriptive theory of global normativity. 
The word “inchoate” means “just begun” or “undeveloped.”131 In 
most jurisdictions, the concept of “inchoate offenses” criminalizes 
conduct that is prior to the realization of a consummated offense. As 
Andrew Ashworth explains:  
 
[A] principal feature of these crimes is that they are 
committed even though the substantive offense (i.e. the 
offense it was intended to bring about) is not completed and 
no harm results. An attempt fails, conspiracy comes to 
nothing, words of incitement are ignored – in all these 
instances, there may be liability for the inchoate crime.132 
 
Thus, as Ashworth’s explanation suggests, there are three general offenses 
that are usually termed “inchoate” or “preliminary” in common law 
                                                
131 ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 437 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing 
inchoate offences generally, and the trend in English criminal law to widen the scope of 
the three traditional inchoate crimes). See also, JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING 
CRIMINAL LAW 373 (6th ed. 2012) (“Activity in the middle ranges [between formation of 
an idea and completed criminal action], i.e., after the formation of the mens rea but short 
of attainment of the criminal goal, is described as ‘inchoate’ – imperfect or incomplete – 
conduct.” 
132 ASHWORTH, supra note 131, at 373. 
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jurisdictions – attempt, conspiracy, and incitement.133 Unsurprisingly, 
foreign jurisdictions understand inchoate crimes differently, in part 
because punishing unconsummated offences raises the specter of thought 
crimes: the dangerous intrusion of the criminal law into the realm of 
purely personal ideation.134  
If different jurisdictions enact diverse rules governing when 
criminal plans are adequately ripe to warrant punishment (i.e. great 
doctrinal plurality), it should come as no surprise that ICL is caught 
between these competing sensibilities. Yet it would be premature to 
equate doctrinal pluralism, either in the law governing inchoate crimes in 
ICL or in the national law it draws upon, with a diversity of popular 
values within either constituency. In fact, in this the first element of our 
typology, we see how criminal law doctrine may be a vehicle for overt 
human rights repression, such that we want to deliberately deny legal 
diversity. To illustrate, we draw on the inchoate crime of association de 
malfaiteurs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). We select 
this example because of the Francophone colonial lineage, because this 
inchoate offense will be somewhat exotic to Anglophone audiences, and 
because the DRC is a country international criminal institutions are rightly 
engaged with at present. Most importantly, however, we choose this initial 
example because association de malfaiteurs is now used to systematically 
silence Congolese human rights defenders. And strikingly, although there 
are major discontinuities, the use of conspiracy at Nuremberg and Tokyo, 
which we discuss further below, reveals more continuity than rupture with 
its Francophone equivalent. 
 
 
A. Association de Malfaiteurs as Repression in the Congo  
 
The Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire, is one of the 
largest countries in Africa. The country’s history is spectacular, starting 
with Belgian King Leopold annexing the territory as his own personal 
property,135 then ruling with astonishing brutality.136 Later, all the uranium 
                                                
133 Id. 
134 Antony Duff, for instance, argues that privacy and autonomy are the primary rationale 
for why thought crimes are objectionable. See ANTONY DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME: 
RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY IN THE CRIMINAL LAW (2007). See also, DOUGLAS 
HUSAK, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS 47–51 (2010) 
(discussing criminal liability for thoughts, including inchoate crimes). 
135 ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST : A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND 
HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA (Mariner Books ed. 1998). For a more recent history, see 
also DAVID VAN REYBROUCK, CONGO: THE EPIC HISTORY OF A PEOPLE (2014). 
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for the Manhattan Project would come from the DRC, Che Guevara would 
find himself fighting in the country, and Western leaders would 
assassinate Patrice Lumumba – the first democratically elected President 
of the newly independent nation – for his Communist leanings. In modern 
times, the DRC has suffered what Madeline Albright dubbed “Africa’s 
First World War,”137 leading to in excess of 5 million civilian deaths since 
just 1998.138 And as political scientist Kevin Dunn reports, Joseph 
Conrad’s famous novel Heart of Darkness139 has probably proved 
something of a curse for the Congolese people too, since it set in stone 
perceptions that “this central African country was a land of violence, 
chaos, and avarice, perhaps beyond the comprehension of Western 
audiences.”140 
Inevitably, Congolese criminal law was and remains inextricably 
caught up in this bleak history such that it is readily distinguishable from 
our earlier Argentine example. Prior to Belgian colonialism, the mode of 
social governance was collective and concentric. Governance occurred at 
various subgroupings of increasing importance, starting with clans, then 
tribes, and culminating in sovereign ethnicities as the largest political 
unit.141 The cosmological commitment to “increasingly vital force” 
                                                                                                                     
136 As Hochschild points out, John Dunlop’s discovery of the rubber tire initially sparked 
a craze for the bicycle, but this paved the way for an even more popular Western fixation: 
the automobile. As Hochschild observed with no small dose of irony given the hellish 
implications it would have for the Congolese, “[f]or Leopold, the rubber boom was a 
godsend.” HOCHSCHILD, supra note 135 at 158–59. 
137 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Welcoming Remarks at the UN Security 
Council Session on the Democratic Republic of the Congo 1 (Jan. 24, 2000) (transcript 
available at http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/2000/000124.html) (“Because of 
that nation’s location and size, and because of the number of countries involved, the 
conflict there could be described as Africa’s first world war.”). Gérard Prunier, arguably 
the leading historian of the region, has also employed the metaphor. See GERARD 
PRUNIER, AFRICA’S WORLD WAR: CONGO, THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE, AND THE MAKING 
OF A CONTINENTAL CATASTROPHE (2009). 
138 INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, MORTALITY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF 
CONGO: AN ONGOING CRISIS 16 (2007) (estimating 5.4 million excess deaths in the first 
decade of the conflict, from 1998 to 2007). 
139 JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS AND OTHER TALES (Cedric Watts ed., 2008). 
For recurrent references to Conrad’s metaphor, see ROBERT EDGERTON, THE TROUBLED 
HEART OF AFRICA: A HISTORY OF THE CONGO (2002); LOSO KITETI BOYA, D. R. CONGO: 
THE DARKNESS OF THE HEART: HOW THE CONGOLESE HAVE SURVIVED 500 YEARS OF 
HISTORY (2010); MICHELA WRONG, IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF MR. KURTZ: LIVING ON THE 
BRINK OF DISASTER IN MOBUTU’S CONGO (2002). 
140 KEVIN C. DUNN, IMAGINING THE CONGO: THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF 
IDENTITY 4 (2003). 
141 E. Lamy, Le problème de l’intégration du droit congolais: son origine, son évolution, 
son avenir, numéro spécial REVUE JURIDIQUE DU CONGO 135–287, 142 (1965). Lamy is 
also clear that there were occasionally “souverainetés racialement hétérogènes.” 
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formed the foundation of this system, which was especially significant, 
since life-force was located in the group’s ancestral history.142 As a result, 
customary rules were frequently divided into two domains: (a) the Laws 
of the Sacred and the invisible; and (b) the Laws of the living and the 
visible.143 The former entailed a network of obligations that were 
ascertained through specialists in sacred law; the latter varied from place 
to place and attached to individuals by dint of being born into a particular 
normative system.144  
By all accounts, individualized forms of punishment were very 
much the exception across either system. Local communities, for example, 
“knew of no prisons.”145 According to one noted commentator, “[f]orms 
of physical restraint were used, but normally only to detain an offender 
pending his trial or punishment and even then rarely; certainly detention in 
itself does not appear to have been regarded as a punishment.146 Corporal 
punishment for wrongdoing existed, but had “a very limited 
application.”147 Instead, collective responsibility of the community as a 
whole, compensation, and ostracism of individual perpetrators from the 
collective were all the norm.148 As Dembour concludes, “Les Africains 
étaient habitués à un système où ce qui comptaitétait la compensation de 
la victim et non le châtiment du coupable (sauf pour des faits graves ou 
répétés où le châtiment était alors impitoyable).”149 The Belgians, 
however, saw this as “la barbarie.”150 
                                                
142 Id. at 143 (translated by first author). 
143 Id.  
144 Id. 
145 James S. Read, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, in AFRICAN PENAL SYSTEMS 89, 103 
(Alan Milner ed., 1969). 
146 Id. at 103. 
147 Id. at 104. 
148 Marie-Benedicte Dembour, La peine durant la colonisation belge, in Transactions of 
the Jean Bodin Society for Comparative Institutional History, Vol. LVII, PUNISHMENT 
67, 72 (1991) (“En effet, en Afrique prévalait une conception toute différente, qui faisait 
reposer la responsabilité sur le groupe auquel appartenait le coupable – sauf dans le cas 
où le groupe se désolidarisait du dernier en l’excluant.”); Read, supra note 145, at 105 
("The interdependence of individuals in the close-knit societies of earlier times made 
ostracism a potent sanction."). 
149 Dembour, supra note 148, at 92 (“Africans were used to a system where 
compensation to the victim was what mattered, not punishment of the guilty individual 
(except for grave or repeated crimes, where the punishment was without mercy” 
(Stewart’s translation)). 
150 Id. at 92. In fairness, one of the practices for dispute resolution that the Belgians took 
particular exception to involved a form of proof that required two parties to a dispute to 
imbibe toxic drinks called N’Kassa, which were administered by sorcerers. Predictably, 
the colonial reaction to these practices came with strong civilizing overtones. Writing in 
1898, Félicien Cattier, a close friend of King Leopold, Chairman of the Union minière 
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 By a decree dated January 7th, 1886, King Leopold promulgated 
the Congo’s first penal code (Code Pénal du Congo). The new code 
involved “vocabulary, formulation, and structure that was directly 
borrowed from Belgian criminal law legislation”.151 Although it was 
probably seen as an instrument for civilizing backwards or child-like 
African customs,152 in truth, the Code served far darker purposes. Writing 
in 1908, a close friend to King Leopold, Chairman of the Union minière 
du-Haut-Katanga (one of the most prominent Congolese mining 
companies) and Dean of the Université Libre de Bruxelles’ Law School 
declared that “[t]he Congo State is not a colonizing state, hardly a state: it 
is a financial company […] its aim has simply been to procure a maximum 
of resources for the King himself.”153 To do this, the King and his agents 
had to resort to what Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja calls “primitive 
accumulation” through “the use of torture, murder and other inhumane 
methods to compel Congolese to abandon their way of life to produce or 
do whatever the colonial state required of them.”154 The brutality that 
ensued was stupendous – a recent historiography estimated that as many 
as 10 million Congolese were murdered or disappeared under King 
Leopold’s reign, placing him among the most infamous purveyors of mass 
violence in known history.155  
Importantly for present purposes, the criminal law enabled rather 
than curtailed this violence. In an open letter of protest to King Leopold in 
1890 after a period in the Congo, American anti-slavery campaigner 
George Washington Williams objected that “the Courts of your Majesty’s 
Government [in the Congo] are abortive, unjust, partial and delinquent.”156 
                                                                                                                     
du-Haut-Katanga and Dean of the Université Libre de Bruxelles’ Law School claimed “le 
pouvoir colonial, exerçant son autorité, voulut à tout prix extirper de telles coutumes 
qualifiée mauvais parce qu’infrieures aux principle généraux de civilization.” FÉLICIEN 
CATTIER, DROIT ET ADMINISTRATION DE L’ETAT INDEPENDANT DU CONGO 442 (1898).  
151 Dembour, supra note 148, at 67. 
152 For a full exposition of colonial authorities referring to African populations as child-
like, see MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPORARY AFRICA AND 
THE LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM 12 (1996). 
153 FÉLICIEN CATTIER, ÉTUDE SUR LA SITUATION DE L’ÉTAT INDÉPENDANT DU CONGO 341 
(1906) (Stewart’s translation). 
154 GEORGES NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, THE CONGO: FROM LEOPOLD TO KABILA: A 
PEOPLE’S HISTORY 22 (2002). 
155 WILTZ MARC, IL PLEUT DES MAINS SUR LE CONGO (Magellan et Cie 2015). The 
number of prominent authors protesting Belgian atrocities in the Congo was striking. See 
SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE CRIME OF THE CONGO 14–15 (1909); See also Mark 
Twain’s brilliant satire in MARK TWAIN, KING LEOPOLD’S SOLILOQUY: A DEFENSE OF 
HIS CONGO RULE (The P. R. Warren Co., 2nd ed. 1905). 
156 George Washington Williams, “An Open Letter to His Serene Majesty Leopold II, 
King of the Belgians and Sovereign of the Independent State of Congo By Colonel, The 
Honorable Geo. W. Williams, of the United States of America,” 1890 
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The statement is corroborated by both the substance and enforcement of 
Congolese criminal law. The criminal law enacted for the DRC was 
considerably harsher than domestic Belgian criminal law of the time: the 
Belgian distinction between crimes, délits and peines was abrogated in the 
“vérsion simplifiée” imposed in the Congo,157 depriving the criminal law 
of important moral nuance. Attempts were punished the same way as 
completed crimes;158 and most significantly, only Africans received the 
infamous chicotte,159 the notoriously brutal whip made of dried 
hippopotamus hide. This whip, sanctioned by overtly racist criminal law 
doctrine, was at the heart of an intensely violent system of colonial 
governance.160 One Belgian District Commissioner in the Congo remarked 
as late as 1950, that “I used the punishment very sparingly. But its effect 
was terrible. We were so proud to be members of the administrative 
service, we felt so powerful. But all our power had its roots in the 
chicotte.”161  
We seize on one inchoate crime that featured in the 1886 Code 
Pénal du Congo, which by no small coincidence, has survived as a means 
                                                                                                                     
http://www.blackpast.org/george-washington-williams-open-letter-king-leopold-congo-
1890  
157 CATTIER, supra note 153 at 437 (explaining that “La loi congolaise ne connaît pas la 
distinction en crimes, délits et peines, qui est à la base du système répressif belge.”); 
Dembour, supra note 148, at  86 (“En effet, les testes sont d’inspiration belge, mais vu 
leur brièveté, ils ne présentent du système belge qu’une version simplifiée.” 
158 CATTIER, supra note 153 at 440. 
159 Dembour, supra note 148, at 86 (observing “la ségrégation qui régnait au sein de la 
société congolaise [...]. Celle-ci se situait à la fois dans la nature de la peine applicable – 
seuls les Africains recevaient la chicote – et dans la manière dont la peine était appliquée 
– un régime carcéral différent était prévu [...] l’Africain était en effet puni selon une 
échelle plus sévère que celle appliquée à l’Européen.”). 
160 Roger Casement, a British Consul stationed in Congo returned to Britain in 1903 to 
write a report on the Belgian atrocities in the Congo, in which he provided “detailed 
documentation and graphic examples of abuses, mainly the use of the chicotte (a type of 
whip) and the chopping off of hands and other body parts as punishment for failing to 
procure the required amount of rubber.” According to Dunn, “these reports recast the 
Congolese as victims of Belgian barbarity.” DUNN, supra note 140 at 52. WRONG, supra 
note 139, at 47 (“The chicotte, the gallows, mass executions were all liberally applied ill 
a campaign that often seemed to have extermination of races deemed inferior as an 
incidental aim.”). 
161 WRONG, supra note 139, at 39–40; REYBROUCK, supra note 135, at 216 (explaining 
that even in the 1950s, “[c]orporal punishment with the chicotte was still applied to all 
Africans, even those who could distinguish the Latin dative case from the genitive and 
read De Gaulle’s speeches.”). Evidently, the chicotte’s use was so widespread that it has 
taken on an important symbolic function within the Congolese memory of colonialism. 
See, critically, Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, La chicotte comme symbole du colonialisme 
belge?, 26 CANADIAN J. AFR. STUD./LA REVUE CANADIENNE DES ÉTUDES AFRICAINES 
205 (1992). 
2017] THE AHISTORICISM OF LEGAL PLURALISM 38 
   
of silencing human rights defenders and pro-democracy movements in the 
modern DRC. The chicotte is abandoned but the underlying criminal law 
lives on. 
Association de malfaiteurs literally means association of 
wrongdoers. Soon after the French Revolution, the French legislature set 
about codifying new criminal rules in response to excesses in the 
preceding period.162 To deal with marauding groups of organized 
criminals that had taken advantage of the insecurity that reigned during 
the revolution, the French Code Pénal of 1810 constructed a new inchoate 
offense that criminalized criminal associations.163 The Belgian criminal 
code of 1867 borrowed the then novel doctrine from its neighbor,164 just in 
time for the wholesale transmission of a rough-and-ready form of Belgian 
criminal law into the DRC a decade later. As a result of this 
uncomfortable passage, association de malfaiteurs became a criminal 
offense amongst an African people who did not agree to the rule and 
probably suffered terribly as a result of its very one-sided enforcement. 
After all, in a technical sense, much of what transpired under Belgian 
colonial rule satisfied the definition of the offense, vindicating Sir Arthur 
Conan Doyle’s choice of title for his oeuvre on the topic, The Crime of the 
Congo. 
As a doctrine, association de malfaiteurs has survived unscathed in 
Congolese criminal law to this day. In 1940, the Belgians again 
promulgated a Criminal Code for the Congo by decree, which largely re-
enacted the earlier law in a slightly more coordinated fashion that, 
predictably, was again “patterned after the Belgian Criminal Code.”165 
Independence in 1960 did not lead to a sharp break with this history, 
                                                
162 Marcel Culioli & Pierre Gioanni, Association de Malfaiteurs, 80 REVUE 
PÉNITENTIAIRE ET DE DROIT PÉNAL 1, 22 (2007) (referring to a particularly notorious 
group of organized criminals called the “Chauffers”, who pillaged and killed throughout 
the countryside during the period); RAPHAËLE PARIZOT, GENEVIÈVE GIUDICELLI-DELAGE 
& ALESSANDRO BERNARDI, LA RESPONSABILITÉ PÉNALE À L’ÉPREUVE DE LA 
CRIMINALITÉ ORGANISÉE : LE CAS SYMPTOMATIQUE DE L’ASSOCIATION DE MALFAITEURS 
ET DU BLANCHIMENT EN FRANCE ET EN ITALIE 131 (2010) (confirming this history). 
163 Culioli and Gioanni, supra note 162, at 22 (referring to a particularly notorious group 
of organized criminals called the “Chauffers”, who pillaged and killed throughout the 
countryside during the period); PARIZOT, GIUDICELLI-DELAGE, AND BERNARDI, supra 
note 162, at 131 (confirming this history). The initial language stipulated that “Toute 
association de malfaiteurs envers les personnes ou les propriétés, est un crime contre la 
paix publique.” CODE DES DÉLITS ET DES PEINES art. 265 (1810) (Belg.), 
http://www.koeblergerhard.de/Fontes/CodePenal1810.htm (last visited June 1, 2017). 
164 Frank Verbruggen & Philip Traest, Belgique, 73 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT 
PÉNAL 13 (2007). 
165 ANTON WEKERLE, GUIDE TO THE TEXT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE CODES OF BURUNDI, RWANDA, AND ZAIRE 25 (1975), 
http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/010452689 (last visited Feb 5, 2015). 
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meaning that association de malfaiteurs continued in Congolese criminal 
law without major modification: as leading commentators agreed soon 
after independence that “[w]ith the change to Republican status, the 
criminal law has scarcely changed.”166 Evidently, the same remains true 
today. The leading modern textbook on Congolese criminal law – 
authored by the Dean of the School of Law at the University of Kinshasa – 
still draws a direct line between the current criminal code, the decree of 20 
January 1940, and that of 7 January 1886.167 Taking ICL as an inter-
penetrating normative system that respects extant doctrine needs to 
simultaneously grapple with this lineage. Based on this preliminary 
historical inquiry, it seems far removed from the example of Argentine 
criminal procedure (to say nothing of the problems of diversity raised in 
the study of Leipzig). 
Despite our best efforts, we have not unearthed material suggesting 
that association de malfaiteurs was debated, reconsidered, and 
enthusiastically retained by anyone over this history, let alone some entity 
with meaningful democratic credentials capable of vesting a degree of 
popular acquiescence into a rule derived from a spectacularly brutal 
history. Whereas Argentine procedure was redesigned in an eclectic 
fashion based on the needs of a changing society, association de 
malfaiteurs remains largely unchanged. Association de malfaiteurs is only 
Congolese law by omission; it is “Congolese” only because the Congolese 
have not repealed it. And to undermine the thesis that this omission 
somehow evidences popular endorsement of the imposed rule (like 
Pakistani enthusiasm for cricket or Argentine retention of some aspects of 
Spanish criminal procedure), observe also the repressive function this 
criminal law doctrine continues to play vis-à-vis the local population in 
this country. Association de malfaiteurs is no friend to everyday 
Congolese—it still appears to function as a mechanism that maintains a 
violent social order for the betterment of the few who wield it.  
To the extent association de malfeiteurs can meaningfully be 
described as ‘Congolese’, it is an instrument of violence for certain 
elements of the Congolese state. In 2013, twelve Congolese human rights 
defenders were arrested, tried and convicted of association de malfaiteurs 
                                                
166 Antoine Rubbens, The Congo Democratic Republic,  in AFRICAN PENAL SYSTEMS 14, 
16 (1969). Although Rubbens was writing in 1969, only a matter of years after 
independence, more recent studies conclude similiarly. See, e.g., Marie-Benedicte 
Dembour, supra note 148 at 69, (“Encore aujourd’hui, le système pénal zaïrois reste 
fortement imprégné des principes que le colonisateur belge a introduits...”). 
167 NYABIRUNGU MWENE SONGA, TRAITÉ DE DROIT PÉNAL GÉNÉRAL CONGOLAIS 49 
(2001) (“La loi pénale trouve son siège principal au code pénal. Celui-ci, qui est 
aujourd’hui porté par le décret du 30 janvier 1940, a eu un début de formulation dans un 
texte législatif du 7 janvier 1886”.). 
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for having encouraged people to participate in peaceful demonstrations 
against an increase in energy and water prices, as well as the general 
mismanagement by the Governor of the province.168 Likewise, in 2006, a 
Congolese bishop and two others were convicted of association de 
malfaiteurs soon after the bishop televised a sermon criticizing the 
Congolese President, in a trial that Amnesty International called 
“summary and unfair.”169 Evidently, these are not isolated incidents. The 
misuse of association de malfaiteurs is so common that after listing at 
least five other very recent examples in the Congo, one representative of a 
human rights organization in the DRC wrote to us that “there are so many 
of these cases throughout the entire territory that it is difficult for the 
moment to draw up a decent list.”170 If leading western human rights 
organizations are up in arms protesting the excessive application of 
association de malfaiteurs in France,171 it is of little surprise that the same 
doctrine is having much worse consequences in the far periphery. 
                                                
168 Evidently, the defendants were not able to present a defense, pressure was placed on 
judges to enter convictions, and the defendants were prohibited from raising claims about 
physical abuse in custody. Fédération internationale des droits de l’Homme (FIDH), 
RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO (RDC) : CONDAMNATION EN APPEL DE 12 
DÉFENSEURS DES DROITS DE (...), http://www.fidh.org/fr/afrique/republique-
democratique-du-congo/republique-democratique-du-congo-rdc-condamnation-en-appel-
de-12-13194 (last visited Jul. 31, 2014). 
169 Amnesty International, Républic démocratique du Congo: Persistance de la torture et 
des homicides par des agents de l'État chargé de la sécurité, Indiex AI: AFR 
62/012/2007, at 16-17. 
170 Email correspondence with Congolese human rights representative (name and 
organization withheld), June 12, 2014. On file with authors. (“Il y a autant des dossiers 
sur l’ensemble du territoire qu’il est difficile pour le moment de faire une bonne liste”) 
(Stewart’s translation).   
171 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PREEMPTING JUSTICE: COUNTERTERRORISM LAWS AND 
PROCEDURES IN FRANCE 8 (2008) (protesting that “[t]he overly broad formulation of the 
association de malfaiteurs offense has led, in our view, to convictions based on weak or 
circumstantial evidence.”); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF PREVENTION: 
INSUFFICIENT SAFEGUARDS IN NATIONAL SECURITY REMOVAL 19 (2007) (quoting a 
French criminal lawyer as reporting that “you are the cousin of the cousin of the cousin 
of someone who’s done something, so you are in an association de malfaiteurs. The 
concept is very vague. It’s the law itself that’s dangerous.... [and] the defense becomes 
impossible’.”). Theorists of French criminal law also object that association de 
malfaiteurs has become “a veritable rupture of the theory of criminal participation’s 
limits.” RAPHAËLE PARIZOT, LA RESPONSABILITÉ PÉNALE À L’ÉPREUVE DE LA 
CRIMINALITÉ ORGANISÉE : LE CAS SYMPTOMATIQUE DE L’ASSOCIATION DE MALFAITEURS 
ET DU BLANCHIMENT EN FRANCE ET EN ITALIE 129 (2010) (translated by first author). See 
also, Culioli & Gioanni, supra note 162, at 20 (listing a set of conceptual problems with 
the application of association de malfaiteurs in France); Evidently, association de 
malfaiteurs is used extensively, including in the vast majority of cases involving arrest on 
suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities. FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DES 
DROITS DE L’HOMME, FRANCE PAVING THE WAY FOR ARBITRARY JUSTICE 9 (1999). 
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Hopefully, this history exposes the underbelly of the criminal law 
to which ICL cannot afford to turn a blind eye to. As Jacqueline Costa has 
argued, “[i]n Africa, criminal law is not the codified expression of the 
values of an established social order. It is a tool to be used in the very 
creation of such an order.”172 Her point is more sinister than a quick 
reading suggests. Frequently, criminal law doctrine does not represent 
popular social values; it often continues a long history of violent 
repression in the service of authoritarian rule. The criminal law in Nazi 
Germany and Stalin’s Russia are just extreme examples of an 
unfortunately common trend that flows into an appreciable number of 
modern states. Although we have not unearthed examples of association 
de malfaiteurs being employed in this fashion during the colonial period, 
it certainly appears to operate this way in the DRC now. In line with the 
history of the colonial criminal law that produced it, association de 
malfaiteurs seems to have become a highly one-sided instrument to further 
governance by force, and in extremis, to systematically undermine 
enjoyment of basic human rights. The parallels with the past are striking. 
If this reading is even somewhat accurate, allowing international 
rules to defer to, absorb, or mirror legal doctrine from countries that find 
themselves in a similar situation as the DRC in the name of Legal 
Pluralism is not necessarily the noble act of respect it might seem at first 
blush—as is the case here, the doctrine in question may actually stem 
from elsewhere, have been imposed by force as part of a brutal campaign 
of subjugation and plunder, and may operate to inhibit political 
participation, freedom of expression, and other fundamental rights. 
Criminal law is sometimes part of the problem ICL exists to address, such 
that resistance for reasons of principle and not deference in the name of 
Legal Pluralism is the appropriate normative response. Moreover, the 
problem is not just whether the criminal law doctrine complies with 
human rights in an abstract conceptual sense, such that Legal Pluralists 
can save their position by crafting human rights as a generic exception; it 
is also whether the doctrine enjoys any democratic legitimacy, whether it 
represents a terrible past local populations hope to leave well behind them, 
and whether a facially defensible criminal law doctrine operates within a 
concrete sociological frame to the great detriment of those affected—
physically, socially or symbolically.  
In all these respects, conceiving of ICL as a diverse, conflicting, 
sometimes inter-penetrating normative system to be managed, without 
adding a sophisticated historical critique of the norm(s) in question risks 
tarring ICL with the same brush as the objectionable national criminal law 
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standards it draws upon. This is quite apart from the difficulty we learn 
from Leipzig, that drawing on single jurisdictions might underappreciate 
the need for a brand of criminal justice that speaks neutrally across 
multiple cultures. In other words, championing a diversity of legal 
doctrine to preserve doctrinal heterogeneity is, methodologically speaking, 
dangerous if carried out without first adopting what James Whitman calls 
a “sociohistorical perspective” on the criminal law,173 then assessing 
countervailing normative aspirations for the field. As Franz Kafka was so 
earnest to remind us, that perspective will sometimes confirm that 
criminal law doctrine is part and parcel of what his fellow novelist Joseph 
Conrad called “the horror”.174 	
 
B. The Repressive Aspects of Conspiracy at the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals 
 
We move, then, from the experience of association de malfaiteurs 
in the Congo, to conspiracy, the Anglo-American inchoate offense applied 
at the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals to discuss the international 
equivalent of our typology’s first element – instances where criminal 
doctrine is part of the problem ICL exists to counteract. Here too, we 
observe courts drawing on national legal standards, but standards that, 
despite appearances, actually stem from a very small number of Western 
states. Whereas the Congolese experience involved the passage of a 
French inchoate offense through Belgium, the international experience of 
conspiracy at both postwar tribunals arose from English criminal law that 
was imported into ICL via and at the behest of the United States. In both 
instances, the law was foreign and therefore alien to its ultimate audiences 
(as in Leipzig), deeply one-sided in application, operated to expunge basic 
human rights and, ultimately, was very deliberately deployed to construct 
a social order by force rather than popular approval. To be sure, there are 
very significant differences between these two examples, but by and large, 
one is left with the sense that international criminal doctrine is again no 
trustworthy guarantor of the value-pluralism that pluralists tacitly seek to 
uphold once they shift from a descriptive to a normative mode. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Nuremberg was an almost complete 
                                                
173 JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING 
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reversal of Leipzig.175 In the memorable words of the US Secretary of 
War Henry Stimson, by late 1944, the end of the Third Reich was 
“approaching on a galloping horse.”176 This looming event raised a 
pressing set of questions for the Allies: what would become of Hitler and 
his cronies after their fall? Initially, both Britain and the United States 
were firmly in favor of mass executions. Indeed, it was only when Henry 
Morgenthau’s plan to execute Nazis en masse and reduce Germany to an 
agrarian society was leaked to the American public that Allied policy 
begrudgingly tilted in favor of trials.177 Public opinion in the United Stated 
viewed the now infamous Morgenthau Plan as “inhumane,” creating new 
impetus to try rather than shoot the vanquished enemy.178 Even then, the 
British still needed much convincing, probably because their memories of 
Leipzig were still fresh.179 By this point, though, the Americans were hard 
at work determining what law they could possibly use to achieve this 
tremendous feat. The stakes were high, especially when some were 
tempted to see these trials as “the Ten Commandments, Magna Carta, and 
the Gettysburg Address all rolled into one.”180 
In early autumn 1944, a New York securities lawyer named 
Colonel Murray C. Bernay, then working for the U.S. War Department, 
                                                
175 The reversal is evident from many factors, including: (a) that Winston Churchill was 
for prosecutions after WWI but staunchly opposed to them after WWII; (b) that the 
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particularly on concepts like military necessity, would reach diametrically opposite 
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GERRY SIMPSON, LAW, WAR AND CRIME : WAR CRIMES TRIALS AND THE REINVENTION 
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hatched a plan to combine the use of conspiracy and membership in 
criminal organizations to capture a broad swath of Nazi hardliners and 
sympathizers alike, without going to the trouble of proving who did 
what.181 Very quickly, this doctrine of conspiracy would find itself front 
and center at Nuremberg and Tokyo thereafter (although courts would 
interpret it restrictively and as applying only to aggression).182 This notion 
of conspiracy came with a number of major shortcomings leading up to, at 
and subsequent to the trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo, often revealing the 
same sorts of difficulties as its cousin association de malfaiteurs in the 
Congo. Consequently, this history again reveals a dark shadow from 
which modern ICL may wish to distance itself. This process of distancing 
may be preferable to permitting all ICL doctrine to simply co-exist 
alongside other doctrinal arrangements, within a system of legal diversity 
to be tolerated and managed.   
During the negotiation of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters, it 
quickly emerged that—as with the use of German criminal procedure at 
Leipzig—defining and using conspiracy risked alienating the trial’s 
closest audiences. Herbert Wechsler, a Professor at Columbia Law School 
(then acting as U.S. Assistant Deputy General, but famous for his later 
role in spearheading the drafting of the U.S. Model Penal Code) wrote a 
detailed memorandum forewarning that “some confusion may be 
engendered by the terminology of the War Department proposal which 
refers to the basic crime as a ‘common-law conspiracy,’ employing that 
concept as it is known to American law.”183  
The confusion Wechsler’s foresaw came to pass. When the whole 
conspiracy/criminal organizations scheme was presented to the Russians 
and French, their representatives were left veritably dumb-founded by the 
idea of using an inchoate crime like conspiracy to enmesh Nazis high and 
                                                
181 Jonathan Bush explains how this approach was made necessary by the sheer volume 
of devastation stretching across more than twelve years coupled with the shortage of 
individualized documentary evidence. J.A. Bush, The Prehistory of Corporations and 
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182 According to the Nuremberg Judgment, “the [Nuremberg] Charter does not define as a 
separate crime any conspiracy except the one to commit acts of aggressive war.” 
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low for harm that did actually transpire. Momentarily, we will discuss 
retorts that conspiracy was actually part of continental legal systems, but 
for now, note that if this was formally true as a matter of comparative law 
doctrine, the fact was entirely lost on French and Russian representatives 
at Nuremberg. In an often-quoted passage, the noted historian of the 
Nuremberg trials, Bradley F. Smith, reported that:  
 
[T]he Russians and French seemed unable to grasp all the 
implications of the concept [conspiracy]; when they finally 
did grasp it, they were genuinely shocked. The French 
viewed it entirely as a barbarous legal mechanism unworthy 
of modern law, while the Soviets seemed to have shaken their 
head in wonderment—a reaction, some cynics may believe, 
prompted by envy. But the main point of the Soviet attack on 
conspiracy was that it was too vague and so unfamiliar to the 
French and themselves, as well as to the Germans, that it 
would lead to endless confusion.184  
 
Despite the apparent surprise, there was continual disagreement in 
pleadings before both the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals about whether 
or not conspiracy was actually alien to civil law systems. In one camp, 
leading civil lawyers protested the concept’s intrusion into ICL. Bert 
Röling, the Dutch Judge at Tokyo, for instance, described conspiracy as 
“one of the ugly aspects of the Anglo-American system,”185 protesting that 
“[i]n the continental European countries conspiracy has played only a very 
limited role.”186 Similarly, August von Knieriem, the lawyer for I.G. 
Farben who was tried and acquitted at Nuremberg, subsequently wrote a 
lengthy legal polemic criticizing the concept more forcefully: “[t]o the 
continental lawyer and to the layman, too, the Anglo-American concepts 
of conspiracy and of accessory after the fact are hard to understand and 
their results appear to be unfair.”187 In the competing camp, a number of 
commentators have argued that these critics were altogether too coy about 
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the uptake of conspiracy in continental legal systems, including in both 
German and Japanese criminal law.188 Instead of taking sides in this 
contest, we focus on the analytical methodology the Tokyo Tribunal 
adopted to justify its controversial conclusion that, despite all the 
foregoing hesitation and critique, conspiracy was a general principle 
common to all nations.189 
When the issue of conspiracy’s legitimacy in international law was 
addressed at the Tokyo Tribunal, the Prosecution argued that all four 
major powers approved of the two Charters in which this apparently 
foreign concept appeared, and eighteen of twenty-two other states that 
also signed the London Agreement were civil law jurisdictions.190 On 
closer inspection, however, this argument was not especially compelling 
in that this assent was subject to the same dynamics that manufactured 
criminal law throughout the globe: in truth, brute power probably 
overrode consent as a plausible explanation for conspiracy’s entry into the 
corpus of ICL. In negotiating the Charters, even the Allies complained of 
“an arbitrary and domineering American manner,”191 so “that in the end 
the Americans pretty much had their way was surely more of a tribute to 
their great power… than it was to any skills they showed in 
diplomacy.”192 In this light, conspiracy’s ability to claim any cross-
cultural endorsement in ICL today seems poor.  
The inchoate offense’s right to peaceful co-existence in a plural 
ICL is even weaker still if we interrogate its history further. In a rousing 
set of arguments at Tokyo, defense lawyers began by repeating the 
familiar argument that the doctrine treated as universal that which was 
highly particular. Counsel for the defense argued that conspiracy’s 
                                                
188 Even during the negotiations of the Nuremberg charter, some had stressed this point. 
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inclusion in the Tokyo Tribunal’s Statute was “astonishing!,”193 and asked 
rhetorically: “Are not all comparativist jurists aware that the doctrine of 
criminal conspiracy is a peculiar product of English legal history?”194 In 
addressing this history directly, the defense also pointed out that even 
Adam Smith had shown that conspiracy was initially used in Britain to 
penalize trade unions, “a social class highly obnoxious to the dominant 
class in the eighteenth century.”195 Similarly, they cited Harvard Professor 
Francis Bowes Sayre’s conclusion that “a doctrine so vague in its outlines 
and uncertain in its fundamental nature as conspiracy lends no strength or 
glory to law, it is a veritable quick-sand of shifting opinion and ill-
considered thought.”196 If conspiracy was a vague “weapon of 
convenience” for the powerful nationally, as Sayre suggested, was 
migrating it into ICL doing much of a service to the majority of the world? 
We do not believe that Legal Pluralism can wash its hands of this question 
now, just because the Tokyo Tribunal once did.  
No matter how one answers this question though, the mechanics of 
conspiracy’s absorption into ICL were highly suspect. At Tokyo, the Chief 
Prosecutor – an American named Joseph Keenan – tabled a comparative 
survey of conspiracy-like provisions in several legal systems in an attempt 
to refute the argument that “conspiracy is not an international crime 
because… it is a doctrine peculiar to the Anglo-American law.”197 In an 
ambitious bid to synthesize criminal doctrine applicable in Germany, 
France, the Netherlands, Spain, China, and Japan, Keenan made a 
methodological error that concerns us still today about the operation of 
Legal Pluralism in ICL. In the context of France, Keenan cited the 
provision of the French Code Pénal governing association de malfaiteurs 
without any apparent appreciation as to its history, within France or 
beyond.198 To compound matters, when turning to Spain, he surmised that 
“Spain, and all the countries which were formerly Spanish colonies, 
including the Philippines, base their penal codes on the original Code 
Napoleon of 1810, which is, of course, also the source of the French Penal 
Code.”199 In all likelihood, this genealogy is quite accurate, but the 
method should be disquieting to those who care about infusing ICL with a 
plurality of social, cultural and political values—we know what 
association de malfaiteurs might mean within these recipient 
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communities. 
The concerns with respect to conspiracy’s entry into ICL also 
appear at the level of its application, albeit in a different guise. Many, like 
Gerry Simpson, have recognized that conspiracy probably worked well 
enough at Nuremberg “but it was discredited at Tokyo.”200 Japanese 
historians express no opinion on the first aspect of the claim, but they 
agree with the second. Several years ago, a noted Japanese scholar 
reported that “I doubt that any Japanese historian – and there are many 
historians present today – still accepts the interpretation of conspiracy, or 
of an overall common plan, put forward in the Tokyo Trial’s view of 
history.”201 Evidently, there were many smaller conspiracies, rather than 
one all-encompassing “gigantic” one.202 The implications of this excessive 
application for the defendants go without saying, but for now, we focus 
just on the political and sociological implications of this broad standard’s 
application, recalling comparable problems with association de 
malfaiteurs in the Congo.  
At Tokyo, conspiracy speaks to a repeat of the double standards 
we witnessed with respect to the chicotte—Japanese defendants were 
charged and convicted of conspiracy to wage war against “French 
Indochina.” Within the section of the Tokyo Judgment that deals with 
Japanese aggression in Indo-China, the Tribunal set out how “[i]n June 
1940, shortly after the fall of France, she [France] was forced to agree 
with Japan’s demands to permit a military mission into Indo-China”.203 
On 25 August, the French Ambassador informed the Japanese “that 
France had decided to yield to the Japanese demands,” and the so-called 
Matsuoka-Henri Agreement was signed.204 In brushing aside defense 
arguments that this agreement precluded a finding of aggression, the 
majority in the Tokyo Tribunal reasoned that “the sovereignty of France in 
all parts of the Union of Indo-China” was violated by Japanese conduct.205 
This was because the French only signed the agreement “when faced with 
an actual invasion”.206 Using coercion to vitiate consent was no doubt fair 
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and accurate in the circumstances, but the failure to register that “French” 
Indochina, indeed Allied authority over much of the Third World, was 
brought about by legally comparable processes is striking. Again here, 
ICL operated like the chicotte in the Congo: as an openly discriminatory 
instrument of power to be used in the very construction of a (global) social 
order.207  
Other parallels with colonialism emerged throughout WWII trials, 
sometimes explicitly. For instance, when Allied prosecutors quizzed 
Hermann Göring about lebensraum, the political concept that served as a 
pretext for Nazi expansionism, Göring snidely remarked: “I fully 
understand that the four signatory powers [to the Charter] who call three 
quarters of the world their own explain the idea differently.”208 Likewise, 
even the U.S. Prosecutor at Nuremberg, Robert Jackson, could not shake 
off the uncomfortable parallel between his cases against German 
industrialists for pillaging natural resources like coal, oil, and manganese 
from Occupied Europe and comparable colonial practices, the likes of 
which had so horrified Joseph Conrad and others. In a letter to President 
Truman written during the Nuremberg process, Jackson remarked glibly, 
“we are prosecuting plunder and our allies are practicing it.”209 And to 
square the circle, in defending Klaus Barbie before French courts for his 
wartime participation in Nazi atrocities, the notorious lawyer Jacques 
Verge’s procès de rupture entailed a detailed parallel between the 
allegations against Barbie in wartime Lyon and colonial atrocities in a 
number of the prosecuting state’s former colonies, including “French 
Indochina.”210  
We tie the criminal law doctrine that currently exists in much of 
the world to these histories of parochialism, imposition by power, and 
hypocrisy in application. Without suggesting that the relation is inevitable 
or constant, even in post-colonial states, these histories warn against a fast 
assumption that allowing modern ICL to reabsorb extant criminal law 
doctrine is somehow noble, liberal, respectful or functionally optimal. To 
be sure, there are important discontinuities between the operation of 
association de malfaiteurs in the Congo and conspiracy at Tokyo, most 
notably, the absence of massive guilt on the part of the Congolese people. 
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Nonetheless, association de malfaiteurs in the Congo and conspiracy at 
post-war tribunals probably overlap more than they diverge. In both 
instances, these inchoate crimes were foreign and therefore alienating 
(replicating Leipzig); both crimes were applied in a highly discriminatory 
fashion to construct a social order by force rather than popular approval, 
and both were applied in such a way that they occasioned important 
human rights violations. The contexts are entirely different, but certain 
themes emerge from both. When faced with these commonalities, scholars 
and practitioners of modern ICL may wish to distance themselves from 
doctrine born of these ugly histories. To do this, they will have to rethink 
ICL in ways that better reflect a plurality of political interests and social 
values, perhaps in a way that solves the sorts of dilemmas that arose with 
procedure post WWI, instead of just managing doctrinal diversity once a 
norm is formally anointed somewhere as binding law. 
 
IV. MODES OF ATTRIBUTION 
 
In our typology’s second element, we ask whether criminal law 
doctrine transplanted into recipient legal systems outside formal 
colonialism might also upset criminal law doctrine’s capacity to act as a 
marker for underlying social values within the polity it serves, again 
making doctrine an unreliable proxy for value diversity. As we pointed out 
by way of introduction, the literature on legal transplants is voluminous,211 
and suggests that legal transplants of these sorts seldom “work.” If 
Argentina was our illustration of an instance where it did work, and WWI 
a qualification of what it means to “work” for ICL, we are still concerned 
that in a number of instances, local communities will prove “unreceptive” 
to transposed criminal law doctrine, meaning that the recipient society is 
“unable to give meaning to the law.”212 In this Part, we seize on modes of 
attribution within national and international law to highlight these 
concerns, again cautioning against a fast shift from a descriptive version 
of Legal Pluralism that plots interacting normativity to a prescriptive 
alternative that uses existing laws as the building blocks of a defensible 
system of global governance. 
Modes of attribution – like aiding and abetting, superior 
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GABRIEL DE TARDE, THE LAWS OF IMITATION (Elsie Worthington Clews Parsons trans., 
Henry Holt & Co. 1903) (1895). 
212 Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The Transplant Effect, 
51 AM. J. COMP. L. 179, 179 (2003). 
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responsibility, and joint criminal enterprise – attribute criminal harm to 
individual agency.213 In this section, we emphasize the history of modes of 
attribution in two inter-connected legal systems, one national the other 
international. To reiterate our wider method, an analysis at both levels is 
essential to unpacking the ahistoricism of Legal Pluralism in ICL since 
power decoupled the relationship between ICL and a genuine plurality of 
social and cultural values by first distorting the national criminal law ICL 
often draws on, then by subjecting ICL itself to the same sword.  
Moreover, to reiterate lessons learned from attempts at accountability  
after WWI, unconditional surrender to the diversity of doctrine may 
undermine the probability of meaningful justice. In our national example 
of these dynamics, we explain how Japan came to adopt German modes of 
attribution through these dynamics. We show how virtually all of modern 
Japanese criminal law doctrine – not just modes of attribution – was 
initially imported from the West through varying degrees of coercion. In 
the second section, we study the modern mode of attribution called Joint 
Criminal Enterprise (JCE) within ad hoc ICL tribunals. That doctrine 
claims a history rooted in the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals as well as 
multiple national criminal systems around the world. Yet a deeper 
historical analysis suggests that JCE is actually the product of a very 
selective reading of ICL and national criminal law that privileges a minute 
sample of Western understandings of criminal responsibility. In short, our 
study of the law of modes of attribution shows yet another means by 
which criminal doctrine is imposed coercively on states, and another 
instance where a modern set of ICL institutions ingest this imbalanced 
history. 
                                                
213 As an example of doctrinal legal pluralism, different legal systems use different labels 
to describe what we call modes of attribution here. International criminal courts and 
tribunals tend to call these legal concepts “modes of liability,” but practice has also used 
the terms “forms of attribution” and “modes of participation.” See Prosecutor v. Charles 
Taylor, No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Judgement, ¶ 455 (18 May 2012) (referring to “modes 
of liability”); Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Judgment 
pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den 
Wyngaert, ¶ 62 (18 Dec, 2012) (discussing “forms of attribution”); and, Tadić, supra 
note 6, at ¶ 227 (referring to joint criminal enterprise as a “mode of participation”). 
Again, national systems tend to adopt different labels. In German criminal law, the 
overarching concept is Beteiligung, which experts translate as “participation.” See 
MICHAEL BOHLANDER, PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW 154 (2008). French 
criminal law theory also refers to criminal participation. See Christine Lazerges, La 
Participation criminelle, in RÉFLEXIONS SUR LE NOUVEAU CODE PÉNAL 11 (1995). In 
many Anglo-American jurisdictions, the tendency is to describe modes of liability as 
those rules that determine parties to a crime. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 701 
(5th ed. 2010) (employing the term “Parties to Crime”); A. SIMESTER & G.R. SULLIVAN, 
CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND DOCTRINE 195 (3d ed. 2007) (discussing modes of 
participation). 
2017] THE AHISTORICISM OF LEGAL PLURALISM 52 
   
 
 
A. German Modes of Attribution in Japan 
 
 For the uninitiated, there is something very peculiar about modes 
of attribution in modern Japanese criminal law—they are strikingly 
German. Leafing through the leading English-language text on Japanese 
criminal law, Shigemitsu Dando’s The Criminal Law of Japan: The 
General Part, one is immediately struck by the enormous influence of 
German criminal law and theory.214 The word “German” appears sixty-
seven times in the text, and “Germany” appears slightly more frequently. 
The text is also replete with references to leading theories within German 
criminal law, from Welzel’s theory of action to Roxin’s theory of 
perpetration;215 the book contains literally hundreds of references to 
German theorists. As the author himself acknowledges in the preface to 
the English translation, “I have been strongly influenced on a number of 
points by German penal law theory, which tends to be true of most of the 
body of criminal law scholars in Japan.”216  
 Unsurprisingly then, when one turns to Japanese modes of 
attribution in particular, the text reveals a variety of features quite alien to 
Anglo-American systems that mirror German criminal law and theory 
more or less precisely.217 Thus, if one looked to Japanese criminal law to 
determine the scope of complicity in order to interpret the concept in 
customary ICL (as one international criminal tribunal recently did),218 or 
                                                
214 SHIGEMITSU DANDO, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF JAPAN: THE GENERAL PART (B.J. 
George trans. 1997) (1957). 
215 Id. at 11, 218. (discussing Hans Welzel’s telelogical theory of action and Claus 
Roxin’s theory of perpetration). 
216 Id. at xv. 
217 To cite but a few illustrations, Japanese criminal law adopts a German tripartite 
structure, differentiating the paradigm of the crime, from justifications and excuses, 
whereas Anglo-American systems amalgamates the latter two of these categories. Id. at 
3–4. Following its German inspiration, Japanese criminal law also includes dolus 
eventualis as the lowest subcategory of intention, in contrast with Anglo-American 
criminal law whose closest equivalent is a stand-alone mental element called 
recklessness. For the Japanese treatment of dolus eventualis as intention, see id. at 154–
55. Normally, recklessness is not assimilated into intention in English-speaking systems 
as it is in Germany, and by mimicry now, in Japan. Finally, Japanese criminal law also 
rejects the objective theory of perpetration in favor of quintessentially German accounts 
of the dividing line between perpetration and complicity—while Anglo-American 
criminal law (unconvincingly) always treats the person doing the killing as the 
perpetrator, both Japanese and German criminal law do not. Compare DANDŌ, supra 
note 214, at 217–19, with BOHLANDER, supra note 213, at 156–66. 
218 Recently, in surveying standards of complicity around the world to help determine the 
scope of aiding and abetting in customary international law, the ICTY drew heavily on 
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to ascertain the ways in which ICL (applied in national legal systems) 
constrains the global trade in weaponry, one recognizes the distinctive 
mark of German criminal law immediately. How could this be so? 
Accomplice liability is constructed very differently from one legal system 
to another,219 and Germany never colonized Japan. Perhaps Japanese 
scholars and legislators were moved by the undeniable analytical elegance 
of German criminal law, or by pure happenstance, German ideas about 
social order, crime and punishment meshed well with underlying 
ideological pre-commitments in Japan. While both these hypotheses are 
probably partially true, history reveals a slightly darker explanation that 
again unsettles the view that extant doctrine is a necessary repository of 
social and cultural diversity to be safeguarded and preserved 
internationally—perhaps German criminal law was forced upon the 
Japanese? 
 The uptake of German criminal law in Japan began during the 
reign of the Emperor Meiji in the late 19th century, when the country 
reshaped its legal system to mirror Western norms.220 From the seventh 
century until the Meiji reforms, Japanese law was based on Chinese 
thought,221 and criminal justice was administered through the Shogunate 
and its officials.222 The impetus to shift to a more European system came 
                                                                                                                     
Dando’s text to report Japanese standards that were strikingly similar to those applicable 
in Germany. This, once again, is an example of the normative inter-penetration we 
identify here. See Šainović supra note 4, at ¶ 1645 n.5416 (discussing Japanese law of 
complicity in the context of its rejection of “specific direction” as an element of 
complicity in customary international law). Aside from the fact that Japanese criminal 
law allows dolus eventualis as the lowest mental element for complicity, as the ICTY 
recognizes, Japanese criminal law also involves a differentiated system of participation 
with limited derivative liability, mandatory mitigation of sentences for accomplices, a 
distinction between co-perpetration and complicity, and a control theory to delineate 
between the two. All of these features are consistent with German criminal law theory 
and few conform with Anglo-American principles.  
219 For a comparative overview of theories of complicity, see James G. Stewart, 
Complicity,  in OXFORD CRIMINAL LAW HANDBOOK (forthcoming) (Markus Dubber & 
Tatjana Hörnle eds., 2014). 
220 See DANDO, supra note 214, at 34–35; Sally Engle Merry, Colonial and Postcolonial 
Law, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 569, 570 (Austin Sarat, ed., 
2004). 
221 Wilhelm Röhl, Generalities, in HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN SINCE 1868 1, 23 (Wilhelm 
Röhl, ed., 2004). 
222 Yoshiro Hiramatsu, Tokugawa Law, 14 LAW IN JAP. 1, 48 (1981). Instead of rendering 
individuals equal, the Shogunate system depended on hierarchies of status and therefore 
reinforced the role of central administration through the Emperor. See Dan Henderson, 
Introduction to the Kujikata Osademegaki (1742), in HO TO KEIBATSU NO REKISHI-TEKI 
KOSATSU [HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF LAW AND PUNISHMENT] MEMORIAL ESSAYS 
IN HONOUR OF DR HIRAMATSU YOSHIRO (1987), quoted in MERYLL DEAN, JAPANESE 
LEGAL SYSTEM 59 (2d ed. 2002). 
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after Western military powers forced the Tokugawa Shogunate to open 
Japan up to international trade.223 In this respect, the Japanese experience 
was consistent with those we identify in the DRC and Pakistan. As 
Antony Anghie has eloquently explained, “[i]t is hardly controversial that 
one of the primary driving forces of nineteenth-century colonial expansion 
was trade.”224 Japan, however, was able to avoid the ignominy of physical 
occupation by complying with European standards for transnational trade 
in order to win international recognition and assert itself as a sovereign 
state on an international stage.225 In other words, the litmus test for the 
type of international recognition that would forestall formal colonial rule, 
known as standards of civilization, demanded that states like Japan create 
“idealized European standards in both their external and, more 
significantly, internal relations.”226  
 Initially, Japanese officials resisted this path. Prior to the full-
blown assumption of European law, foreign trading companies arrogated 
to themselves more and more influence over local administration, 
precisely in order to create an environment most conducive to their 
economic expansion.227 These nominally independent companies operated 
in tandem with colonial governments to press Japan into assuming a raft 
of unequal treaty obligations, which ceded an important set of powers to 
the foreign colonial powers and/or companies under the direct threat of 
military action. The resulting unequal treaties granted foreign states – 
including the United States, Britain, France, Russia, and the Netherlands – 
a number of important privileges:228 Japan was no longer entitled to 
control its monetary system, regulate tariffs or trade, or determine where 
                                                
223 After the Opium War, in 1854 and 1855, the United States, followed by Great Britain, 
Russia, and the Netherlands, all concluded treaties with the Shogunate that granted a 
number of privileges to the states and their nationals. These initial treaties were quickly 
supplanted by even more unequal treaties that allowed additional states to have 
extraterritorial rights and jurisdiction for indefinite periods of time. Ram Prakash Anand, 
Family of “Civilized” States and Japan: A Story of Humiliation, Assimilation, Defiance 
and Confrontation, 5 J HIST. INT’L L. 1, 9–14 (2005). 
224 ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 67 (2007). 
225 Id. at 91. 
226 Id. at 84. 
227 Id. at 84–85. 
228 MICHAEL R. AUSLIN, NEGOTIATING WITH IMPERIALISM: THE UNEQUAL TREATIES AND 
THE CULTURE OF JAPANESE DIPLOMACY 1–8 (2006). Auslin notes that while the treaties 
were unequal, the foreign powers did not engage in the usual form of colonialism that 
involved territorial dominance and the exclusion of other potential competitor colonial 
nations. Instead, the treaties served as means of regulating both relations with Japan as 
well as with each other. 
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foreigners settled within Japanese territory.229 Moreover, foreign powers 
established consular jurisdictions with enforcement powers within Japan, 
displacing the Japanese judiciary.230  
 In 1868, the loss of sovereign control in the consular jurisdictions 
contributed to a revolution that restored the Emperor Meiji.231 In order to 
reassert Japanese jurisdiction and appease the Japanese citizens who saw 
foreign legal control of Japan as a major affront, the new Meiji 
government decided to impose “standards of civilization” upon itself as a 
lesser evil that would at least ward off formal colonial rule.232 Thus, the 
Japanese did to their own legal system what colonialism would have 
achieved anyway. In this way, the Japanese government developed a legal 
system that was more amenable to the Western powers, thereby obviating 
the need for the foreign consular jurisdiction that had proved so deeply 
offensive that it destabilized the entire political regime.233 Given the value 
of criminal law as a vehicle for protecting trade and reinforcing fragile 
governmental authority, not to mention the desire to appease their colonial 
interlocutors, the Japanese quickly looked to European criminal codes for 
inspiration. Thus began the process that saw Japanese professors of 
criminal law learning German most earnestly.  
 Initially, Japan adopted both the French Napoleonic Penal Code 
(1880) and the Code of Criminal Instruction (1880), both of which had 
proved a favorite export of French colonial rule.234 The initial adoption of 
French law in Japan was mostly a matter of expedience—the Japanese 
needed an existing body of law that was not burdened by case law and 
they needed it quickly. As a result, the French codes were translated into 
Japanese criminal law verbatim.235 This first experiment with European 
models was short-lived, however. After only a very brief period in effect, 
                                                
229 CARL F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 16–17 
(2d rev. ed. 2008). Similar treaties were found in other Asian countries as well, including 
China. See GERRIT W. GONG, THE STANDARD OF ‘CIVILIZATION’ IN INTERNATIONAL 
SOCIETY 14–35 (1984).  
230 GOODMAN, supra note 229, at 21. 
231 SHIGENORI MATSUI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 8 
(2011). 
232 TAKII KAZUHIRO, THE MEIJI CONSTITUTION: THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE OF THE WEST 
AND THE SHAPING OF THE MODERN STATE 5 (David Noble trans., International House of 
Japan ed. 2007) (2003). 
233 Karl-Friedrich Lenz, Penal Law, in HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN SINCE 1868, supra note 
221, at 607, 609–10. Evidently, the need for internal legal reform within Japan to remove 
Western jurisdiction quickly became the focal point of Japanese politics during the 
period. See GEORGE BAILEY SANSOM, THE WESTERN WORLD AND JAPAN: A STUDY IN 
THE INTERACTION OF EUROPEAN AND ASIATIC CULTURES 378–85 (1950). 
234 Röhl, supra note 221, at 24. 
235 Id. at 23 – 24. 
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the French-based code came to be perceived as overly liberal, and 
incapable of legitimating the structure and values of the imperial 
regime.236 In looking for European alternatives, the Japanese found that 
German law was not only viewed as more advanced than French law,237 
but the German code appeared especially relevant to the Japanese context: 
Germany was a relatively new nation, trying to create a federation out of a 
monarchical system of government while reconciling historical and 
customary practice with statutory law.238 And most importantly, the 
German code still enjoyed the necessary European pedigree.  
 Therefore, the influence of French law in Japan was soon 
superseded by a new, German-based Meiji Constitution and criminal 
code.239 As a result of this switch in legal affiliations, Japanese law as a 
whole is now a mixture of a number of foreign influences: German law 
was deeply mixed with French practice along with the earlier Chinese 
influence.240 The criminal law, however, clearly followed the German 
path. As we mention earlier, if one even browses leading Japanese 
criminal law texts or compare the structure of core modes of attribution 
like complicity, Japanese criminal law is shot through with German 
thinking.241 As Markus Dubber has joked in irony, “the sun never sets on 
German criminal theory.”242 Japan is clearly an important ingredient in 
making this proposition true.  
 While Japan both accepted and felt compelled to adopt German 
criminal law prior to the Second World War, the process of transplantation 
contrasted starkly with the force of American legal influences during the 
                                                
236 Ronald Frank, Civil Code, in HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN SINCE 1868, supra note 221, 
at 166, 178 – 179. See also MATSUI, supra note 231, at 9. 
237 Frank, supra note 236, at 183. 
238 Id. at 182–86. The other important aspect of German law was the conservative nature 
of its constitution, which allowed for the establishment of institutions of governance that 
were subordinate and answerable to the Emperor. The subsequent adoption of Germanic 
codes was a natural result of adopting this constitution. Anand, supra note 223, at 18.  
239 Which concentrated political power in the Emperor. Kenzo Takayanagi, A Century of 
Innovation: The Development of Japanese Law 1868 – 1961, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE 
LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 6−12 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren, ed., 1963). See 
also MATSUI, supra note 231, at 9−13. There had been a momentary hesitation when 
British parliamentary democracy had been proposed instead of the German model. The 
debate ended when the leading proponent of the British model, Okuma Shigenobu, was 
expelled from Parliament for opposing a suspicious sale of government assets on 
preferential terms. See Joyce Chapman Lebra, Okuma Shigenobu and the 1881 Political 
Crisis, 18 J. OF ASIAN STUD. 475 (1959). 
240 DEAN, supra note 222, at 71. 
241 See, e.g., DANDO, supra note 214 
242 Dubber, supra note 18, at 1298 Dubber points to the strong influence of German 
criminal law in Spain, Latin America, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Greece, Poland and 
Turkey. 
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postwar occupation. The new American-authored Japanese Constitution 
was subordinated to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers 
(SCAP), whose orders could not be constitutionally challenged.243 By this 
point, the American occupying forces were reforming virtually every 
aspect of Japanese law, including substantive criminal law and criminal 
procedure.244 This episode of reform added another layer of foreign 
influence onto the long history of supplanting Japanese “patterns of 
knowing, feeling, and acting”245 about criminal punishment with foreign 
alternatives that furthered outside interests. Nonetheless, while 
Americanization would further dilute the concentration of Japanese 
cultural norms in national criminal law, the Japanese law governing 
complicity today suggests that these American changes were insufficient 
to dislodge the prior German influence.  
 Overall, this set of multiple reforms and revisions led to a system 
of criminal law whose connection to Japanese societal values was filtered 
through layers of foreign law. We do not argue that these outside 
influences necessarily negate the possibility of a correlation between 
societal values and German-inspired criminal law in contemporary Japan 
including on the topic of complicity—the Japanese people may have come 
to adopt these foreign doctrine as their own in much the same way that 
one has some difficulty walking through the streets of Islamabad without 
interrupting games of cricket. German criminal law may well be in Japan 
what Spanish criminal procedure is in Argentina. Indeed, we believe that 
there is every possibility that this is true given the passage of time, the 
number of legal reforms since and the reality that Japanese forcibly 
introduced German criminal law to other Asian nation-states, mostly 
notably, South Korea.246 Still, we express concern that a prescriptive 
                                                
243 The bulk of the post-war Constitution was drafted in a matter of days primarily by 
American legal experts, before its rapid acceptance in Japan. See Robert E. Ward, The 
Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution, 50 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 980 (1956); and, 
ALFRED C OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN (1972). See also, Lenz, supra 
note 233, at 622–23. As for the higher constitutional status of the SCAP, the Supreme 
Court of Japan made this ruling. See MATSUI, supra note 231, at 27. 
244 See OPPLER, supra note 243, at 136 (describing the reform of criminal procedure law 
as “the most complicated and time-consuming reform”). 
245 GARLAND, supra note 15. 
246 Markus Dubber, for instance, notes the influence of German criminal law on both 
South Korea and Japan. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Theories of Crime and Punishment in 
German Criminal Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 679, 679 (2005); The influence is such that 
Volker Krey’s helpful English translation of German criminal law principles is explicitly 
addressed to “professors and students of Japanese and South Korean law faculties.” 
VOLKER KREY, GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW GENERAL PART vii (2002). From an academic 
perspective, the influence of German criminal theory and later of American language on 
South Korea produced one of the first scholars to introduce German criminal law to the 
2017] THE AHISTORICISM OF LEGAL PLURALISM 58 
   
variant of Legal Pluralism should just assume this relation automatically 
in light of a history that, on its face, would seem to point in the opposite 
direction. And even if this apprehension proves unfounded, what of 
Leipzig?  
 Put differently, when the ICTY draws on the Japanese criminal 
law governing complicity to define the equivalent concept in ICL,247 their 
method is undeniably plural as a matter of doctrine, but it does not 
necessarily add the diversity that ICL lacks and which pluralism is 
supposed to furnish. Nor is respecting all doctrinal arrangements because 
they reflect underlying social values inevitably functionally desirable for 
ICL. Consequently, deferring to and then managing the diversity of extant 
legal doctrine throughout the world does not lead inexorably to 
meaningful pluralism, nor the type of diversity that will give effect to 
value pluralism or cosmopolitan aspirations for international criminal 
justice. Doctrinal pluralism is thus a shaky foundation for global Legal 
Pluralism in any field, even where colonialism was never formally 
achieved.  
 
B. Double-Counting Joint Criminal Enterprise in Ad Hoc International 
Tribunals 
 
Forms of participation in international crimes are highly 
doctrinally plural within international courts, but when scrutinized 
historically, their ability to claim a diversity of values is also weak. The 
wide array of forms of attribution that might apply to international crimes 
before ad hoc tribunals in the former-Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Cambodia and 
Sierra Leone, really reflect the dominant influence of a very few national 
systems. At every step, these tribunals subjected defendants to standards 
of responsibility that draw on the history of national criminal law we have 
pointed to above. In other words, the history of forms of participation in 
these institutions is largely in step with, not an exception to, the dynamics 
we point out in global criminal law doctrine. Using history as our method 
and technique, we scratch the surface of one mode of attribution in ad hoc 
Tribunals, namely Joint Criminal Enterprise (“JCE”), to illuminate this 
reality. 
                                                                                                                     
United States, prior to George Fletcher. See Paul Ryu, Contemporary Problems of 
Criminal Attempts, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1170 (1957); Paul Ryu, Causation in Criminal 
Law, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 773 (1957); Paul Ryu, Discussion of Structure and Theory, 24 
THE AM. J. OF COMP. L. 602 (1976).  
247 See infra note 218. 
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Before we get to JCE in ad hoc tribunals, we pause to briefly 
observe its absence at Nuremberg or Tokyo. After the St James 
Declaration, in which the Allies promised punishment for atrocities “of 
those who ordered them, perpetrated them or participated in them,”248 the 
Allies established what was first known as the Inter-Allied Conference on 
the Punishment of War Crimes.249 The body, later renamed a Commission, 
busied itself with issues of law for the international trials it envisioned, 
including the question of law governing the attribution of criminal 
responsibility. The Commission even issued a questionnaire to states on 
the topic, although the project of consolidating responses was soon 
abandoned. Where discussions did continue, they tended to focus almost 
obsessively on the issue of superior orders, but forms of attribution were 
also a frequent agenda item. On this topic, Professor Lauterpacht tabled a 
report recommending that “every case, as it would arise in war crimes 
trials, be solved on the basis of general principles of penal law, and that 
individual responsibility be determined in ascertaining the existence of the 
mens rea of the accused.”250  
Curiously, Lauterpacht’s idea of general principles appears to have 
carried the day at Nuremberg and Tokyo. Although the Charters of both 
tribunals explicitly enumerated different forms of attribution,251 the 
Nuremberg Tribunal itself merely considered whether an accused was 
“concerned in,” “connected with”, “inculpated in” or “implicated in” 
                                                
248 INTER-ALLIED INFORMATION COMMITTEE, PUNISHMENT FOR WAR CRIMES—THE 
INTER-ALLIED DECLARATION SIGNED AT ST. JAMES’S PALACE LONDON ON 13TH JANUARY 
AND RELATIVE DOCUMENTS 15 (1942). For discussion of the significance of the 
declaration, see TAYLOR, supra note 177, at 25 (2013), and MAGUIRE, supra note 179, at 
67 (rev. ed. 2010). 
249 HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 89 (1948). 
250 Id. at 277. Lauterpacht later published his submissions to the UN War Crimes 
Commission. See Hersch Lauterpacht, The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War 
Crimes, 21 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 58, 73 (1944). In addition, he also argued that general 
principles of criminal law should form the basis of war crimes, which he argued “may de 
defined as such offences against the law of war as are criminal in the ordinary and 
accepted sense of fundamental rules of warfare and of general principles of criminal 
law.” Id., at 79. 
251 Art. 6(3) of the Nuremberg Charter reads: “Leaders, organizers, instigators and 
accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or 
conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed 
by any persons in execution of such plan.” Agreement for the Prosecution and 
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 
U.N.T.S. 284, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT’L L. 257 (Supp. 1945) [hereinafter Nuremberg 
Charter]. 
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international crimes.252 As many leading commentators now accept, this 
approach entailed what Europeans call a unitary theory of perpetration,253 
which does not disaggregate forms of attribution into formal legal 
concepts like aiding and abetting, superior responsibility or JCE. To the 
modern international criminal lawyer, the refusal to differentiate between 
forms of attribution like this will appear either fringe or antiquated, but in 
fact, the abundance of differentiated systems of blame attribution 
throughout the many systems of criminal law around the globe largely has 
colonialism to thank: with the partial exception of Italy, the European 
states that had adopted a unitary theory like that employed at Nuremberg 
and Tokyo were never colonial powers.254 England, France, Spain and 
Germany, on the other hand, all adopted the differentiated system ICL 
lawyers know best. 
Aside from this brief glimpse into the prehistory of modes of 
attribution at Nuremberg, it is also important to appreciate that the 
doctrinal variety of modes of attribution used to prosecute international 
crimes after WWII was probably massive. Just with respect to zonal trials 
held by each of the occupying powers in Germany after WWII, the 
Americans prosecuted 1,885 alleged war crimes;255 French military 
tribunals convicted 2,107 individuals (and staged numerous other trials 
                                                
252 For an overview of these cases, see 15 THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES 
COMMISSION, DIGEST OF THE LAWS AND CASES, LAW REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS, 49–58 (1947). Like Hector Olásolo, we conclude that this amounts to a 
unitary theory of perpetration insofar as it fails to distinguish modes of participation. See 
OLÁSOLO ET AL., THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SENIOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY 
LEADERS AS PRINCIPALS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 21 (2010). 
253 KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: VOLUME 1: 
FOUNDATIONS AND GENERAL PART 105 (2013) (“the IMT and IMTFE Statutes merely 
require a causal contribution to a certain criminal result, thereby opting for a unitarian 
concept of perpetration (Einheitstäterschaft). As will be seen below, the jurisprudence 
adopted this fairly unsophisticated approach.”); OLÁSOLO, supra note 252, at 21 (“the 
IMT and IMTFE embraced a unitary model which did not distinguish between the 
perpetration of a crime... and participation in a crime committed by a third person”); and 
ALBIN ESER, INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 781 (2002) (“for supranational 
courts and codes, this somehow `holistic’ model of perpetratorship [the unitary theory of 
perpetration] seemed attractive enough to be followed by the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals”). 
254 This countries include Denmark, Norway, Austria, Italy, Poland and Brazil. See 
generally, James G. Stewart, The End of “Modes of Liability” for International Crimes, 
25 LEIDEN. J. INT’L. L. 165, 170 (2012). For a history of the rise of the unitary theory of 
perpetration, including the Union International de Droit Pénal’s endorsement of it in 
1902, see James G. Stewart, The Strangely Familiar History of the Unitary Theory of 
Perpetration, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MIRJAN DAMAŚKA, (forthcoming 2015).  
255 David Fraser, Shadows of Law, Shadows of the Shoah: Towards a Legal History of the 
Nazi Killing Machine, 32 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 401, 414 (2011). 
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within France and French North Africa);256 the British tried 1,085 
crimes;257 and the Russians – by then no strangers to the value of the 
criminal trial as a means of authoritarian control – staged a number in 
Russian-occupied Germany that historians cannot quantify.258 Therefore, 
even leaving aside these Russian prosecutions,259 there were at least 5,077 
trials held within the WWII zonal trials, creating a very large class of 
standards of law to synthesize in the quest for “common principles.” 
Indeed, outside the zones occupied by the victorious Allied nations, the 
historian István Deak reports “up to 2 to 3 percent of the population 
formerly under German occupation… was charged by national courts for 
what was alternatively, or often simultaneously, termed collaboration with 
the enemy, treason, and war crimes”.260 In Europe alone, then, state 
practice on questions of criminal participation in atrocity was 
gargantuan.261 
                                                
256 Id. 
257 Id. 
258 Id. If one considers trials held by East German Courts, then there were 12,766 
convictions alone during from 1945 – 1955. Soviet tribunals themselves prosecuted an 
uncounted number of crimes (including against domestic political opponents), with 776 
death penalties imposed. See Moritz Vormbaum, An “Indispensable Component of the 
Elimination of Fascism”: War Crimes Trials and International Criminal Law in the 
German Democratic Republic, in 2 HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 397, at 401, 424 (Morten Bergsmo, CHEAH Wui Ling and YI Ping eds., 2014). See 
also Jonathan Friedman, The Sachsenhausen Trials: War Crimes Prosecution in the 
Soviet Occupation Zone and in West and East Germany, in ATROCITIES ON TRIAL: 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICS OF PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES 159 (Patricia 
Heberer & Jürgen Matthäus eds., 2008). 
259 Presumably, whatever number the Russians did prosecute, it did not include trials of 
the perpetrators of the 90,000 rapes of German women by Russian forces in the two 
weeks after Berlin fell. For more details, see Tony Judt, The Past is Another Country: 
Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe, in THE POLITICS OF RETRIBUTION IN EUROPE: 
WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH, supra note 260, at 293, 294 (“in the weeks 
following the Soviet army’s capture of Berlin some 90,000 women in the city sought 
medical assistance for rape. In Vienna the Western allies recorded 87,000 rape victims in 
the three weeks following the arrival of the Red Army.”). 
260 István Deák, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF RETRIBUTION IN EUROPE: WORLD WAR 
II AND ITS AFTERMATH 3, 4 (István Deák, Jan Tomasz Gross, & Tony Judt eds., 2000). 
261 Outside Europe, trials were certainly less numerous, but they unquestionably added to 
this number. See, e.g., DAVID FRASER, DAVIBORSHCH’S CART: NARRATING THE 
HOLOCAUST IN AUSTRALIAN WAR CRIMES TRIALS (2010). See also, THE HIDDEN 
HISTORIES OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS (Kevin Jon Heller & Gerry Simpson eds., Oxford, 
United Kingdom, Oxford Univ. Press, 1 edition ed. 2013) (including chapters on war 
crimes trials in Turkey and Ethiopia). See also HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW VOL. 2 (Morten Bergsmo et al. eds., FICHL Publication Series, Brussels, 
Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher 2014) (adding histories of war crimes trials in 
China, Singapore, Australia and the USSR, not to mention the many others that focus on 
proceedings within Europe). 
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Against this background, we now introduce JCE and critically 
retrace its passage into received understandings of customary ICL via ad 
hoc tribunals. According to these tribunals, JCE has three strands. The 
“basic” form occurs where “co-defendants, acting pursuant to a common 
design, possess the same criminal purpose.”262 The second “systematic” 
form of joint criminal enterprise is a mere subset of the “basic” form, and 
adds little of great salience for present purposes,263 mostly because it also 
requires that the participants in the enterprise harbor the necessary intent 
to commit the crime. Under the third variant (JCE III), however, all 
participants in a joint criminal enterprise are responsible for crimes 
committed beyond those agreed, provided they are “a natural and 
foreseeable consequence of the common purpose.”264 Thus, the soldier 
manning the door is also convicted of torturing the victim, even if he 
believed he was guarding the entry to prevent enemy soldiers from 
entering and only foresaw that one of his confederates might commit 
torture.265  
 How did the doctrine infiltrate international law? The Charters of 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals had referenced liability based on a 
                                                
262 Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 6, at ¶ 196.  Note that this language is not always 
consistent. See Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgment, ¶ 97 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 25, 2004) (finding that “[t]he first category is 
a ‘basic’ form of joint criminal enterprise. It is represented by cases where all co-
perpetrators, acting pursuant to a common purposes, possess the same criminal 
intention.”). 
263 In JCE II, the common plan in JCE I is merely replaced by “an organized criminal 
system,” such as an extermination or concentration camp. There is, therefore, general 
consensus that this “systematic” category in JCE II is only a subset of the ‘basic’ form in 
JCE I. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 6, at ¶ 203 (“this category of cases... is 
really a variant of the first category”); Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-
A, Judgment, ¶ 82 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2005) 
(describing JCE II as “a variant of the first form”); and Kai Ambos, Amicus Curiae Brief 
in the Matter of the Co-Prosecutors’ Appeal of the Closing Order Against Kaing Guek 
Eav “Duch” Dated 8 August 2008, 20 CRIM. L.F. 353, 374 (2009) (concluding that JCEII 
can be viewed as an element of JCE I if interpreted narrowly). 
264 Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., supra note 263, at ¶ 83. 
265 In fact, there is good authority for the idea that the standard is actually objective 
foreseeability, lowering the mental element required for JCEIII even further. See Elies 
van Sliedregt, Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to Convicting Individuals for 
Genocide, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 184 (2007) (arguing that whether members of a JCE 
must comply with the full mens rea of genocide turns on whether they are perpetrators or 
participants), and, Antonio Cassese, The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under 
the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 109, 121 (2007) 
(arguing that it is a logical impossibility for someone who does not have the necessary 
mens rea for genocide to “commit” the crime, but accepting that he or she may aid and 
abet the crime nonetheless). 
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“common plan,”266 which laid the foundation for JCE in modern ICL, but 
as we saw a moment ago, the Tribunals did not apply it as such. Likewise, 
JCE was hardly a common element of all of the very many trials that 
followed WWII, in Europe or beyond. The negotiating history of the 
Nuremberg Charter points to a familiar answer to the riddle of its 
emergence in ICL. In a trans-Atlantic discussion on the topic of criminal 
responsibility that was held in early 1945,267 no lesser personality than 
Justice Robert Jackson opined that international law was “indefinite and 
weak” in the area of criminal liability.268 Jackson went on to argue that, as 
a consequence of this frail foundation, the task of defining these issues 
within the Charter “fulfills in a sense the function of legislation.”269 As to 
the content of this new legislation, he concluded that “there is greater 
liberty in us to declare principles as we see them now”.270 Needless to say, 
the “we” in his remarks hardly reflected the views of a meaningful cross-
section of a global polity. 
 The notion of “common purpose” that the Allies freely injected into 
the Nuremberg and then Tokyo Charters during this process derived from 
complicated debates about conspiracy. We have addressed the partial 
absorption and application of conspiracy earlier,271 and here we add only 
one point of great salience for JCE in particular. According to well-
reviewed historical records,272 the conspiracy debate involved a seemingly 
constant oscillation between conspiracy (an inchoate separate crime in its 
own right as we saw earlier) and common purpose liability (a means of 
participating in a consummated offense i.e. a mode of attribution). The 
slippage between these two very different concepts was nowhere more 
evident than in the report of American Lieutenant Colonel Murray C. 
Bernay, whose recommendations to President Roosevelt in September 
1944 are widely regarded as the genesis of common purpose liability and, 
by derivation, the modern notion of JCE.273  
 Once again, the method of absorption would prove revealing. When 
the famed Tadić appeal judgment decided whether the ICTY Statute 
                                                
266 Nuremberg Charter, supra note 251. 




271 See infra section II.B. 
272 See Bush, supra note 181. 
273 Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal 
Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal 
Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 113 (2005) (discussing Bernay’s major contribution to the 
development of JCE); ELIES VAN SLIEDREGT, INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 22-30 (2012) (same); and, CIARA DAMGAARD, INDIVIDUAL 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 132 (2008) (same). 
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(implicitly) included JCE a.k.a common plan liability, it seized upon only 
portions of this history and a small subset of favorable Anglo-American 
criminal law.  
 This choice created three conspicuous problems. First, the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber made no mention of the unitary theory of perpetration 
applied at Nuremberg, Tokyo, and in subsequent cases. In other words, 
aside from pointing to the common plan doctrine that was formally 
included in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters, the Chamber ignored 
most everything in the judgments. If, as most experts agree, these two 
prior tribunals had applied a unitary theory of perpetration, the leap to JCE 
in Tadić makes the Nuremberg standards “legal bastard cousins in the 
family’s juridical closet.”274 Yet a system that purports to ground its forms 
of criminal attribution in a venerable lineage of customary international 
law within international courts and tribunals is undermined by illegitimate 
offspring like these.275  
 Second, the sources the Tadić Appeals Judgment drew upon in 
turning away from the unitary theory were obtained from an extremely 
selective preference for certain Western standards. Faced with a tidal 
wave of disparate modes of attribution for international crimes that were 
suddenly pushed to the surface in the immediate post-war context, the 
Tadić decision cited just ten cases as supporting JCE. The choice was 
illuminating, as much for the origins of the cases cited as their meager 
sample size: six of the cases were drawn from British military courts 
established after WWII;276 one stemmed from a Canadian military court in 
                                                
274 The historian David Fraser eloquently criticizes international criminal lawyers for 
sometimes drawing implausible lines between historical phenomena that may be 
unconnected, mostly out of a desire to justify that which currently exists. Fraser, supra 
note 255, at 9. In structure, this argument resembles that which Samuel Moyn makes in 
international human rights law. SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
HISTORY (2010). 
275 Fraser, supra note 255, at 9. 
276 Trial of Otto Sandrock and three others, British Military Court for the Trial of War 
Criminals, held at the Court House, Almelo, Holland (Nov. 24–26, 1945), reprinted in 1 
THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, DIGEST OF THE LAWS AND CASES, 
LAW REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 35 (1947); Trial of Gustav Alfred 
Jepsen and others, Proceedings of a War Crimes Trial held at Luneberg, Germany (Aug. 
13–23, 1946), Judgement of 24 August 1946; Trial of Franz Schonfeld and others, British 
Military Court, Essen, June 11th-26th, 1946, reprinted in 11 THE UNITED NATIONS WAR 
CRIMES COMMISSION, DIGEST OF THE LAWS AND CASES, LAW REPORTS OF THE TRIALS 
OF WAR CRIMINALS 68 (1947) (summing up of the Judge Advocate); Trial of Feurstein 
and others, Proceedings of a War Crimes Trial held at Hamburg, Germany (Aug. 4–24, 
1948), Judgement of 24 August 1948; Trial of Erich Heyer and six others, British 
Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals, Essen, (Dec. 18–19 and 21–22, 1945), 
reprinted in 1 THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, DIGEST OF THE LAWS 
AND CASES, LAW REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 88, 91 (1947); Trial of 
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occupied Germany;277 two from the United States Tribunal convened 
pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10;278 and, a small series of national 
Italian cases. Despite the evident limitations in quantum and 
representation of these sources, the Appeals Chamber in Tadić cited the 
familiar but false notion, inspired from Lauterpacht, Wechsler and many 
others in between, that JCE was “[i]n line with recognized principles 
common to all civilized legal systems.”279 To the (limited) extent that the 
claim was true of criminal law doctrine, it was only so because of a 
double-counting of English criminal law: once in the metropole, then 
several times again within former colonies the parent system had 
constructed in its own image. 
 If this sample of case law fell short of establishing the universality 
claimed, the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s subsequent treatment of national 
legislation only exacerbated the earlier methodological shortcoming. The 
Appeals Chamber in Tadić went on to reason that  “international criminal 
rules on common purpose [i.e. JCE] are substantially rooted in, and to a 
large extent reflect, a position taken by many States of the world in their 
national legal systems.”280 But here too, the countries the Appeals 
Chamber pointed to as substantiating their thesis included just “England 
and Wales, Canada, the United States, Australia and Zambia.”281 In 
conjunction with the difficulties with the selection of case law, this limited 
legislative survey renders this aspect of ICL in ad hoc tribunals almost 
inseparable from criminal law developed for the British 
Commonwealth.282 The two histories come apart slightly, and certainly 
not enough to sooth worries that legal pluralism risks sanctifying 
principles conceived in British imperialism. 
                                                                                                                     
Josef Kramer and 44 others ("Belsen Case"), British Military Court, Luneberg, Sept. 17 – 
Nov. 17, 1945, reprinted in 2 THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, DIGEST 
OF THE LAWS AND CASES, LAW REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS,1. 
277 Hoelzer et al., Canadian Military Court, Aurich, Germany, 1 RECORD OF 
PROCEEDINGS 25 MAR-6 APRIL 1946, 341, 347, 349 (RCAF Binder 181.009 (D2474)). 
278 The United States of America v. Otto Ohlenforf et al., reprinted in 4 TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL 
LAW NO. 10 3 (1951); and, Trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss and thirty-nine others, 
General Military Government Court of the United States Zone, Dachau, Germany, (Nov. 
15– Dec. 13, 1945), reprinted in 11 THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, 
DIGEST OF THE LAWS AND CASES, LAW REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 5 
(1947). 
279 Tadić, supra note 6, at ¶ 200. 
280 Tadić, supra note 6, at ¶ 193. 
281 Id., at ¶ 224. 
282 See Martin Friedland, Codification in the Commonwealth: Earlier Efforts, 2 CRIM. 
L.F. 145, 150 (1990); Simon Coldham, Criminal Justice Policies in Commonwealth 
Africa: Trends and Prospects (2000) 44 J. AFR. L. 218, 223–28, 230–35. 
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 Ironically, the same dangers are evident within judicial opposition to 
JCE. If the Appeals Chamber had included laws governing criminal 
attribution from non-British colonial powers, it might have come to a very 
different conclusion about JCE’s existence in customary ICL. French law, 
for example, did not contemplate the doctrine, and given the histories we 
have gestured to, this reality suggests that numerically speaking, many 
other modern criminal law systems throughout the world do not contain it 
either. In an eerie reminder of this point, a decision of the Extraordinary 
Criminal Chambers of Cambodia (ECCC) rejecting one component of 
JCE pointed to the fact that the doctrine did not exist in Cambodian 
criminal law. As authority for this proposition, the ECCC cited a French 
text on the Cambodian Projet de Nouveau Code Pénal, which explained 
Cambodian modes of attribution in terms that reflected French concepts 
par excellence. Historically speaking, this was entirely unremarkable—
French criminal law was introduced into Cambodia as early as 1929 and 
remains the dominant influence to this day.283 To revisit a recurring 
uncomfortable parallel, however, modern Cambodia was then subsumed 
within “French Indo-China.”284  
 So even if the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadić took the absence of 
JCE in Cambodian criminal law into consideration as legal pluralists 
would implore, doing so could just engender a double-counting contest 
between colonial influences without necessarily honoring anything 
particular about Cambodians’ “patterns of knowing, feeling, and 
acting.”285 Even if it did, the question would still remain whether honoring 
this incarnation of criminal doctrine makes sense for ICL in its attempts to 
speak to a wider  constituency. In other words, in the first instance, 
managing conflicts between global criminal law risks adjudicating 
contests between competing colonial artifacts, taking us further away from 
the plurality of social, cultural and political values Legal Pluralism should 
seek to promote (if it is to shift away from its purely descriptive roots). In 
                                                
283 Phann Vanrath, The Basics of Substantial Cambodian Criminal Law, in 
INTRODUCTION TO CAMBODIAN LAW 198, 201 (Hor Peng, Kong Phallack, & Jörg 
Menzel, eds., 2010) (noting as well that French criminal law was in force in Cambodia 
since 1929 and that the 2009 code was drafted jointly by Cambodian officials and French 
experts). 
284 To take the parallel a step deeper, Jörg Menzel reports that the post-Khmer Rouge 
reconstruction of Cambodia’s legal system resulted in a ‘mixed civil law’ system, where 
much of the kingdom’s civil law is now Japanese in nature, but its criminal law remains 
French. Jörg Menzel, Cambodian Law: Some Comparative and International 
Perspectives, in INTRODUCTION TO CAMBODIAN LAW, ibid at 477, 482. We know how the 
French influence came about, and can only hazard a guess at how the Japanese civil law 
still accompanies it. 
285 GARLAND, supra note 15. 
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the second, it presumes that genuflecting to extant standards is best, which 
Leipzig tells us may or may not be the case.  
 With respect to JCE, it is hard to view the catalogue of sources 
relied upon by the Appeals Chamber in adopting the doctrine as reflecting 
any real degree of inclusive, plural, cosmopolitan values, but the same is 
true (to a lesser extent) of the ECCC decision rejecting it. Thus, to claim 
that modes of attribution for ICL crimes are doctrinally plural within a 
diverse, conflicting, sometimes inter-penetrating system of criminal law is 
empirically undeniable, what William Twining calls “Social Fact Legal 
Pluralism,”286 but to take a normative position about the desirability of 
that diversity in the name of Legal Pluralism or any other theoretical 
system risks turning a blind eye to the troubling history that generated the 
doctrinal diversity, and ultimately, begs the question about what the 
standard should be.  
 
V. CRIMINAL OFFENSES 
 
 In this Part, we turn to in the special part of ICL to illustrate the 
third element of our typology: instances where societies are not only 
“unreceptive” to transposed criminal law doctrine but when a foreign 
imposition contaminates surrounding law too. In this third element, we 
again question whether it can safely be said that the definition of crimes 
necessarily correspond to popular values. We have chosen two laws 
whose criminalization would seem inevitable given the respective social 
contexts. In the first section, we look at the process by which blasphemy 
became a crime in the ‘Islamized’ law of Muslim-majority Pakistan. 
While the inclusion of this crime would seem almost unavoidable, it was 
in fact a British colonial-era crime that soon became what Gunther 
Teubner calls a “legal irritant.” 287 In the international context, we study 
colonialism and apartheid. Apartheid would seem to be one of the most 
obvious international crimes, given its sordid and tragic history in South 
Africa. Yet the process by which it was eventually criminalized in the ICC 
Statute was littered with obstruction, mainly from Western states, and 
even now the status and definition of the norm is unclear. This would 
seem to represent another scenario where the norm bears little connection 
to social values, and instead communicates the preferences of a small 
number of influential states. Again, these histories suggest that formal 
laws are not water-tight vessels capable of carrying the full diversity a 
prescriptive account of pluralism ought to value. 
                                                
286 Twining, supra note 33. 
287 Teubner, supra note 31. 
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A. Blasphemy as a “Legal Irritant” in Pakistan 
 
 International courts and tribunals occasionally draw on Pakistani 
criminal law as part of the surveys of national criminal law they undertake 
to ground their readings of ICL norms. In the Čelebići judgment, for 
instance, an ICTY Trial Chamber analyzed various national laws 
governing the mental element required for murder, concluding that 
“[u]nder Canadian law, the accused is required to have a simultaneous 
awareness of the probability of death and the intention to inflict some 
form of serious harm, and this is also the position in Pakistan.”288 
Pakistani criminal law also features in other international courts and 
tribunals,289 in one instance, when an international court cited to the 
Indian Penal Code (IPC) of 1860 to substantiate its position.290 In fact, the 
British used the IPC as a template for most all their colonial territories; it 
was implemented verbatim in countries as diverse as Uganda, Singapore 
and Australia, without calibration to local circumstances.291 Citing the IPC 
as Pakistani criminal law is only one of the ways that ICL and national 
criminal law interface, but it invites a deeper inquiry into the quality of the 
national law harnessed to demonstrate ICL’s inclusive, pluralistic, or 
cosmopolitan credentials.  
 Once again, the effect of colonialism on Pakistani criminal offences 
undermines the assumption that legal doctrine necessarily reflects diverse 
cultural value; unfortunately, Pakistani criminal law fares no better against 
British colonialism than our earlier examples of the Franco-Belgian 
influence on Congolese notions of inchoate crime or the influence of 
German criminal law on Japanese concepts of blame attribution. In all 
these instances, we seem far from the Argentine experience with criminal 
                                                
288 Prosecutor v Delalić et al, No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgement, ¶ 434 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998)..  
289 Bagosora, supra note 4, at n.1680. See also, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al, Case No. IT-
96-23-T& IT-96-23/1-T, Judgement, ¶ 454 n.1160 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001) (drawing on Pakistani criminal law, and many other national 
definitions, to interpret the scope of rape). 
290 Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 454 
n.1160 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001). 
291 Uganda received the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Criminal Procedure Code in 1897 
and 1902 respectively. See Henry Francis Morris, “A History of the Adoption of Codes 
of Criminal Law and Procedure in British Colonial Africa, 1876 − 1935” (1974) 18 J. 
Afr. L. 6, 6 – 7. For discussion of the IPC’s transmission to Singapore, see BARRY 
WRIGHT, STANLEY YEO & WING-CHEONG CHAN, CODIFICATION, MACAULAY AND THE 
INDIAN PENAL CODE: THE LEGACIES AND MODERN CHALLENGES OF CRIMINAL LAW 
REFORM 2 (2013). 
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procedure. Nevertheless, the Pakistani experience does produce a 
particular variation worth stressing—Pakistan is distinguished from many 
of its post-colonial counterparts in that, after independence, it underwent a 
heartfelt attempt to radically restructure its legal system in order to create 
an Islamic instead of British system. Unlike the DRC, which maintained 
its colonial criminal law inheritance at various points of recodification, 
Pakistan actively sought to reconstruct colonial law from the inside out in 
order to create an identifiably Pakistani and Islamic legal state.292  
 The Pakistani Penal Code would therefore appear to give effect to a 
criminological policy that is at once markedly distinct from its British 
predecessor, and truly representative of an Islamic perspective. Yet, a 
closer study of Pakistani criminal offenses confirms a pattern of grafting 
Islamic cloaks onto colonial-era laws in ways that likely prove 
“unreceptive” for local populations, and more distinctly, end up infecting 
other contiguous aspects of the legal system. In this section, we consider 
the history of the crime of blasphemy in Pakistan to illustrate this 
dynamic. We chose blasphemy because, although it is not an international 
crime itself, it personifies attempts to Islamize an originally colonial 
doctrine that ultimately results in an inconsistent mix of colonial and 
Islamic legal concepts that do not co-exist amicably,293 substantiating 
Günter Teubner’s claim that some legal transplants act as “irritants”. As a 
result, the history of blasphemy in Pakistan offers a new reason for 
reticence toward the idea of treating criminal law doctrine as a proxy for 
cultural variation.  
 On its surface, blasphemy involves provisions that seem to conform 
to common understandings of Shari’a punishment, and reflect Pakistan’s 
status as an Islamic state with Islamic laws—surely, blasphemy is the 
quintessential Islamic offence? Yet the crime is in fact a colonial artifact 
that was not a part of Pakistani (or Indian) law until the British colonial 
regime imposed the IPC in 1860.294 In 1947, Pakistan was granted 
                                                
292 General Zia, the military dictator who suspended the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan in 
order to properly ‘Islamize’ Pakistan, stated that: “Pakistan, which was created in the 
name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why I consider 
the introduction of [an] Islamic system as an essential pre-requisite for the country.” See 
ANWAR HUSSAIN SYED, PAKISTAN: ISLAM, POLITICS, AND NATIONAL SOLIDARITY 144 
(1982). 
293 Described as a “disconnect between the principles of Islamic law and statutory law.” 
Moeen H. Cheema, Beyond Beliefs: Deconstructing the Dominant Narratives of the 
Islamization of Pakistan’s Law 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 875, 892 (2012). 
294 David F. Forte, Apostasy and Blasphemy in Pakistan, 10 CONN. J. INT’L L. 27, 27–28 
(1994) (stating that apostasy was never specifically included in the law of Pakistan/India 
prior to colonial intervention). Although the IPC was drafted in 1860, it did not come into 
force until 1862. 
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autonomy from both India and its erstwhile colonial master, but no 
substantial connection was made between the Islamic identity the new 
nation adopted soon thereafter and its legal system until the period of 
‘Islamization’ that began in the early 1970s.295 Before and since, the 
British law of blasphemy has remained the most potent causal force in the 
development and maintenance of a crime that has, for worse not better, 
become synonymous with Pakistani criminal justice.296  
 When Pakistani criminal law was finally “Islamized” a generation 
after independence,297 this process of internal reform was so haphazard 
that, faced with four different Shari’a bills, General Zia ul-Haq simply 
                                                
295 While General Zia ul-Huq receives much of the attention for his ‘Islamization’ 
program, the man he executed and then replaced oversaw the implementation of a new 
constitution first gave Islam its pre-eminent place in modern-day Pakistan. The 1973 
Constitution passed by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto explicitly defined Islam as the 
national religion (Art. 2); introduced requirements that most national politicians be 
Muslim or be compliant with and conversant in Islamic practices (Art. 62); adopted 
provisions on following an Islamic Way of Life (Art. 31); and, established a theological 
council to advise “on the ‘Islamic’ credentials of existing and proposed law”. See Jeffrey 
A. Redding, Constitutionalizing Islam: Theory and Pakistan, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 759, 768–
70 (2004). Bhutto also changed the day of rest from Sunday to Friday, banned alcohol, 
took Christian schools out of the control of churches, and ‘acquiesced’ to persecution of 
the Ahmadi sect. See Forte, supra note 294, at 36. 
296 A particularly low point was the mimicry of colonial-era laws that restrained the 
ability of non-Muslims to participate in public life. Article 260 of the Bhutto constitution 
managed to offer a definition of “Muslim” through its outlawing of the Ahmadi sect. Id. 
at 769. This was in keeping with pre-existing repression of Ahmadis – including forcing 
them to declare themselves not as Muslims, but to register as Ahmadis on all official 
documents – and supplemented by non-state killings of Ahmadis, as well as the state’s 
prosecution of Ahmadis for blasphemy violations. See Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Identity 
Politics and Minorities in Pakistan (2007) 30:1 SOUTH ASIA: JOURNAL OF SOUTH ASIAN 
STUDIES 111. Besides the application of the blasphemy laws, this criminalization of the 
Ahmadis paralleled another British colonial artifact, the Criminal Tribes Act (No. XXVII 
of 1871), which required all members of certain communities to register with the 
authorities, who then restricted their movements and imprisoned those who left 
authorized areas. See K.M. Kapadia, The Criminal Tribes of India (1952) 1:2 
SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN 99, 99–100. On the inherent Orientalism of the Criminal Tribes 
Act, and the colonial attempt to impose a particular moral order, see Sanjay Nigham, 
Disciplining and policing the ‘criminals by birth’, Part 1: The making of a colonial 
stereotype—The criminal tribes and castes of North India, (1990) 27:2 THE INDIAN 
ECON. AND SOCIAL HIST. REV. 131, 132–134. 
297 The quality of this reform was dubious given the lack of competence at both the 
judicial and legislative levels. See Abdul Ghafur Muslim, Islamization of Laws in 
Pakistan: Problems and Prospects, 26 ISLAMIC STUD. 265, 265–66 (1987). This 
incompetence combined with the haste with which the process was undertaken led to 
“jurisdictional and doctrinal incoherence” throughout the legal system. Osama Siddique 
& Zahra Hayat, Unholy Speech and Holy Laws: Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan—
Controversial Origins, Design Defects, and Free Speech Implications, 17 MINN. J. INT’L 
L. 303, 319 (2008). 
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dismissed the government and introduced his own bill.298 The irregularity 
of this extra-constitutional legislation was exacerbated by the 
establishment of an additional Islamic judicial system that ran in parallel 
to the preexisting one.299 The inevitable result was a lack of jurisdictional 
clarity throughout the judicial system,300 as the High Court and Shariat 
courts sought to undermine one another through competition over cases 
and by professing different interpretations of Islamized laws.301 This 
contest over religious fidelity was part of a broader confusion over what it 
meant to even have an ”Islamic” law. As one expert has argued, “the 
partisans of the Shari’a…are arguing for the dominance of a particular 
version of Islam, a version that never existed”.302  
 In the absence of a clear consensus on the content or propriety of 
Islamization, the process has slowed. While some religious parties have 
managed to implement particular visions of Shari’a at the local level, they 
have found it difficult to impose their vision of Islam on the national 
Pakistani legal system.303 Secular parties have resisted further 
Islamization, and even post-Zia dictators have countered some of the 
excesses of Islamization through separate legislation.304 The net effect is 
that, at best, the Islamized blasphemy laws merely painted a veneer of 
Islam over the pre-existing colonial system,305 thereby creating a legal 
                                                
298 Charles Kennedy, Repugnancy to Islam: Who Decides? Islam and Legal Reform in 
Pakistan, 41 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 769, 776–77 (1992). 
299 This parallel Federal Shariat Court (FSC) was established through Article 203 of the 
Constitution. Kennedy notes that in five years, operational provisions of the FSC “were 
modified 28 times, through the mechanism of 12 separate presidential ordinances, and 
were incorporated into the constitution in 14 subsections covering 11 pages of text.” See 
Charles Kennedy, Islamization and Legal Reform in Pakistan, 1979-1989, 63 PAC. AFF. 
62, 64 (1990). 
300 Redding, supra note 295, at 772−73. 
301 Cheema, supra note 293, at 881–82. 
302 Forte, supra note 294, at 66. 
303 See Juris Pupcenoks, Democratic Islamization in Pakistan and Turkey: Lessons for 
the Post-Arab Spring Muslim World, 66 THE MIDDLE EAST J. 273, 278–81 (2012) 
(discussing the inability of the religious Muttahidda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) coalition to 
pass all of its Islamization agenda). 
304 See Cheema, supra note 293, at 885 (noting the passage of bills that sought to ‘de-
Islamize’ Pakistani criminal law).  
305 RUBYA MEHDI, THE ISLAMIZATION OF THE LAW IN PAKISTAN 33 (Routledge 2013) 
(1994) (“However, Islamization has not made any qualitative change; all the features of 
Anglo-Muhammadan law are still there”). With respect to the penal code in general, the 
Federal Sharia Court noted that British law and Pakistani-Islamic law were largely 
compatible: In one of its first decisions, the Federal Shariat Court explained the basic 
concept of Islamization:  
Our statute laws whether inherited from the British Government or enacted after 
Independence are based upon the principle of common good and justice, equity 
and good conscience which is the same as ... [the] principle of Istihsan of Imam 
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regime governing criminal law that is marked by important internal 
contradictions; Pakistani criminal law remains deeply incoherent when 
viewed alternatively as either a body of criminal or Islamic law.306 
 With respect to pre-existing, colonial-era blasphemy laws in 
particular, these were neither abandoned nor rewritten with either system 
in mind. Instead, they were simply supplemented by additional 
prohibitions. Crucially, these supplemental prohibitions undermined what 
appeared to be otherwise unbiased colonial law. The British included 
blasphemy as an offence in order to reduce inter-religious tension in pre-
Partition India, and preserve a religiously pluralist society that included 
Hindus, Muslims, Jains, Sikhs, Parsis and Buddhists, whereas the 
‘Islamization’ of those laws instrumentalized them as tools to elevate and 
protect Muslim sensibilities alone.307 Now, these laws are used to incite 
discrimination and attacks against minorities, or to settle private disputes 
between individuals.308  
 This is not to say that the Indian Penal Code was preferable. Just as 
colonial administrators imposed the IPC throughout the world without 
local consultation, the post-independence imposition of such strict 
provisions bypassed an important and ongoing debate about the nature of 
Islam in Pakistan. As a result, the revised blasphemy laws are “not the 
product of a pluralistic and participatory democratic discourse”, leaving 
their “genesis and ethos… highly tainted.”309 In short, while the military 
dictatorship of Zia gave the modern Pakistani crime of blasphemy its 
current form, it employed colonial-era laws and anti-populist modes of 
implementing Islamization. Consequently, the resulting doctrine offers 
only a distorted image of cultural values that cannot be linked to 
widespread or uniform societal attitudes with any degree of confidence. 
Unfortunately, all of this flies beneath the radar where international courts 
                                                                                                                     
Abu Hanifa. A fortiori these laws must be more in harmony with Shariah. In 
some respects the statute law may not fulfill the standard of the law of the 
Qur'an and may also be repugnant to it but such instances are few.  
Muhammed Riaz v. Federal Government, PLD 1980 FSC at 16, quoted in Daniel P. 
Collins, Islamization of Pakistani Law: A Historical Perspective, 24 STAN. J. INT’L L. 
511, 572 (1988). 
306 Tahir Wasti writes that the introduction of Shari’a law in Pakistan led to “numerous 
contradictions”; that Islamization was motivated by “political expediency”; and that “the 
new law has encouraged criminal homicide and murder.” TAHIR WASTI, THE 
APPLICATION OF ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW IN PAKISTAN: SHARIA IN PRACTICE 283 (2009).  
See also Butti Sultan Butt Ali Al-Muhairi, The Islamisation of Laws in the UAE: The 
Case of the Penal Code, 11 ARAB L.Q. 350, 351 (1996) (noting that Islamization 
programmes create internal contradictions in Shari’a jurisprudence). 
307 Siddique & Hayat, supra note 297, 337–39.  
308 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2014 367–68  (2014). 
309 Siddique & Hayat, supra note 297, at 322.  
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use Pakistani law to bolster ICL’s depiction of itself as truly 
universal/cosmopolitan, or when Legal Pluralists call for legal 
managerialism without engaging the misalignment between criminal law 
doctrine and social, cultural, or political values throughout much of the 
modern world. 
 Instead of reflecting a transformational shift towards a 
fundamentally new legal system, the Islamized penal laws of Pakistan are 
distressingly familiar: “The rhetoric is all Islamic, but the reality is not 
very different from prior practice.”310 The new blasphemy laws used 
religious piety to mask antiquated forms of colonial governance;311 rather 
than representing a departure from colonialism, they arguably distorted 
and then entrenched a variety of unwelcome foreign imports.312 The 
                                                
310 Collins, supra note 305, at 581. Other aspects of Pakistani criminal law are similarly 
tainted. Rules of evidence in Pakistan are also a colonial artifact, originally imposed by 
the British in 1872 through the Indian Evidence Act (Act I of 1872), which remains in 
force in both Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) and India. Four entirely new Islamic 
codes of evidence were proposed in Pakistan in 1982, but ultimately rejected. Instead, in 
1984, the government essentially promulgated the same 1872 colonial law. See Kennedy, 
Islamization supra note 299, at 69 (stating that this “much heralded and contested Islamic 
Qanoon-i-Shahadat is in substance merely a reaffirmation of the 1872 Law of 
Evidence”). Even the introduction of hudood and t’azir crimes, for which corporal 
punishments may be delivered, made little change to law and procedure dating from 1860 
See Charles Kennedy, Islamization in Pakistan: Implementation of the Hudood 
Ordinances, 28 ASIAN SURV. 307, 315 – 316 (1988). 
311 See, e.g., Forte, supra note 294, at 49–50, 53–59 and 63–65 (describing how 
blasphemy laws have been used primarily to repress minorities); OMAR NOMAN, THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PAKISTAN: 1947-85, 143–44 (1988) (arguing that Zia was a 
dictator who claimed religious legitimacy by drawing parallels between himself and the 
Prophet Muhammad). It has been further argued that the Islamization process itself was 
not undertaken to add any doctrinal clarity but to consolidate Zia’s power. See AYESHA 
JALAL, THE STATE OF MARTIAL RULE: THE ORIGINS OF PAKISTAN’S POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF DEFENCE 324 (1990) (“Quite clearly, Zia’s state sponsored ‘Islamisation’ 
programme cannot be seen as anything more than a token effort, and a highly spurious 
one at that, to establish his own legitimacy without having to court mass popular 
support”); ASMA JAHANGIR & HINA JILANI, THE HUDOOD ORDINANCES: A DIVINE 
SANCTION? 21 (2003) (“It is widely accepted that President Ziaul Haq had used Islam as 
an instrument to consolidate his power. It was not a matter of genuine concern with 
him”); and, Kennedy, supra note 298, at 776 (1992) (noting that opposition claimed 
Sharia legislation was designed “to bolster the fading legitimacy of an unpopular 
regime”). 
312 Three particular cultural imports stand out: (1) British imperialism; (2) a Hindu-
derived caste system (which prioritizes private enforcement of the law; see Forte, supra 
note 294, at 56); and, (3) a particularly fundamentalist interpretation of Islam exported by 
wealthy Arab oil states. See KHALED M. ABOU EL FADL, THE GREAT THEFT – 
WRESTLING ISLAM FROM THE EXTREMISTS 79–81 (2005) (in discussing the influence of 
Arab Wahhabism in Pakistan, he argues that “Ultimately, Mawdudi and his followers, as 
well as the Wahhabis, shared in the belief in a dictatorial theocratic state that forces 
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nature of these refined colonial-era laws—internally inconsistent, and of 
contested provenance or value to the local population—undermine any 
claim to pluralism beyond the superficial. Absent wholesale reform, even 
the injection of a system as apparently distinct as Islamic law could not 
provide a way out from the impositions of colonial criminal law in 
Pakistan. Thus, in this and analogous situations, doctrinal pluralism 
appears to offer little guaranteed diversity that international criminal 
lawyers can bank on. 
 
B. Colonialism and Apartheid in the ICC Statute 
 
 On its face, a treaty that all states helped negotiate offers a potential 
cure for the one-sidedness of previous stages in the development of ICL. 
And yet, appearances often deceive—while the ICC Statute did mark a 
break from earlier methodologies, several aspects of the international 
crimes the Statute adopts are still disquieting for the legal pluralist 
prepared to look behind doctrine. Some of these culturally biased 
international crimes are highly conspicuous from the language in the ICC 
Statute itself, like the decision to define the war crime of pillage as 
“pillaging a town or place even when taken by assault,”313 which deferred 
to European histories of siege warfare over the widespread experience of 
plunder in the Global South.314 In this section, however, we review the 
                                                                                                                     
people to comply with their puritanical version of Islamic law”); IRA LAPIDUS, A 
HISTORY OF ISLAMIC SOCIETIES, 646 (2d ed. 2002) (“As Pakistan became increasingly 
dependent on oil-rich Arab states for loans, commerce, and employment of labor, Bhutto 
made further concessions to Islamic morality such as prohibiting alcohol and gambling”). 
313 ICC Statute, Arts 8(2)(b)(xvi) and 8(2)(b)(e)(v).  
314 The term ‘pillaging a town and place even when taken by assault’ derives verbatim 
from Art. 28 of the Hague Regulations of 1907. The reference to “even when taken by 
assault,” is reflective of a period of European history when it was lawful to pillage a town 
as retribution for local resistance to siege. See N. BENTWORTH, THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
PROPERTY IN WAR 8 (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1907. The Brussels Declaration of 
1864 elected to do away with even the exception by prohibiting pillage categorically, 
hence the language “even when taken by assault.” The Hague Regulations of 1907 then 
adopted this same language from the Brussels Declaration. That the ICC Statute chose to 
adopt it too speaks to a failure to consider the substance of war crimes or the realities of 
modern warfare outside a European mindset, which is particularly disappointing when 
Art. 47 of the same Hague Regulations also stipulates that ‘pillage is formally forbidden’. 
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Convention (IV) of 1907]. 
As things stand, the reference to town, place and assault within the definition is legally 
redundant, and historically passé, serving to only obfuscate the legal relevance of pillage 
to Third World contexts. For literatures on this phenomenon, see EDUARDO GALEANO, 
OPEN VEINS OF LATIN AMERICA: FIVE CENTURIES OF THE PILLAGE OF A CONTINENT (25 
Anv edition ed. 1997); PIERRE JALÉE, THE PILLAGE OF THE THIRD WORLD (1968). Here, 
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pivotal work of the International Law Commission (“ILC”) in the 
development of substantive ICL crimes for the ICC Statute, focusing 
particularly on the moment when a broader understanding of international 
crimes seemed possible, only to be discarded soon after in favor of the 
status quo ante. Though we might have hoped that the process of 
developing a global court would affirm the importance of value pluralism, 
we again point to greater historical continuity than rupture with all that 
came before. In the end, the work of the ILC on the identification and 
definition of international crimes represents a continuation of the sorts of 
historical pressures that so seriously upset the relationship between 
criminal law doctrine and ideas of social justice almost everywhere. 
Indeed, whereas the Islamization of blasphemy became a legal irritant in 
Pakistan, it may be reasonable to think that colonialism and apartheid 
were rejected during the ICC negotiations because they threatened to 
become irritants for Western powers. 
 In 1947, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution 
requesting the then nascent ILC to “(a) formulate the principles of 
international law recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and 
in the Judgment of the Tribunal; (b) prepare a draft code of offences 
against the peace and security of mankind, indicating clearly the place to 
be accorded to the principles mentioned in (a).”315 Over what many lament 
as several “tortuous” decades,316 the ILC’s work was divided and then 
divided again, with the effect of forestalling the arrival of the ICL 
announced at Leipzig, Nuremberg and Tokyo on the doorsteps of Great 
Powers. Apparently, it was a surprise to no one that despite encouraging 
U.N. General Assembly resolutions and the flurry of activity it generated, 
the ILC produced little output over even the medium-term. As Cherif 
Bassiouni has argued, the ILC process was chiefly born of the desire to 
avoid the charge of hypocrisy: “the powers that had established the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals only a few years earlier could not make a 
complete about-face [on ICL] in such a short period of time without losing 
face and credibility.” 317 
 As it happened, the work of the ILC was inhibited from within and 
obstructed from without. By 1953, the ILC had delivered the Nuremberg 
Principles and a Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of 
                                                                                                                     
and elsewhere, the drafters of the ICC Statute privileged (European) history over 
normative coherence and value pluralism. 
315 G.A. res 177 (II), 21 November 1947. 
316 Rosemary Rayfuse, The Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind: Eating Disorders at the International Law Commission, 8 CRIM. L.F. 43, 43 
(1997). 
317 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The History of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind, 27 ISR. L. REV. 247, 251 (1993). 
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Mankind , but as Bassiouni explains, their time “was not yet ripe.”318 In 
response, the United Nations established two further parallel processes 
that ground these initiatives to a virtual standstill for several decades. 
First, the United Nations appointed different Special Rapporteurs charged 
with creating a Draft Statute for the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court.319 This parallel process was more counterproductive than 
facilitative when the work on the Draft Code was ongoing, contentious 
and overlapping in key substantive areas.320 Second, both of these ill-
coordinated, under-resourced and politically duplicitous initiatives were 
placed on ice when a separate working group was established to define the 
international crime of aggression. This third process only reached a 
conclusion in 1974, by which time the delay sought was well achieved. 
 In 1981, a full seven years after the aggression impasse was resolved 
in the General Assembly, the U.N. General Assembly invited the ILC to 
reignite the process of creating a Draft Code of Offences Against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind. In a rare opening for voices from the 
Global South, the ILC appointed Senegalese diplomat and international 
lawyer Doudou Thiam as the Special Rapporteur to lead the new drafting 
process. Under his direction, the ILC went from very lean times to 
something of a “binge”;321 Thiam produced an enormous body of work on 
a wide range of topics, including ICL crimes. It is within this work that we 
see the sorts of partial political agendas that make doctrinal pluralism 
unsafe as a measure of diverse values and interests in the international 
community seep into treaty-making. In this instance, they present 
themselves within the prehistory to the ICC Statute rather than the 
criminal law governing association de malfaiteurs in the DRC, conspiracy 
in the Tokyo Tribunal, the Japanese law of complicity, the doctrine of JCE 
announced by ad hoc tribunals or the British/Pakistani crime of 
blasphemy. Rather than defining cross-cultural standards of the sort 
Mullins had called for at Leipzig, the norms developed at the ICC would 
not escape the power dynamics that infuse criminal law everywhere. 
 At first, Thiam’s advice very much reflected a plural perspective on 
ICL. In 1991, the first draft code he tabled included the familiar crimes 
derived from Leipzig then Nuremberg, like aggression, genocide, 
“systematic or mass violations of human rights” (read crimes against 
humanity), and “exceptionally serious war crimes.” At the same time, this 
                                                
318 Id. 
319 Id. at 250–251. 
320 Id. 
321 The term is attributed to an ILC member, but Rayfuse employs the eating disorder 
metaphor to describe the initial under-consumption then over-consumption of the ILC on 
this topic. See Rayfuse, supra note 316, at 47. 
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first draft also included a supplemental set of crimes that were more 
sensitive to the histories we have reviewed. These brand new, 
supplemental offences included “colonial domination and other forms of 
alien domination”; “apartheid”; and “recruitment, use, financing, and 
training of mercenaries.”322 Clearly, this revised set of crimes flowed from 
Thiam’s pluralist appreciation of global values. Rather than accept as a 
fait accompli that the only crimes to be considered international crimes 
were those that had been prosecuted over the past century, Thiam saw 
value in attempting to develop a more representative understanding of 
what constituted an international crime. Thus, unconvinced that the list of 
international crimes was closed post-Nuremberg, and unsatisfied by the 
tautologies of existing approaches that did not specify what made an 
international crime an international crime,323 Thiam and the ILC he lead 
set about developing a coherent theory of international criminalization. In 
particular, the ILC began considering the criteria that international crimes 
shared, instead of simply adopting the closed list of existing crimes that 
deferred to history over principle. Ultimately, the ILC proposed a standard 
of ‘extreme seriousness’ to define the international crimes it espoused.324 
While not crystal clear, this touchstone did act as a decent platform for 
criminalizing additional conduct without abandoning any crimes from the 
existing corpus. 
 Whether coherent or not, Thiam’s reengineering met with staunch 
resistance from the outset. Some states preferred the list approach that 
remained true to Nuremberg; still others tried to identify international 
crimes in relation to what they believed to be the appropriate penalty for 
                                                
322 From his very first report on the draft code, Thiam gestured at the emergence and 
importance of new crimes like colonial domination. Doudou Thiam (Special Rapporteur), 
First Report on the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 
¶ 44, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/364 (Mar. 18, 1983), reprinted in [1983] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n, 137 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1983/Add.1 (Part 1) [hereinafter Thiam, First 
Report] (drawing inspiration from the ILC’s work on state responsibility at the time, 
which had included similar notions). It was not until his third report, released in April 
1985, that Thiam explicitly listed colonial domination and other colonialism-type 
offenses within his code. See Doudou Thiam (Special Rapporteur), Third Report on the 
Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, ¶¶ 157–162, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/387 (Apr. 8, 1985, reprinted in [1985] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 63, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1985/Add.1 (Part 1) [hereinafter Thiam, Third Report]. Note that 
this list also included “Economic Aggression.” 
323 First Report, supra note 322, at ¶ 55 (“[M]erely listing criminal acts without relating 
them to a common principle does not appear to be satisfactory.”) 
324 Martin Ortega, The ILC Adopts the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind, 1 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UN L. 283, 296–97 (1997). 
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their commission.325 Despite these different resistant strategies, the ILC 
pushed forward with its progressive position, assessing every possible 
international crime that it could find using its threshold test. The sources it 
looked to included the Nuremberg Charter, the 1954 Draft Code, and 
every international agreement that might have suggested an international 
crime thereafter.326 Over time, ‘extreme seriousness’ was refined,327 but it 
still allowed the ILC to expand beyond the Nuremberg list and identify a 
total of twelve international crimes.328 On paper, the new draft was an 
attempt to reconcile criminal law doctrine with the diversity of social 
values throughout the world, in part by criminalizing the political  practice 
that had produced such a deep schism between them throughout global 
law. 
 This expansive approach to ICL crimes was quickly shut down in 
the face of objections from Western states. The states concerned – 
including the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Belgium and the 
Netherlands – offered only flimsy rationales for their political stances.329 
Apartheid and colonialism, for example, were not crimes but political 
novelties that had ceased to exist by that point, so there was no reason to 
criminalize them now.330 These Western states did not want to consider 
                                                
325 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Thirty-Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/40/10, ¶¶ 65–67; 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10 (1985), reprinted in [1985] 2 Y.B. Int’l 
L. Comm’n, 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1985/Add.1 (Part 2). 
326 Special Rapporteur on the draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind, Second Rep. on the draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind, ¶ 13, UN Doc. A/CN.4/377, (Feb. 1, 1984) (by Doudou Thiam), reprinted in 
[1984] II(1) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 89, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1984/Add.1 (Part 1). 
[hereinafter Second Report]. 
327 Id. ¶ 8; Thiam, Third Report, supra note 322, ¶ 49; Doudou Thiam (Special 
Rapporteur), Fifth Report on the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security 
of Mankind, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/404 (Mar. 17, 1987), reprinted in [1987] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 1, 2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1987/Add.1 (Part 1); Int’l Law Comm’n, supra 
note 325, ¶ 69.  
328 Including: aggression, the threat of aggression, interference, terrorism, violation of 
treaties concerning the maintenance of peace, violation of treaties prohibiting the 
deployment or testing of weapons, colonial domination, mercenarism, genocide, 
apartheid, inhuman acts, and breaches of serious obligations to preserve the human 
environment. See Doudou Thiam (Special Rapporteur), Fourth Report on the Draft Code 
of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/398 (Mar. 
11, 1986), reprinted in [1986] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1, 83–86, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1987/Add.1 (Part 1). 
329 Ortega, supra note 324, at 302 (stating that the non-Nuremberg crimes were 
abandoned “without convincing justification”). 
330 In its comment on apartheid, the United Kingdom, for example, claimed that the ILC 
needed to “fundamentally reconsider this article in the light of changed international 
circumstances.” The crime of colonialism was described as “of another era”. Comments 
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whether the prohibited conduct actually satisfied the seriousness criteria 
developed by the ILC – they simply wanted them deleted.331 To no avail, 
Thiam argued very reasonably that the present absence of certain conduct 
did not foreclose the possibility of future conduct, which would then 
demand criminal punishment.332 Yet his arguments fell on deaf ears; 
Thiam was sent back to trim the unwelcome additions from his overly 
ambitious draft. When he later reflected on the slimmer version Western 
states found more tolerable, Thiam regretted the “mutilated draft” that was 
forced upon him but acknowledged that without bowing to the (Western) 
political agenda, he risked “reducing the draft Code to a mere exercise in 
style, with no chance of becoming an applicable instrument.”333  
 This, perhaps more than any other moment, reveals one-sidedness at 
the ICC’s point of design, where political power operated to extinguish 
alternative agendas, interests and priorities rather than embracing an 
inclusive Statute that recognized the multiple ways in which serious 
international crimes could be inflicted. In particular, it excised criminal 
offenses European states had inflicted but not suffered.334 Analytically, the 
failure created a deep anomaly. The only radical consequence of 
describing colonialism as an international crime in the late 1990s is that it 
might implicate a number of states in ongoing crimes; but that would be a 
principled argument in favour of defining colonialism as a crime, rather 
than not defining it as such. Similarly, on what principle could states 
refuse to identify apartheid as an international crime? That these Western 
states had refused to ratify the Apartheid Convention in 1976 was 
surprising; that they refused to criminalize apartheid even after the fall of 
the South African regime is outright perplexing.335 Claiming that South 
African apartheid was singularly horrific hardly seems a position from 
                                                                                                                     
and observations received from Governments, UN Doc. A/CN.4/448 and Add. 1 (1 
March 1993), Y.B. INT’L L. COMMISSION, Vol. II, Pt. 1, at 101. 
331 Id. at 59ff.  
332 Special Rapporteur on the draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind, Thirteenth Report on the draft Code of Offences against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind, ¶ 13 – 15 UN Doc. A/CN.4/466 (Mar. 24, 1995) (by Doudou 
Thiam), reprinted in [1995] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 33, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1995/Add.1 (Part 1) [hereinafter Thirteenth Report]. 
333 Id. at ¶ 3. 
334 Aimé Césaire, among others, has suggested that Nazi crimes in WWII often amounted 
to colonial crimes, while also pointing out the discrepancy with the non-prosecution of 
prior Western colonial crimes. AIMÉ CÉSAIRE, DISCOURSE ON COLONIALISM 36 (Joan 
Pinkham trans., Monthly Review Press, 2000) (1955). This is not to say that only 
Western states were capable of colonial crimes.   
335 To this day, a number of major Western states – including the United States, Canada, 
the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, France and Italy – have yet to ratify the 
Apartheid Convention.  
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which one would want to argue that apartheid should not be criminalized; 
if anything, the opposite would be true.    
 Lacking the support of powerful Western states, Thiam was 
compelled to submit the ‘mutilated’ draft to the United Nations General 
Assembly. In 1996, this draft contained “institutionalized racial 
discrimination”, and while Thiam described it as “the crime of apartheid 
in a more general denomination”,336 it had little effect since preparations 
for the ICC Statute had already started based on an earlier ILC draft Code 
that did not include any apartheid-type crime. That apartheid eventually 
made it into the final ICC Statute was the result of lobbying by Mexico, 
Ireland, and a group of African states including South Africa.337 Yet the 
Rome Statute definition of apartheid as a crime is both ambiguous and 
contains an important dissonance with both the Apartheid Convention and 
the Draft Code Thiam had originally favored. Unlike its predecessors, the 
Rome Statute requires that apartheid take place in the context of a 
widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population.338 
According to Paul Eden, the scope of apartheid is even narrower than in 
those documents, being “limited to a residual category of acts not falling 
within the ambit of persecution”339 and thus excluding a range of conduct 
characteristic of apartheid.340 Similarly, Tim McCormack notes that the 
                                                
336 Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 48th Sess., May 6–July 26, 1996, p. 49, UN Doc. 
A/51/10; U.N. GAOR 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (1996). 
337 Mexico and Ireland first raised the issue during the Rome Conference. United Nations 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, Third Meeting of the Committee of the Whole, Rome, It., June 15-July 
17, 1998, Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR3 (Vol. II), at 152-53 (June 17, 1998).  This was later supplemented 
by an appeal from South Africa and a group of sub-Saharan states. Timothy L.H. 
McCormack, Crimes Against Humanity, in THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 179, 198–99 (Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe & 
Eric Donnelly eds., 2004). 
338 This is the so-called chapeau element in the definition of crimes against humanity. See 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7(1), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90, 37 I.L.M. 1002 (1998). 
339 Paul Eden, The Role of the Rome Statute in the Criminalization of Apartheid, 12 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 171, 185 (2014). But see Machteld Boot and Christopher K Hall, 
“Article 7” in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 263–66 (arguing for a broad 
interpretation of the definition, although one still restricted by the requirement of a 
widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population). 
340 See, e.g., International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime 
of Apartheid, GA Res 3068 (XXVIII), Nov. 30, 1973, 28 UN GAOR Supp. No. 30 at 75, 
1015 U.N.T.S. 243 (criminalizing, inter alia, “any legislative measures and other 
measures calculated to prevent a racial group or groups from participation in the political, 
social, economic and cultural life of the country”). 
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intent requirement for apartheid in the Rome Statute was included at the 
insistence of the United States, who was fearful that it would criminalize 
domestic white supremacist organizations.341 So, if Mahmood Mamdani is 
correct that in history “apartheid, usually considered unique to South 
Africa, is actually the generic form of the colonial state in Africa,”342 ICC 
negotiations dropped colonialism as a crime and defined apartheid to 
disprove his thesis. 
 When coupled with the continued absence of the crime of 
colonialism, Eden’s description of apartheid as ‘progressive 
development’343 suggests that the obstructionism of the 1990s was 
partially overcome at the Rome Conference. While this is obviously true 
in part in that the negotiations produced some criminal law doctrine where 
there was none before, it is difficult not to come away from this 
negotiation with the sense that the same dynamics that so colored criminal 
law throughout the world are also alive and well in the ICC too. It may 
even be fair to surmise that colonialism and a farther-reaching concept of 
apartheid were not enshrined as international law because they risked 
becoming “legal irritants” for Western states, replicating blasphemy in 
Pakistan in reverse. Whatever the case, the ILCs definitions of ICL crimes 
point to the privileging of Western preferences. Thus, this scenario 
signifies another instance where the forces that skewed the relationship 
between criminal law doctrine and local values in much of the world, also 
shaped criminal law at the international level. So to the extent that Legal 
Pluralism accepts the constellation of diverse global law that arose 
through this history, we worry that this approach cedes too much ground 






 In this Article, we have sought to contribute to a discourse on Global 
Legal Pluralism, using ICL as an illustration. The implications of the 
histories we revisit here are significant for both fields.  
 For Global Legal Pluralism, the foregoing substantiates de Sousa 
Santos’ argument, set out in the epigraph to this Article, that “there is 
                                                
341 McCormack, supra note 337, at 199–200. The intention requirement demands that the 
constituent criminal acts be committed for the purpose of maintaining an apartheid 
regime. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7(2)(h), supra note 338. 
This is not the case with white supremacist movements that do not control government. 
342 Mamdani, supra note 152, at 8. 
343 Eden, supra note 338, at 186. 
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nothing inherently good, progressive, or emancipatory about legal 
pluralism.”344 With de Sousa Santos, we insist on the word “inherently.” 
No doubt, criminal law doctrine frequently reflects diverse social and 
cultural values, which a cosmopolitan vision of global law will rightly 
venerate, but we have drawn on a range of different components of the 
criminal law, histories of colonialism by various European powers, and a 
variegated set of distortions in situ to demonstrate that the relation 
between doctrine and social value is far from invariable. Consequently, 
once legal pluralism moves away from its purely descriptive origins to 
make any normative claim about how to respond to the diversity of legal 
standards available internationally, it risks honoring laws that are born of 
force, that may not enjoy any meaningful degree of popular support, or 
that symbolize a painful history of subjugation to be overcome. 
Universalism may therefore prove a superior guarantor of (value) 
pluralism than respect for existing doctrinal arrangements in certain 
circumstances, although this will be case-sensitive since as the ICC 
experience suggests, this too may not escape the dynamics we point to. 
Overall, ICL is but a metaphor for a dynamic that will undoubtedly 
permeate other areas of law. On a certain level, then, the histories we point 
to are a challenge to the new prescriptive style of legal pluralism writ 
large. 
 For ICL, the foregoing suggests that the field is biased in legal 
methodology and substance, not just in application. By declining to 
engage with this reality, legal pluralism risks tacitly condoning this 
normative partiality, thereby making too few demands on a global system 
of criminal law (national and international law in dynamic interaction) that 
remains tainted in the various ways we point to: criminal doctrine is 
sometimes part of the problem ICL exists to counteract, may be 
transplanted from afar in ways that prove “unreceptive” in the recipient 
society, and can operate as a legal irritant that contaminates adjacent 
concepts. Thus even though legal pluralists might argue that we have 
unfairly targeted a particularly shallow vision of pluralism in ICL, our 
underlying concern remains that even a more rigorous legal pluralism is 
still unable to: (a) excise these deeply problematic legacies from the law it 
embraces; (b) determine the proper role for norms born of these ugly 
histories in a plural account of ICL; (c) adjudicate between legal and non-
legal norms the field should draw on; or (d) defend a prescriptive version 
of legal pluralism in absolute terms. Consequently, once laid bare, the 
histories we have unveiled open up space for the idea of pluralism by 
unification; it is at least conceivable that in certain areas, a universal 
concept of ICL might better guarantee (value) pluralism than managing 
                                                
344 Supra note 1. 
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the set of laws governing criminal law at international or national levels 
presently.345 Conceivably, George Fletcher may be right that “resolutions 
on the surface of the law should not obscure the unity that underlies 
apparently diverse legal cultures.”346 As these histories show, however, 
one would have to tread carefully in assessing whether any given norm 
meets this mark to avoid power again masquerading as unity.  
 At the level of enforcement, these stories also reveal that the 
institutions capable of enforcing ICL norms should explore ways of at 
least partially correcting for these flaws, provided recipient societies see 
this as a desirable course of action. In fact, doing so may amount to a 
collective responsibility; a concept we scholars of ICL often impose on 
others. In her remarkable study of the effects of the Tokyo Trials in Japan, 
Madoka Futamura interviewed a Japanese man in his late thirties, who 
pointed out that he still felt a sense of responsibility for Japanese wartime 
atrocities even though he was not yet born when they transpired: “I as a 
Japanese person shoulder an historical responsibility… I do not want to 
shoulder such a thing. But I cannot help it because I cannot stop being 
Japanese, and I should shoulder it. But it is unpleasant. What have our 
ancestors done!”347 The Europeans who populate courts and tribunals 
(international and domestic) shoulder a different burden for colonialism, 
but it should register with a similar intensity. Although one cannot be too 
politically naïve about the possibility of counteracting this past,348 the 
challenge lies in asserting, jointly, that our futures will not be like our 
pasts. 
                                                
345 As we mention earlier, one of us has suggested that forms of participation might be 
one site where this universalism is both achievable and appropriate. See James G. 
Stewart, Ten Reasons for Adopting a Universal Concept of Participation in Atrocity,  in 
PLURALISM IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (Elies Van Sliedregt & Vasiliev eds., 
2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2343392. 
346 GEORGE FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 5 (1998). 
347 MADOKA FUTAMURA, WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: THE 
TOKYO TRIAL AND THE NUREMBURG LEGACY 136 (2007). 
348 For two excellent warnings against the ability of ICL to extricate it from the power 
dynamic that created it, which come at the question from very different vantage points, 
see SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONISING INTERNATIONAL LAW: DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC 
GROWTH, AND THE POLITICS OF UNIVERSALITY (2011) (discussing failed Third World 
attempts at redirecting international law in various other domains); DAVID BOSCO, 
ROUGH JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN A WORLD OF POWER POLITICS 
(2013) (discussing the politics of the ICC with respect to major powers). 
